Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) K. Moriarty
Request for Comments: 8996 CIS
BCP: 195 S. Farrell
Obsoletes: 5469, 7507 Trinity College Dublin
Updates: 3261, 3329, 3436, 3470, 3501, 3552, March 2021
3568, 3656, 3749, 3767, 3856, 3871,
3887, 3903, 3943, 3983, 4097, 4111,
4162, 4168, 4217, 4235, 4261, 4279,
4497, 4513, 4531, 4540, 4582, 4616,
4642, 4680, 4681, 4712, 4732, 4743,
4744, 4785, 4791, 4823, 4851, 4964,
4975, 4976, 4992, 5018, 5019, 5023,
5024, 5049, 5054, 5091, 5158, 5216,
5238, 5263, 5281, 5364, 5415, 5422,
5456, 5734, 5878, 5953, 6012, 6042,
6083, 6084, 6176, 6347, 6353, 6367,
6460, 6614, 6739, 6749, 6750, 7030,
7465, 7525, 7562, 7568, 8261, 8422
Category: Best Current Practice 
ISSN: 2070-1721
Deprecating TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1
Abstract
This document formally deprecates Transport Layer Security (TLS)
versions 1.0 (RFC 2246) and 1.1 (RFC 4346). Accordingly, those
documents have been moved to Historic status. These versions lack
support for current and recommended cryptographic algorithms and
mechanisms, and various government and industry profiles of
applications using TLS now mandate avoiding these old TLS versions.
TLS version 1.2 became the recommended version for IETF protocols in
2008 (subsequently being obsoleted by TLS version 1.3 in 2018),
providing sufficient time to transition away from older versions.
Removing support for older versions from implementations reduces the
attack surface, reduces opportunity for misconfiguration, and
streamlines library and product maintenance.
This document also deprecates Datagram TLS (DTLS) version 1.0 (RFC
4347) but not DTLS version 1.2, and there is no DTLS version 1.1.
This document updates many RFCs that normatively refer to TLS version
1.0 or TLS version 1.1, as described herein. This document also
updates the best practices for TLS usage in RFC 7525; hence, it is
part of BCP 195.
Status of This Memo
This memo documents an Internet Best Current Practice.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
BCPs is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 8996.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
1.1. RFCs Updated
1.2. Terminology
2. Support for Deprecation
3. SHA-1 Usage Problematic in TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1
4. Do Not Use TLS 1.0
5. Do Not Use TLS 1.1
6. Updates to RFC 7525
7. Operational Considerations
8. Security Considerations
9. IANA Considerations
10. References
10.1. Normative References
10.2. Informative References
Acknowledgements
Authors' Addresses
1. Introduction
Transport Layer Security (TLS) versions 1.0 [RFC 2246] and 1.1
[RFC 4346] were superseded by TLS 1.2 [RFC 5246] in 2008, which has now
itself been superseded by TLS 1.3 [RFC 8446]. Datagram Transport
Layer Security (DTLS) version 1.0 [RFC 4347] was superseded by DTLS
1.2 [RFC 6347] in 2012. Therefore, it is timely to further deprecate
TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1, and DTLS 1.0. Accordingly, the aforementioned
documents have been moved to Historic status.
Technical reasons for deprecating these versions include:
* They require the implementation of older cipher suites that are no
longer desirable for cryptographic reasons, e.g., TLS 1.0 makes
TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA mandatory to implement.
* There is a lack of support for current recommended cipher suites,
especially authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD)
ciphers, which were not supported prior to TLS 1.2. Note that
registry entries for no-longer-desirable ciphersuites remain in
the registries, but many TLS registries were updated by [RFC 8447],
which indicates that such entries are not recommended by the IETF.
* The integrity of the handshake depends on SHA-1 hash.
* The authentication of the peers depends on SHA-1 signatures.
* Support for four TLS protocol versions increases the likelihood of
misconfiguration.
* At least one widely used library has plans to drop TLS 1.1 and TLS
1.0 support in upcoming releases; products using such libraries
would need to use older versions of the libraries to support TLS
1.0 and TLS 1.1, which is clearly undesirable.
Deprecation of these versions is intended to assist developers as
additional justification to no longer support older (D)TLS versions
and to migrate to a minimum of (D)TLS 1.2. Deprecation also assists
product teams with phasing out support for the older versions, to
reduce the attack surface and the scope of maintenance for protocols
in their offerings.
1.1. RFCs Updated
This document updates the following RFCs that normatively reference
TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1, or DTLS 1.0. The update is to obsolete usage of
these older versions. Fallback to these versions is prohibited
through this update. Specific references to mandatory minimum
protocol versions of TLS 1.0 or TLS 1.1 are replaced by TLS 1.2, and
references to minimum protocol version DTLS 1.0 are replaced by DTLS
1.2. Statements that "TLS 1.0 is the most widely deployed version
and will provide the broadest interoperability" are removed without
replacement.
