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IETF RFC 7146
Last modified on Saturday, April 5th, 2014
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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) D. Black
Request for Comments: 7146 EMC
Updates: 3720, 3723, 3821, 3822, 4018, 4172, P. Koning
4173, 4174, 5040, 5041, 5042, 5043, Dell
5044, 5045, 5046, 5047, 5048 April 2014
Category: Standards Track
ISSN: 2070-1721
Securing Block Storage Protocols over IP:
RFC 3723 Requirements Update for IPsec v3
 Abstract
RFC 3723 specifies IPsec requirements for block storage protocols
over IP (e.g., Internet Small Computer System Interface (iSCSI))
based on IPsec v2 (RFC 2401 and related RFCs); those requirements
have subsequently been applied to remote direct data placement
protocols, e.g., the Remote Direct Memory Access Protocol (RDMAP).
This document updates RFC 3723's IPsec requirements to IPsec v3 (RFC
4301 and related RFCs) and makes some changes to required algorithms
based on developments in cryptography since RFC 3723 was published.
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 7146.
Black & Koning Standards Track PAGE 1 
RFC 7146 RFC 3723 Reqs Update for IPsec v3 April 2014
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ....................................................3
1.1. Requirements Language ......................................3
1.2. Summary of Changes to RFC 3723 .............................4
1.3. Other Updated RFCs .........................................4
2. ESP Requirements ................................................6
2.1. Data Origin Authentication and Data Integrity Transforms ...6
2.2. Confidentiality Transform Requirements .....................7
3. IKEv1 and IKEv2 Requirements ....................................8
3.1. Authentication Requirements ...............................10
3.2. DH Group and PRF Requirements .............................11
4. Security Considerations ........................................11
5. References .....................................................12
5.1. Normative References ......................................12
5.2. Informative References ....................................16
Appendix A. Block Cipher Birthday Bounds ..........................17
Appendix B. Contributors ..........................................17
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RFC 7146 RFC 3723 Reqs Update for IPsec v3 April 2014
1. Introduction
[RFC 3723] specifies IPsec requirements for block storage protocols
over IP (e.g., iSCSI [RFC 3720]) based on IPsec v2 ([RFC 2401] and
related RFCs); those requirements have subsequently been applied to
remote direct data placement protocols, e.g., RDMAP [RFC 5040]. This
document updates RFC 3723's IPsec requirements to IPsec v3 ([RFC 4301]
and related RFCs) to reflect developments since RFC 3723 was
published.
For brevity, this document uses the term "block storage protocols" to
refer to all protocols to which RFC 3723's requirements apply; see
Section 1.3 for details.
In addition to the IPsec v2 requirements in RFC 3723, IPsec v3, as
specified in [RFC 4301] and related RFCs (e.g., IKEv2 [RFC 5996]),
SHOULD be implemented for block storage protocols. Retention of the
mandatory requirement for IPsec v2 provides interoperability with
existing implementations, and the strong recommendation for IPsec v3
encourages implementers to move forward to that newer version of
IPsec.
Cryptographic developments since the publication of RFC 3723
necessitate changes to the encryption transform requirements for
IPsec v2, as explained further in Section 2.2; these updated
requirements also apply to IPsec v3.
Block storage protocols can be expected to operate at high data rates
(multiple gigabits/second). The cryptographic requirements in this
document are strongly influenced by that expectation; an important
example is that Triple Data Encryption Standard Cipher Block Chaining
(3DES CBC) is no longer recommended for block storage protocols due
to the frequent rekeying impacts of 3DES's 64-bit block size at high
data rates.
1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC 2119].
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1.2. Summary of Changes to RFC 3723
This document makes the following changes to RFC 3723:
o Adds requirements that IPsec v3 SHOULD be implemented
(Encapsulating Security Payload (ESPv3) and IKEv2) in addition to
IPsec v2 (see Section 1).
o Requires extended sequence numbers for both ESPv2 and ESPv3 (see
Section 2).
o Clarifies key-size requirements for AES CBC MAC with XCBC
extensions (MUST implement 128-bit keys; see Section 2.1).
o Adds IPsec v3 requirements for AES Galois Message Authentication
Code (GMAC) and Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) (SHOULD implement when
IKEv2 is supported; see Sections 2.1 and 2.2).
o Removes implementation requirements for 3DES CBC and AES in
Counter mode (AES CTR) (changes requirements for both to "MAY
implement"). Adds a "MUST implement" requirement for AES CBC (see
Section 2.2).
o Adds specific IKEv2 implementation requirements (see Section 3).
o Removes the requirement that IKEv1 use UDP port 500 (see
Section 3).
o Allows the use of the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) in
addition to Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) to check
certificates, and changes the Diffie-Hellman group size
recommendation to a minimum of 2048 bits (see Section 3).
