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IETF RFC 9662
Last modified on Monday, October 7th, 2024
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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) C. Lonvick
Request for Comments: 9662
Updates: 5425, 6012 S. Turner
Category: Standards Track sn3rd
ISSN: 2070-1721 J. Salowey
Venafi
October 2024
Updates to the Cipher Suites in Secure Syslog
 Abstract
RFCs 5425 and 6012 describe using TLS and DTLS to securely transport
syslog messages. This document updates the cipher suites required by
RFC 5245 (TLS Transport Mapping for Syslog) and RFC 6012 (DTLS
Transport Mapping for Syslog). It also updates the protocol
recommended by RFC 6012 for secure datagram transport.
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 9662.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the
Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described
in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Terminology
3. Support for Updating
4. Updates to RFC 5425
5. Updates to RFC 6012
6. Early Data
7. IANA Considerations
8. Security Considerations
9. References
9.1. Normative References
9.2. Informative References
Acknowledgments
Authors' Addresses
1. Introduction
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Transport Mapping for Syslog"
[RFC 5425] and "Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Transport
Mapping for Syslog" [RFC 6012] describe using TLS and DTLS to securely
transport syslog messages. Both of these specifications require the
use of RSA-based certificates and the use of TLS and DTLS versions
that are not the most recent.
Section 4.2 of [RFC 5425] requires that implementations MUST support
TLS 1.2 [RFC 5246] and are REQUIRED to support the mandatory-to-
implement cipher suite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA.
Section 5.2 of [RFC 6012] requires that implementations "MUST" support
DTLS 1.0 [RFC 4347] and are also "REQUIRED" to support the mandatory-
to-implement cipher suite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA.
The community is moving away from cipher suites that do not offer
forward secrecy and towards more robust suites.
The DTLS 1.0 transport [RFC 4347] has been deprecated by RFC 8996
[BCP195], and the community is moving to DTLS 1.2 [RFC 6347] and DTLS
1.3 [RFC 9147].
This document updates [RFC 5425] and [RFC 6012] to prefer the use of
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 over the use of
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA.
This document also updates [RFC 6012] by recommending a mandatory-to-
implement secure datagram transport.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC 2119] [RFC 8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. Support for Updating
[RFC8447bis] generally reminds us that cryptographic algorithms and
parameters will be broken or weakened over time. Blindly
implementing the cryptographic algorithms listed in any specification
is not advised. Implementers and users need to check that the
cryptographic algorithms specified continue to provide the expected
level of security.
As the Syslog Working Group determined, syslog clients and servers
MUST use certificates as defined in [RFC 5280]. Since both [RFC 5425]
and [RFC 6012] REQUIRED the use of TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, it is
very likely that RSA certificates have been implemented in devices
adhering to those specifications. RFC 9325 [BCP195] notes that ECDHE
cipher suites exist for both RSA and ECDSA certificates, so moving to
an ECDHE cipher suite will not require replacing or moving away from
any currently installed RSA-based certificates.
[DEPRECATE-KEX] documents that the cipher suite
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, along with some other cipher suites,
may require mitigation techniques to achieve expected security, which
may be difficult to effectively implement. Along those lines, RFC
9325 [BCP195] notes that TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA does not
provide forward secrecy, a feature that is highly desirable in
securing event messages. That document also goes on to recommend
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as a cipher suite that does
provide forward secrecy.
As such, the community is moving away from algorithms that do not
provide forward secrecy. For example, the International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) has selected more robust suites
such as TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, which is also listed
as a currently RECOMMENDED algorithm in [RFC8447bis] for their
deployments of secure syslog.
Additionally, RFC 8996 [BCP195] deprecates the use of DTLS 1.0
[RFC 4347], which is the mandatory-to-implement transport protocol per
[RFC 6012]. Therefore, that transport protocol must be updated.
Finally, RFC 9325 [BCP195] provides guidance on the support of TLS
1.3 [RFC 8446] and DTLS 1.3 [RFC 9147].
Therefore, to maintain interoperability across implementations, the
mandatory-to-implement cipher suites listed in [RFC 5425] and
[RFC 6012] should be updated so that implementations of secure syslog
will still interoperate and provide an acceptable and expected level
of security.
However, since there are many implementations of syslog using the
cipher suites mandated by [RFC 6012], a sudden change is not
desirable. To accommodate a migration path,
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA or TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
may be used, but it is REQUIRED that
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 be preferred.
4. Updates to RFC 5425
The mandatory-to-implement cipher suites are REQUIRED to be
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 and
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA.
Implementations of [RFC 5425] SHOULD offer
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 but MAY offer
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA.
Implementations of [RFC 5425] MUST continue to use TLS 1.2 [RFC 5246]
as the mandatory-to-implement transport protocol.
As per RFC 9325 [BCP195], implementations of [RFC 5425] SHOULD support
TLS 1.3 [RFC 8446] and, if implemented, MUST prefer to negotiate TLS
1.3 over earlier versions of TLS.
5. Updates to RFC 6012
The mandatory-to-implement cipher suites are REQUIRED to be
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 and
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA.