[RFC 3261] [RFC 3329] [RFC 3436] [RFC 3470] [RFC 3501] [RFC 3552] [RFC 3568]
[RFC 3656] [RFC 3749] [RFC 3767] [RFC 3856] [RFC 3871] [RFC 3887] [RFC 3903]
[RFC 3943] [RFC 3983] [RFC 4097] [RFC 4111] [RFC 4162] [RFC 4168] [RFC 4217]
[RFC 4235] [RFC 4261] [RFC 4279] [RFC 4497] [RFC 4513] [RFC 4531] [RFC 4540]
[RFC 4582] [RFC 4616] [RFC 4642] [RFC 4680] [RFC 4681] [RFC 4712] [RFC 4732]
[RFC 4785] [RFC 4791] [RFC 4823] [RFC 4851] [RFC 4964] [RFC 4975] [RFC 4976]
[RFC 4992] [RFC 5018] [RFC 5019] [RFC 5023] [RFC 5024] [RFC 5049] [RFC 5054]
[RFC 5091] [RFC 5158] [RFC 5216] [RFC 5238] [RFC 5263] [RFC 5281] [RFC 5364]
[RFC 5415] [RFC 5422] [RFC 5456] [RFC 5734] [RFC 5878] [RFC 6012] [RFC 6042]
[RFC 6083] [RFC 6084] [RFC 6176] [RFC 6353] [RFC 6367] [RFC 6739] [RFC 6749]
[RFC 6750] [RFC 7030] [RFC 7465] [RFC 7525] [RFC 7562] [RFC 7568] [RFC 8261]
[RFC 8422]
The status of [RFC 7562], [RFC 6042], [RFC 5456], [RFC 5024], [RFC 4540],
and [RFC 3656] will be updated with permission of the Independent
Submissions Editor.
In addition, these RFCs normatively refer to TLS 1.0 or TLS 1.1 and
have already been obsoleted; they are still listed here and marked as
updated by this document in order to reiterate that any usage of the
obsolete protocol should use modern TLS: [RFC 3316], [RFC 3489],
[RFC 3546], [RFC 3588], [RFC 3734], [RFC 3920], [RFC 4132], [RFC 4244],
[RFC 4347], [RFC 4366], [RFC 4492], [RFC 4507], [RFC 4572], [RFC 4582],
[RFC 4934], [RFC 5077], [RFC 5081], [RFC 5101], and [RFC 5953].
Note that [RFC 4642] has already been updated by [RFC 8143], which
makes an overlapping, but not quite identical, update as this
document.
[RFC 6614] has a requirement for TLS 1.1 or later, although it only
makes an informative reference to [RFC 4346]. This requirement is
updated to be for TLS 1.2 or later.
[RFC 6460], [RFC 4744], and [RFC 4743] are already Historic; they are
still listed here and marked as updated by this document in order to
reiterate that any usage of the obsolete protocol should use modern
TLS.
This document updates DTLS [RFC 6347]. [RFC 6347] had allowed for
negotiating the use of DTLS 1.0, which is now forbidden.
The DES and International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA) cipher
suites specified in [RFC 5469] were specifically removed from TLS 1.2
by [RFC 5246]; since the only versions of TLS for which their usage is
defined are now Historic, [RFC 5469] has been moved to Historic as
well.
The version-fallback Signaling Cipher Suite Value specified in
[RFC 7507] was defined to detect when a given client and server
negotiate a lower version of (D)TLS than their highest shared
version. TLS 1.3 ([RFC 8446]) incorporates a different mechanism that
achieves this purpose, via sentinel values in the ServerHello.Random
field. With (D)TLS versions prior to 1.2 fully deprecated, the only
way for (D)TLS implementations to negotiate a lower version than
their highest shared version would be to negotiate (D)TLS 1.2 while
supporting (D)TLS 1.3; supporting (D)TLS 1.3 implies support for the
ServerHello.Random mechanism. Accordingly, the functionality from
[RFC 7507] has been superseded, and this document marks it as
Obsolete.
1.2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC 2119] [RFC 8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
2. Support for Deprecation
Specific details on attacks against TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1, as well as
their mitigations, are provided in [NIST800-52r2], [RFC 7457], and
other RFCs referenced therein. Although mitigations for the current
known vulnerabilities have been developed, any future issues
discovered in old protocol versions might not be mitigated in older
library versions when newer library versions do not support those old
protocols.