1.3. Other Updated RFCs
RFC 3723's IPsec requirements have been applied to a number of
protocols. For that reason, in addition to updating RFC 3723's IPsec
requirements, this document also updates the IPsec requirements for
each protocol that uses RFC 3723; that is, the following RFCs are
updated -- in each case, the update is solely to the IPsec
requirements:
o [RFC 3720] "Internet Small Computer Systems Interface (iSCSI)"
o [RFC 3821] "Fibre Channel Over TCP/IP (FCIP)"
o [RFC 3822] "Finding Fibre Channel over TCP/IP (FCIP) Entities Using
Service Location Protocol version 2 (SLPv2)"
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o [RFC 4018] "Finding Internet Small Computer Systems Interface
(iSCSI) Targets and Name Servers by Using Service Location
Protocol version 2 (SLPv2)"
o [RFC 4172] "iFCP - A Protocol for Internet Fibre Channel Storage
Networking"
o [RFC 4173] "Bootstrapping Clients using the Internet Small Computer
System Interface (iSCSI) Protocol"
o [RFC 4174] "The IPv4 Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP)
Option for the Internet Storage Name Service"
o [RFC 5040] "A Remote Direct Memory Access Protocol Specification"
o [RFC 5041] "Direct Data Placement over Reliable Transports"
o [RFC 5042] "Direct Data Placement Protocol (DDP) / Remote Direct
Memory Access Protocol (RDMAP) Security"
o [RFC 5043] "Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) Direct Data
Placement (DDP) Adaptation"
o [RFC 5044] "Marker PDU Aligned Framing for TCP Specification"
o [RFC 5045] "Applicability of Remote Direct Memory Access Protocol
(RDMA) and Direct Data Placement (DDP)"
o [RFC 5046] "Internet Small Computer System Interface (iSCSI)
Extensions for Remote Direct Memory Access (RDMA)"
o [RFC 5047] "DA: Datamover Architecture for the Internet Small
Computer System Interface (iSCSI)"
o [RFC 5048] "Internet Small Computer System Interface (iSCSI)
Corrections and Clarifications"
[RFC 3721] and [RFC 5387] are not updated by this document, as their
usage of RFC 3723 does not encompass its IPsec requirements.
In addition, this document's updated IPsec requirements apply to the
new specifications for iSCSI [RFC 7143] and iSCSI Extensions for RDMA
(iSER) [RFC 7145].
This document uses the term "block storage protocols" to refer to the
protocols (listed above) to which RFC 3723's requirements (as updated
by the requirements in this document) apply.
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2. ESP Requirements
RFC 3723 requires that implementations MUST support IPsec ESPv2
[RFC 2406] in tunnel mode as part of IPsec v2 to provide security for
both control packets and data packets; and that when ESPv2 is
utilized, per-packet data origin authentication, integrity, and
replay protection MUST be provided.
This document modifies RFC 3723 to require that implementations
SHOULD also support IPsec ESPv3 [RFC 4303] in tunnel mode as part of
IPsec v3 to provide security for both control packets and data
packets; per-packet data origin authentication, integrity, and replay
protection MUST be provided when ESPv3 is utilized.
At the high speeds at which block storage protocols are expected to
operate, a single IPsec security association (SA) could rapidly
exhaust the ESP 32-bit sequence number space, requiring frequent
rekeying of the SA, as rollover of the ESP sequence number within a
single SA is prohibited for both ESPv2 [RFC 2406] and ESPv3 [RFC 4303].
In order to provide the means to avoid this potentially undesirable
frequent rekeying, implementations that are capable of operating at
speeds of 1 gigabit/second or higher MUST implement extended (64-bit)
sequence numbers for ESPv2 (and ESPv3, if supported) and SHOULD use
extended sequence numbers for all block storage protocol traffic.
Extended sequence number negotiation as part of security association
establishment is specified in [RFC 4304] for IKEv1 and [RFC 5996] for
IKEv2.
2.1. Data Origin Authentication and Data Integrity Transforms
RFC 3723 requires that:
o HMAC-SHA1 MUST be implemented in the form of HMAC-SHA-1-96
[RFC 2404].
o AES CBC MAC with XCBC extensions SHOULD be implemented [RFC 3566].
This document clarifies RFC 3723's key-size requirements for
implementations of AES CBC MAC with XCBC extensions; 128-bit keys
MUST be supported, and other key sizes MAY also be supported.
This document also adds a requirement for IPsec v3:
o Implementations that support IKEv2 [RFC 5996] SHOULD also implement
AES GMAC [RFC 4543]. AES GMAC implementations MUST support 128-bit
keys and MAY support other key sizes.
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The rationale for the added requirement is that GMAC is more amenable
to hardware implementations that may be preferable for the high data
rates at which block storage protocols can be expected to operate.
2.2. Confidentiality Transform Requirements
RFC 3723 requires that:
o 3DES in CBC mode (3DES CBC) [RFC 2451] [triple-des-spec] MUST be
supported.
o AES in Counter mode (AES CTR) [RFC 3686] SHOULD be supported.
o NULL encryption [RFC 2410] MUST be supported.