Implementations of [RFC 6012] SHOULD offer
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 but MAY offer
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA.
As specified in RFCs 8996 and 9325 [BCP195], implementations of
[RFC 6012] MUST NOT use DTLS 1.0 [RFC 4347]. Implementations MUST use
DTLS 1.2 [RFC 6347].
DTLS 1.2 [RFC 6347] implementations SHOULD support and prefer the
mandatory-to-implement cipher suite
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256.
As per RFC 9325 [BCP195], implementations of [RFC 6012] SHOULD support
DTLS 1.3 [RFC 9147] and, if implemented, MUST prefer to negotiate DTLS
version 1.3 over earlier versions of DTLS.
6. Early Data
Early data (aka 0-RTT data) is a mechanism defined in TLS 1.3
[RFC 8446] that allows a client to send data ("early data") as part of
the first flight of messages to a server. Early data is permitted by
TLS 1.3 when the client and server share a PSK, either obtained
externally or via a previous handshake. The client uses the PSK to
authenticate the server and to encrypt the early data.
As noted in Section 2.3 of [RFC8446bis], the security properties for
early data are weaker than those for subsequent TLS-protected data.
In particular, early data is not forward secret, and there are no
protections against the replay of early data between connections.
Appendix E.5 of [RFC8446bis] requires that applications not use early
data without a profile that defines its use. Because syslog does not
support replay protection (see Section 8.4 of [RFC 5424]) and most
implementations establish a long-lived connection, this document
specifies that implementations MUST NOT use early data.
7. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
8. Security Considerations
RFCs 8996 and 9325 [BCP195] deprecate an insecure DTLS transport
protocol from [RFC 6012] and deprecate insecure cipher suites from
[RFC 5425] and [RFC 6012]. However, the installed base of syslog
implementations is not easily updated to immediately adhere to those
changes.
This document updates the mandatory-to-implement cipher suites to
allow for a migration from TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA to
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 without deprecating the former.
Implementations should prefer to use
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256.
If a device currently only has TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, an
administrator of the network should evaluate the conditions and
determine if TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA should be allowed so that
syslog messages may continue to be delivered until the device is
updated to have TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[BCP195] Best Current Practice 195,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp195>.
At the time of writing, this BCP comprises the following:
Moriarty, K. and S. Farrell, "Deprecating TLS 1.0 and TLS
1.1", BCP 195, RFC 8996, DOI 10.17487/RFC 8996, March 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 8996>.
Sheffer, Y., Saint-Andre, P., and T. Fossati,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 9325, DOI 10.17487/RFC 9325, November
2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 9325>.
[RFC 2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 2119>.
[RFC 4347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security", RFC 4347, DOI 10.17487/RFC 4347, April 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 4347>.
[RFC 5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 5246, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 5246>.
[RFC 5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC 5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 5280>.
[RFC 5424] Gerhards, R., "The Syslog Protocol", RFC 5424,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 5424, March 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 5424>.
[RFC 5425] Miao, F., Ed., Ma, Y., Ed., and J. Salowey, Ed.,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Transport Mapping for
Syslog", RFC 5425, DOI 10.17487/RFC 5425, March 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 5425>.
[RFC 6012] Salowey, J., Petch, T., Gerhards, R., and H. Feng,
"Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Transport
Mapping for Syslog", RFC 6012, DOI 10.17487/RFC 6012,
October 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 6012>.
[RFC 6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC 6347,
January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 6347>.
[RFC 8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC 8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 8174>.
[RFC 8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC 8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 8446>.
[RFC 9147] Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version
1.3", RFC 9147, DOI 10.17487/RFC 9147, April 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 9147>.
9.2. Informative References
[DEPRECATE-KEX]
Bartle, C. and N. Aviram, "Deprecating Obsolete Key
Exchange Methods in TLS 1.2", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-ietf-tls-deprecate-obsolete-kex-05, 3
September 2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-ietf-tls-deprecate-obsolete-kex-05>.
[RFC8446bis]
Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-tls-rfc8446bis-11, 14 September 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-
rfc8446bis-11>.
[RFC8447bis]
Salowey, J. A. and S. Turner, "IANA Registry Updates for
TLS and DTLS", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-tls-rfc8447bis-09, 30 April 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-
rfc8447bis-09>.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Arijit Kumar Bose, Steffen Fries, and
the members of IEC TC57 WG15 for their review, comments, and
suggestions. The authors would also like to thank Tom Petch, Juergen
Schoenwaelder, Hannes Tschofenig, Viktor Dukhovni, and the IESG
members for their comments and constructive feedback.
Authors' Addresses
Chris Lonvick
Email: lonvick.ietf@gmail.com
Sean Turner
sn3rd
Email: sean@sn3rd.com
Joe Salowey
Venafi
Email: joe@salowey.net
RFC TOTAL SIZE: 15372 bytes
PUBLICATION DATE: Monday, October 7th, 2024
LEGAL RIGHTS: The IETF Trust (see BCP 78)
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