For example, NIST has provided the following rationale, copied with
permission from Section 1.1, "History of TLS", of [NIST800-52r2]:
| TLS 1.1, specified in RFC 4346 [24], was developed to address
| weaknesses discovered in TLS 1.0, primarily in the areas of
| initialization vector selection and padding error processing.
| Initialization vectors were made explicit to prevent a certain
| class of attacks on the Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode of
| operation used by TLS. The handling of padding errors was altered
| to treat a padding error as a bad message authentication code
| rather than a decryption failure. In addition, the TLS 1.1 RFC
| acknowledges attacks on CBC mode that rely on the time to compute
| the message authentication code (MAC). The TLS 1.1 specification
| states that to defend against such attacks, an implementation must
| process records in the same manner regardless of whether padding
| errors exist. Further implementation considerations for CBC modes
| (which were not included in RFC 4346 [24]) are discussed in
| Section 3.3.2.
|
| TLS 1.2, specified in RFC 5246 [25], made several cryptographic
| enhancements, particularly in the area of hash functions, with the
| ability to use or specify the SHA-2 family of algorithms for hash,
| MAC, and Pseudorandom Function (PRF) computations. TLS 1.2 also
| adds authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) cipher
| suites.
|
| TLS 1.3, specified in RFC 8446 [57], represents a significant
| change to TLS that aims to address threats that have arisen over
| the years. Among the changes are a new handshake protocol, a new
| key derivation process that uses the HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand
| Key Derivation Function (HKDF) [37], and the removal of cipher
| suites that use RSA key transport or static Diffie-Hellman ( DH)
| [sic] key exchanges, the CBC mode of operation, or SHA-1. Many
| extensions defined for use with TLS 1.2 and previous versions
| cannot be used with TLS 1.3.
3. SHA-1 Usage Problematic in TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1
The integrity of both TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 depends on a running SHA-1
hash of the exchanged messages. This makes it possible to perform a
downgrade attack on the handshake by an attacker able to perform 2^77
operations, well below the acceptable modern security margin.
Similarly, the authentication of the handshake depends on signatures
made using a SHA-1 hash or a concatenation of MD5 and SHA-1 hashes
that is not appreciably stronger than a SHA-1 hash, allowing the
attacker to impersonate a server when it is able to break the
severely weakened SHA-1 hash.
Neither TLS 1.0 nor TLS 1.1 allows the peers to select a stronger
hash for signatures in the ServerKeyExchange or CertificateVerify
messages, making the only upgrade path the use of a newer protocol
version.
See [Bhargavan2016] for additional details.
4. Do Not Use TLS 1.0
TLS 1.0 MUST NOT be used. Negotiation of TLS 1.0 from any version of
TLS MUST NOT be permitted.
Any other version of TLS is more secure than TLS 1.0. While TLS 1.0
can be configured to prevent some types of interception, using the
highest version available is preferred.
Pragmatically, clients MUST NOT send a ClientHello with
ClientHello.client_version set to {03,01}. Similarly, servers MUST
NOT send a ServerHello with ServerHello.server_version set to
{03,01}. Any party receiving a Hello message with the protocol
version set to {03,01} MUST respond with a "protocol_version" alert
message and close the connection.
Historically, TLS specifications were not clear on what the record
layer version number (TLSPlaintext.version) could contain when
sending a ClientHello message. Appendix E of [RFC 5246] notes that
TLSPlaintext.version could be selected to maximize interoperability,
though no definitive value is identified as ideal. That guidance is
still applicable; therefore, TLS servers MUST accept any value
{03,XX} (including {03,00}) as the record layer version number for
ClientHello, but they MUST NOT negotiate TLS 1.0.
5. Do Not Use TLS 1.1
TLS 1.1 MUST NOT be used. Negotiation of TLS 1.1 from any version of
TLS MUST NOT be permitted.
Pragmatically, clients MUST NOT send a ClientHello with
ClientHello.client_version set to {03,02}. Similarly, servers MUST
NOT send a ServerHello with ServerHello.server_version set to
{03,02}. Any party receiving a Hello message with the protocol
version set to {03,02} MUST respond with a "protocol_version" alert
message and close the connection.
Any newer version of TLS is more secure than TLS 1.1. While TLS 1.1
can be configured to prevent some types of interception, using the
highest version available is preferred. Support for TLS 1.1 is
dwindling in libraries and will impact security going forward if
mitigations for attacks cannot be easily addressed and supported in
older libraries.
Historically, TLS specifications were not clear on what the record
layer version number (TLSPlaintext.version) could contain when
sending a ClientHello message. Appendix E of [RFC 5246] notes that
TLSPlaintext.version could be selected to maximize interoperability,
though no definitive value is identified as ideal. That guidance is
still applicable; therefore, TLS servers MUST accept any value
{03,XX} (including {03,00}) as the record layer version number for
ClientHello, but they MUST NOT negotiate TLS 1.1.
6. Updates to RFC 7525
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)" [RFC 7525] is BCP 195, which
is the most recent Best Current Practice for implementing TLS and was
based on TLS 1.2. At the time of publication, TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1
had not yet been deprecated. As such, BCP 195 is called out
specifically to update text implementing the deprecation
recommendations of this document.
This document updates Section 3.1.1 of [RFC 7525] by changing SHOULD
NOT to MUST NOT as follows:
* Implementations MUST NOT negotiate TLS version 1.0 [RFC 2246].
Rationale: TLS 1.0 (published in 1999) does not support many
modern, strong cipher suites. In addition, TLS 1.0 lacks a per-
record Initialization Vector (IV) for CBC-based cipher suites and
does not warn against common padding errors.
* Implementations MUST NOT negotiate TLS version 1.1 [RFC 4346].
Rationale: TLS 1.1 (published in 2006) is a security improvement
over TLS 1.0 but still does not support certain stronger cipher
suites.
This document updates Section 3.1.2 of [RFC 7525] by changing SHOULD
NOT to MUST NOT and adding a reference to RFC 6347 as follows:
* Implementations MUST NOT negotiate DTLS version 1.0 [RFC 4347]
[RFC 6347].
Version 1.0 of DTLS correlates to version 1.1 of TLS (see above).
7. Operational Considerations
This document is part of BCP 195 and, as such, reflects the
understanding of the IETF (at the time of this document's
publication) as to the best practices for TLS and DTLS usage.
Though TLS 1.1 has been obsolete since the publication of [RFC 5246]
in 2008, and DTLS 1.0 has been obsolete since the publication of
[RFC 6347] in 2012, there may remain some systems in operation that do
not support (D)TLS 1.2 or higher. Adopting the practices recommended
by this document for any systems that need to communicate with the
aforementioned class of systems will cause failure to interoperate.
However, disregarding the recommendations of this document in order
to continue to interoperate with the aforementioned class of systems
incurs some amount of risk. The nature of the risks incurred by
operating in contravention to the recommendations of this document
are discussed in Sections 2 and 3, and knowledge of those risks
should be used along with any potential mitigating factors and the
risks inherent to updating the systems in question when deciding how
quickly to adopt the recommendations specified in this document.
8. Security Considerations
This document deprecates two older TLS protocol versions and one
older DTLS protocol version for security reasons already described.
The attack surface is reduced when there are a smaller number of
supported protocols and fallback options are removed.
9. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[RFC 2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 2119>.
[RFC 2246] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",
RFC 2246, DOI 10.17487/RFC 2246, January 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 2246>.
[RFC 3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 3261, June 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 3261>.
[RFC 3329] Arkko, J., Torvinen, V., Camarillo, G., Niemi, A., and T.
Haukka, "Security Mechanism Agreement for the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 3329,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 3329, January 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 3329>.
[RFC 3436] Jungmaier, A., Rescorla, E., and M. Tuexen, "Transport
Layer Security over Stream Control Transmission Protocol",
RFC 3436, DOI 10.17487/RFC 3436, December 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 3436>.
[RFC 3470] Hollenbeck, S., Rose, M., and L. Masinter, "Guidelines for
the Use of Extensible Markup Language (XML) within IETF
Protocols", BCP 70, RFC 3470, DOI 10.17487/RFC 3470,
January 2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 3470>.
[RFC 3501] Crispin, M., "INTERNET MESSAGE ACCESS PROTOCOL - VERSION
4rev1", RFC 3501, DOI 10.17487/RFC 3501, March 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 3501>.
[RFC 3552] Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 3552, July 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 3552>.
[RFC 3568] Barbir, A., Cain, B., Nair, R., and O. Spatscheck, "Known
Content Network (CN) Request-Routing Mechanisms",
RFC 3568, DOI 10.17487/RFC 3568, July 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 3568>.
[RFC 3656] Siemborski, R., "The Mailbox Update (MUPDATE) Distributed
Mailbox Database Protocol", RFC 3656,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 3656, December 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 3656>.
[RFC 3749] Hollenbeck, S., "Transport Layer Security Protocol
Compression Methods", RFC 3749, DOI 10.17487/RFC 3749, May
2004, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 3749>.
[RFC 3767] Farrell, S., Ed., "Securely Available Credentials
Protocol", RFC 3767, DOI 10.17487/RFC 3767, June 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 3767>.
[RFC 3856] Rosenberg, J., "A Presence Event Package for the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 3856,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 3856, August 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 3856>.
[RFC 3871] Jones, G., Ed., "Operational Security Requirements for
Large Internet Service Provider (ISP) IP Network
Infrastructure", RFC 3871, DOI 10.17487/RFC 3871, September
2004, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 3871>.
[RFC 3887] Hansen, T., "Message Tracking Query Protocol", RFC 3887,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 3887, September 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 3887>.
[RFC 3903] Niemi, A., Ed., "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
Extension for Event State Publication", RFC 3903,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 3903, October 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 3903>.
[RFC 3943] Friend, R., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Compression Using Lempel-Ziv-Stac (LZS)", RFC 3943,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 3943, November 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 3943>.
[RFC 3983] Newton, A. and M. Sanz, "Using the Internet Registry
Information Service (IRIS) over the Blocks Extensible
Exchange Protocol (BEEP)", RFC 3983, DOI 10.17487/RFC 3983,
January 2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 3983>.
[RFC 4097] Barnes, M., Ed., "Middlebox Communications (MIDCOM)
Protocol Evaluation", RFC 4097, DOI 10.17487/RFC 4097, June
2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 4097>.
[RFC 4111] Fang, L., Ed., "Security Framework for Provider-
Provisioned Virtual Private Networks (PPVPNs)", RFC 4111,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 4111, July 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 4111>.
[RFC 4162] Lee, H.J., Yoon, J.H., and J.I. Lee, "Addition of SEED
Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
RFC 4162, DOI 10.17487/RFC 4162, August 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 4162>.
[RFC 4168] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., and G. Camarillo, "The
Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) as a Transport
for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 4168,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 4168, October 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 4168>.
[RFC 4217] Ford-Hutchinson, P., "Securing FTP with TLS", RFC 4217,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 4217, October 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 4217>.
[RFC 4235] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., and R. Mahy, Ed., "An
INVITE-Initiated Dialog Event Package for the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 4235,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 4235, November 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 4235>.
[RFC 4261] Walker, J. and A. Kulkarni, Ed., "Common Open Policy
Service (COPS) Over Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
RFC 4261, DOI 10.17487/RFC 4261, December 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 4261>.
[RFC 4279] Eronen, P., Ed. and H. Tschofenig, Ed., "Pre-Shared Key
Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
RFC 4279, DOI 10.17487/RFC 4279, December 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 4279>.
[RFC 4346] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 4346, April 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 4346>.
[RFC 4497] Elwell, J., Derks, F., Mourot, P., and O. Rousseau,
"Interworking between the Session Initiation Protocol
(SIP) and QSIG", BCP 117, RFC 4497, DOI 10.17487/RFC 4497,
May 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 4497>.
[RFC 4513] Harrison, R., Ed., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
(LDAP): Authentication Methods and Security Mechanisms",
RFC 4513, DOI 10.17487/RFC 4513, June 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 4513>.
[RFC 4531] Zeilenga, K., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
(LDAP) Turn Operation", RFC 4531, DOI 10.17487/RFC 4531,
June 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 4531>.
[RFC 4540] Stiemerling, M., Quittek, J., and C. Cadar, "NEC's Simple
Middlebox Configuration (SIMCO) Protocol Version 3.0",
RFC 4540, DOI 10.17487/RFC 4540, May 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 4540>.
[RFC 4582] Camarillo, G., Ott, J., and K. Drage, "The Binary Floor
Control Protocol (BFCP)", RFC 4582, DOI 10.17487/RFC 4582,
November 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 4582>.
[RFC 4616] Zeilenga, K., Ed., "The PLAIN Simple Authentication and
Security Layer (SASL) Mechanism", RFC 4616,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 4616, August 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 4616>.
[RFC 4642] Murchison, K., Vinocur, J., and C. Newman, "Using
Transport Layer Security (TLS) with Network News Transfer
Protocol (NNTP)", RFC 4642, DOI 10.17487/RFC 4642, October
2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 4642>.
[RFC 4680] Santesson, S., "TLS Handshake Message for Supplemental
Data", RFC 4680, DOI 10.17487/RFC 4680, October 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 4680>.
[RFC 4681] Santesson, S., Medvinsky, A., and J. Ball, "TLS User
Mapping Extension", RFC 4681, DOI 10.17487/RFC 4681,
October 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 4681>.
[RFC 4712] Siddiqui, A., Romascanu, D., Golovinsky, E., Rahman, M.,
and Y. Kim, "Transport Mappings for Real-time Application
Quality-of-Service Monitoring (RAQMON) Protocol Data Unit
(PDU)", RFC 4712, DOI 10.17487/RFC 4712, October 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 4712>.
[RFC 4732] Handley, M., Ed., Rescorla, E., Ed., and IAB, "Internet
Denial-of-Service Considerations", RFC 4732,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 4732, December 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 4732>.
[RFC 4743] Goddard, T., "Using NETCONF over the Simple Object Access
Protocol (SOAP)", RFC 4743, DOI 10.17487/RFC 4743, December
2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 4743>.
[RFC 4744] Lear, E. and K. Crozier, "Using the NETCONF Protocol over
the Blocks Extensible Exchange Protocol (BEEP)", RFC 4744,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 4744, December 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 4744>.
[RFC 4785] Blumenthal, U. and P. Goel, "Pre-Shared Key (PSK)
Ciphersuites with NULL Encryption for Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 4785, DOI 10.17487/RFC 4785, January
2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 4785>.
[RFC 4791] Daboo, C., Desruisseaux, B., and L. Dusseault,
"Calendaring Extensions to WebDAV (CalDAV)", RFC 4791,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 4791, March 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 4791>.
[RFC 4823] Harding, T. and R. Scott, "FTP Transport for Secure Peer-
to-Peer Business Data Interchange over the Internet",
RFC 4823, DOI 10.17487/RFC 4823, April 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 4823>.
[RFC 4851] Cam-Winget, N., McGrew, D., Salowey, J., and H. Zhou, "The
Flexible Authentication via Secure Tunneling Extensible
Authentication Protocol Method (EAP-FAST)", RFC 4851,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 4851, May 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 4851>.
[RFC 4964] Allen, A., Ed., Holm, J., and T. Hallin, "The P-Answer-
State Header Extension to the Session Initiation Protocol
for the Open Mobile Alliance Push to Talk over Cellular",
RFC 4964, DOI 10.17487/RFC 4964, September 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 4964>.
[RFC 4975] Campbell, B., Ed., Mahy, R., Ed., and C. Jennings, Ed.,
"The Message Session Relay Protocol (MSRP)", RFC 4975,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 4975, September 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 4975>.
[RFC 4976] Jennings, C., Mahy, R., and A. B. Roach, "Relay Extensions
for the Message Sessions Relay Protocol (MSRP)", RFC 4976,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 4976, September 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 4976>.
[RFC 4992] Newton, A., "XML Pipelining with Chunks for the Internet
Registry Information Service", RFC 4992,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 4992, August 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 4992>.
[RFC 5018] Camarillo, G., "Connection Establishment in the Binary
Floor Control Protocol (BFCP)", RFC 5018,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 5018, September 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 5018>.
[RFC 5019] Deacon, A. and R. Hurst, "The Lightweight Online
Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Profile for High-Volume
Environments", RFC 5019, DOI 10.17487/RFC 5019, September
2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 5019>.
[RFC 5023] Gregorio, J., Ed. and B. de hOra, Ed., "The Atom
Publishing Protocol", RFC 5023, DOI 10.17487/RFC 5023,
October 2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 5023>.
[RFC 5024] Friend, I., "ODETTE File Transfer Protocol 2.0", RFC 5024,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 5024, November 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 5024>.
[RFC 5049] Bormann, C., Liu, Z., Price, R., and G. Camarillo, Ed.,
"Applying Signaling Compression (SigComp) to the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 5049,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 5049, December 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 5049>.
[RFC 5054] Taylor, D., Wu, T., Mavrogiannopoulos, N., and T. Perrin,
"Using the Secure Remote Password (SRP) Protocol for TLS
Authentication", RFC 5054, DOI 10.17487/RFC 5054, November
2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 5054>.
[RFC 5091] Boyen, X. and L. Martin, "Identity-Based Cryptography
Standard (IBCS) #1: Supersingular Curve Implementations of
the BF and BB1 Cryptosystems", RFC 5091,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 5091, December 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 5091>.
[RFC 5158] Huston, G., "6to4 Reverse DNS Delegation Specification",
RFC 5158, DOI 10.17487/RFC 5158, March 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 5158>.
[RFC 5216] Simon, D., Aboba, B., and R. Hurst, "The EAP-TLS
Authentication Protocol", RFC 5216, DOI 10.17487/RFC 5216,
March 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 5216>.
[RFC 5238] Phelan, T., "Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) over
the Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP)",
RFC 5238, DOI 10.17487/RFC 5238, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 5238>.
[RFC 5263] Lonnfors, M., Costa-Requena, J., Leppanen, E., and H.
Khartabil, "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Extension
for Partial Notification of Presence Information",
RFC 5263, DOI 10.17487/RFC 5263, September 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 5263>.
[RFC 5281] Funk, P. and S. Blake-Wilson, "Extensible Authentication
Protocol Tunneled Transport Layer Security Authenticated
Protocol Version 0 (EAP-TTLSv0)", RFC 5281,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 5281, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 5281>.
[RFC 5364] Garcia-Martin, M. and G. Camarillo, "Extensible Markup
Language (XML) Format Extension for Representing Copy
Control Attributes in Resource Lists", RFC 5364,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 5364, October 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 5364>.
[RFC 5422] Cam-Winget, N., McGrew, D., Salowey, J., and H. Zhou,
"Dynamic Provisioning Using Flexible Authentication via
Secure Tunneling Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP-
FAST)", RFC 5422, DOI 10.17487/RFC 5422, March 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 5422>.
[RFC 5469] Eronen, P., Ed., "DES and IDEA Cipher Suites for Transport
Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5469, DOI 10.17487/RFC 5469,
February 2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 5469>.
[RFC 5734] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
Transport over TCP", STD 69, RFC 5734,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 5734, August 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 5734>.
[RFC 5878] Brown, M. and R. Housley, "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Authorization Extensions", RFC 5878, DOI 10.17487/RFC 5878,
May 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 5878>.
[RFC 5953] Hardaker, W., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Transport
Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)",
RFC 5953, DOI 10.17487/RFC 5953, August 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 5953>.
[RFC 6042] Keromytis, A., "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Authorization Using KeyNote", RFC 6042,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 6042, October 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 6042>.
[RFC 6176] Turner, S. and T. Polk, "Prohibiting Secure Sockets Layer
(SSL) Version 2.0", RFC 6176, DOI 10.17487/RFC 6176, March
2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 6176>.
[RFC 6353] Hardaker, W., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Transport
Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)",
STD 78, RFC 6353, DOI 10.17487/RFC 6353, July 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 6353>.
[RFC 6367] Kanno, S. and M. Kanda, "Addition of the Camellia Cipher
Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 6367,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 6367, September 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 6367>.
[RFC 6739] Schulzrinne, H. and H. Tschofenig, "Synchronizing Service
Boundaries and <mapping> Elements Based on the Location-
to-Service Translation (LoST) Protocol", RFC 6739,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 6739, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 6739>.
[RFC 6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC 6749, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 6749>.
[RFC 6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 6750, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 6750>.
[RFC 7030] Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed.,
"Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 7030, October 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 7030>.
[RFC 7465] Popov, A., "Prohibiting RC4 Cipher Suites", RFC 7465,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 7465, February 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 7465>.
[RFC 7507] Moeller, B. and A. Langley, "TLS Fallback Signaling Cipher
Suite Value (SCSV) for Preventing Protocol Downgrade
Attacks", RFC 7507, DOI 10.17487/RFC 7507, April 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 7507>.
[RFC 7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC 7525, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 7525>.
[RFC 7562] Thakore, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Authorization
Using Digital Transmission Content Protection (DTCP)
Certificates", RFC 7562, DOI 10.17487/RFC 7562, July 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 7562>.
[RFC 7568] Barnes, R., Thomson, M., Pironti, A., and A. Langley,
"Deprecating Secure Sockets Layer Version 3.0", RFC 7568,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 7568, June 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 7568>.
[RFC 8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC 8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 8174>.
[RFC 8422] Nir, Y., Josefsson, S., and M. Pegourie-Gonnard, "Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer
Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier", RFC 8422,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 8422, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 8422>.
10.2. Informative References
[Bhargavan2016]
Bhargavan, K. and G. Leuren, "Transcript Collision
Attacks: Breaking Authentication in TLS, IKE, and SSH",
DOI 10.14722/ndss.2016.23418, February 2016,
<https://www.mitls.org/downloads/transcript-
collisions.pdf>.
[NIST800-52r2]
National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"Guidelines for the Selection, Configuration, and Use of
Transport Layer Security (TLS) Implementations NIST
SP800-52r2", DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-52r2, August 2019,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
NIST.SP.800-52r2.pdf>.
[RFC 3316] Arkko, J., Kuijpers, G., Soliman, H., Loughney, J., and J.
Wiljakka, "Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) for Some
Second and Third Generation Cellular Hosts", RFC 3316,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 3316, April 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 3316>.
[RFC 3489] Rosenberg, J., Weinberger, J., Huitema, C., and R. Mahy,
"STUN - Simple Traversal of User Datagram Protocol (UDP)
Through Network Address Translators (NATs)", RFC 3489,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 3489, March 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 3489>.
[RFC 3546] Blake-Wilson, S., Nystrom, M., Hopwood, D., Mikkelsen, J.,
and T. Wright, "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Extensions", RFC 3546, DOI 10.17487/RFC 3546, June 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 3546>.
[RFC 3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J.
Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 3588, September 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 3588>.
[RFC 3734] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
Transport Over TCP", RFC 3734, DOI 10.17487/RFC 3734, March
2004, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 3734>.
[RFC 3920] Saint-Andre, P., Ed., "Extensible Messaging and Presence
Protocol (XMPP): Core", RFC 3920, DOI 10.17487/RFC 3920,
October 2004, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 3920>.
[RFC 4132] Moriai, S., Kato, A., and M. Kanda, "Addition of Camellia
Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
RFC 4132, DOI 10.17487/RFC 4132, July 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 4132>.
[RFC 4244] Barnes, M., Ed., "An Extension to the Session Initiation
Protocol (SIP) for Request History Information", RFC 4244,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 4244, November 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 4244>.
[RFC 4347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security", RFC 4347, DOI 10.17487/RFC 4347, April 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 4347>.
[RFC 4366] Blake-Wilson, S., Nystrom, M., Hopwood, D., Mikkelsen, J.,
and T. Wright, "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Extensions", RFC 4366, DOI 10.17487/RFC 4366, April 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 4366>.
[RFC 4492] Blake-Wilson, S., Bolyard, N., Gupta, V., Hawk, C., and B.
Moeller, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4492,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 4492, May 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 4492>.
[RFC 4507] Salowey, J., Zhou, H., Eronen, P., and H. Tschofenig,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without
Server-Side State", RFC 4507, DOI 10.17487/RFC 4507, May
2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 4507>.
[RFC 4572] Lennox, J., "Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the
Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol in the Session
Description Protocol (SDP)", RFC 4572,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 4572, July 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 4572>.
[RFC 4934] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
Transport Over TCP", RFC 4934, DOI 10.17487/RFC 4934, May
2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 4934>.
[RFC 5077] Salowey, J., Zhou, H., Eronen, P., and H. Tschofenig,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without
Server-Side State", RFC 5077, DOI 10.17487/RFC 5077,
January 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 5077>.
[RFC 5081] Mavrogiannopoulos, N., "Using OpenPGP Keys for Transport
Layer Security (TLS) Authentication", RFC 5081,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 5081, November 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 5081>.
[RFC 5101] Claise, B., Ed., "Specification of the IP Flow Information
Export (IPFIX) Protocol for the Exchange of IP Traffic
Flow Information", RFC 5101, DOI 10.17487/RFC 5101, January
2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 5101>.
[RFC 5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 5246, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 5246>.
[RFC 5415] Calhoun, P., Ed., Montemurro, M., Ed., and D. Stanley,
Ed., "Control And Provisioning of Wireless Access Points
(CAPWAP) Protocol Specification", RFC 5415,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 5415, March 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 5415>.
[RFC 5456] Spencer, M., Capouch, B., Guy, E., Ed., Miller, F., and K.
Shumard, "IAX: Inter-Asterisk eXchange Version 2",
RFC 5456, DOI 10.17487/RFC 5456, February 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 5456>.
[RFC 6012] Salowey, J., Petch, T., Gerhards, R., and H. Feng,
"Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Transport
Mapping for Syslog", RFC 6012, DOI 10.17487/RFC 6012,
October 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 6012>.
[RFC 6083] Tuexen, M., Seggelmann, R., and E. Rescorla, "Datagram
Transport Layer Security (DTLS) for Stream Control
Transmission Protocol (SCTP)", RFC 6083,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 6083, January 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 6083>.
[RFC 6084] Fu, X., Dickmann, C., and J. Crowcroft, "General Internet
Signaling Transport (GIST) over Stream Control
Transmission Protocol (SCTP) and Datagram Transport Layer
Security (DTLS)", RFC 6084, DOI 10.17487/RFC 6084, January
2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 6084>.
[RFC 6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC 6347,
January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 6347>.
[RFC 6460] Salter, M. and R. Housley, "Suite B Profile for Transport
Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 6460, DOI 10.17487/RFC 6460,
January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 6460>.
[RFC 6614] Winter, S., McCauley, M., Venaas, S., and K. Wierenga,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Encryption for RADIUS",
RFC 6614, DOI 10.17487/RFC 6614, May 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 6614>.
[RFC 7457] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, "Summarizing
Known Attacks on Transport Layer Security (TLS) and
Datagram TLS (DTLS)", RFC 7457, DOI 10.17487/RFC 7457,
February 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 7457>.
[RFC 8143] Elie, J., "Using Transport Layer Security (TLS) with
Network News Transfer Protocol (NNTP)", RFC 8143,
DOI 10.17487/RFC 8143, April 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 8143>.
[RFC 8261] Tuexen, M., Stewart, R., Jesup, R., and S. Loreto,
"Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Encapsulation of
SCTP Packets", RFC 8261, DOI 10.17487/RFC 8261, November
2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 8261>.
[RFC 8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC 8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 8446>.
[RFC 8447] Salowey, J. and S. Turner, "IANA Registry Updates for TLS
and DTLS", RFC 8447, DOI 10.17487/RFC 8447, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 8447>.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to those that provided usage data and reviewed and/or improved
this document, including: Michael Ackermann, David Benjamin, David
Black, Deborah Brungard, Alan DeKok, Viktor Dukhovni, Julien Élie,
Adrian Farrelll, Gary Gapinski, Alessandro Ghedini, Peter Gutmann,
Jeremy Harris, Nick Hilliard, James Hodgkinson, Russ Housley, Hubert
Kario, Benjamin Kaduk, John Klensin, Watson Ladd, Eliot Lear, Ted
Lemon, John Mattsson, Keith Moore, Tom Petch, Eric Mill, Yoav Nir,
Andrei Popov, Michael Richardson, Eric Rescorla, Rich Salz, Mohit
Sethi, Yaron Sheffer, Rob Sayre, Robert Sparks, Barbara Stark, Martin
Thomson, Sean Turner, Loganaden Velvindron, Jakub Wilk, and
Christopher Wood.
Authors' Addresses
Kathleen Moriarty
Center for Internet Security (CIS)
East Greenbush, NY
United States of America
Email: Kathleen.Moriarty.ietf@gmail.com
Stephen Farrell
Trinity College Dublin
Dublin
2
Ireland
Phone: +353-1-896-2354
Email: stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie
RFC TOTAL SIZE: 49676 bytes
PUBLICATION DATE: Tuesday, March 23rd, 2021
LEGAL RIGHTS: The IETF Trust (see BCP 78)
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