The above requirements from RFC 3723 regarding 3DES CBC and AES CTR
are replaced in this document by requirements that both 3DES CBC and
AES CTR MAY be implemented. The NULL encryption requirement is not
changed by this document. The 3DES CBC requirement matched the basic
encryption interoperability requirement for IPsec v2. At the time of
RFC 3723's publication, AES in Counter mode was the encryption
transform that was most amenable to hardware implementation, as
hardware implementation may be preferable for the high data rates at
which block storage protocols can be expected to operate. This
document changes both of these requirements, based on cryptographic
developments since the publication of RFC 3723.
The requirement for 3DES CBC has become problematic due to 3DES's
64-bit block size; i.e., the core cipher encrypts or decrypts 64 bits
at a time. Security weaknesses in encryption start to appear as the
amount of data encrypted under a single key approaches the birthday
bound of 32 GiB (gibibytes) for a cipher with a 64-bit block size;
see Appendix A and [triple-des-birthday]. It is prudent to rekey
well before that bound is reached, and 32 GiB or some significant
fraction thereof is less than the amount of data that a block storage
protocol may transfer in a single session. This may require frequent
rekeying, e.g., to obtain an order-of-magnitude (10x) safety margin
by rekeying after 3 GiB on a multi-gigabit/sec link. In contrast,
AES has a 128-bit block size, which results in a much larger birthday
bound (2^68 bytes); see Appendix A. AES CBC [RFC 3602] is the primary
mandatory-to-implement encryption transform for interoperability and
hence is the appropriate mandatory-to-implement transform replacement
for 3DES CBC.
AES in Counter mode (AES CTR) is no longer the encryption transform
that is most amenable to hardware implementation. That
characterization now applies to AES GCM [RFC 4106], which provides
both encryption and integrity protection in a single cryptographic
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mechanism (in contrast, neither HMAC-SHA1 nor AES CBC MAC with XCBC
extensions is well suited for hardware implementation, as both
transforms do not pipeline well). AES GCM is also capable of
providing confidentiality protection for the IKEv2 key exchange
protocol, but not the IKEv1 protocol [RFC 5282], and therefore the new
AES GCM "SHOULD" requirement is based on the presence of support for
IKEv2.
For the reasons described in the preceding paragraphs, the
confidentiality transform requirements in RFC 3723 are replaced by
the following:
o 3DES in CBC mode MAY be implemented (replaces RFC 3723's "MUST
implement" requirement).
o AES in Counter mode (AES CTR) MAY be implemented (replaces
RFC 3723's "SHOULD implement" requirement).
o AES in CBC mode MUST be implemented. AES CBC implementations MUST
support 128-bit keys and MAY support other key sizes.
o Implementations that support IKEv2 SHOULD also implement AES GCM.
AES GCM implementations MUST support 128-bit keys and MAY support
other key sizes.
o NULL encryption [RFC 2410] MUST be supported.
The requirement for support of NULL encryption enables the use of SAs
that provide data origin authentication and data integrity, but not
confidentiality.
Other transforms MAY be implemented in addition to those listed
above.
3. IKEv1 and IKEv2 Requirements
Note: To avoid ambiguity, the original IKE protocol [RFC 2409] is
referred to as "IKEv1" in this document.
This document adds requirements for IKEv2 usage with block storage
protocols and makes the following two changes to the IKEv1
requirements in RFC 3723 (the new Diffie-Hellman (DH) group
requirement also applies to IKEv2):
o When DH groups are used, a DH group of at least 2048 bits SHOULD
be offered as a part of all proposals to create IPsec security
associations. The recommendation for the use of 1024-bit DH
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groups with 3DES CBC and HMAC-SHA1 has been removed; the use of
1024-bit DH groups is NOT RECOMMENDED, and
o The requirement to use UDP port 500 is removed in order to allow
NAT traversal [RFC 3947].
There are no other changes to RFC 3723's IKEv1 requirements, but many
of them are restated in this document in order to provide context for
the new IKEv2 requirements.
RFC 3723 requires that IKEv1 [RFC 2409] be supported for peer
authentication, negotiation of security associations, and key
management, using the IPsec domain of interpretation (DOI) [RFC 2407],
and further requires that manual keying not be used since it does not
provide the rekeying support necessary for operation at high data
rates. This document adds a requirement that IKEv2 [RFC 5996] SHOULD
be supported for peer authentication, negotiation of security
associations, and key management. The prohibition of manual keying
as stated in RFC 3723 is extended to IKEv2; manual keying MUST NOT be
used with any version of IPsec for protocols to which the
requirements in this document apply.
RFC 3723's requirements for IKEv1 mode implementation and usage are
unchanged; this document does not extend those requirements to IKEv2
because IKEv2 does not have modes.
When IPsec is used, the receipt of an IKEv1 Phase 2 delete message or
an IKEv2 INFORMATIONAL exchange that deletes the SA SHOULD NOT be
interpreted as a reason for tearing down the block storage protocol
connection (e.g., TCP-based). If additional traffic is sent, a new
SA will be created to protect that traffic.
The method used to determine whether a block storage protocol
connection should be established using IPsec is regarded as an issue
of IPsec policy administration and thus is not defined in this
document. The method used by an implementation that supports both
IPsec v2 and v3 to determine which versions of IPsec are supported by
a block storage protocol peer is also regarded as an issue of IPsec
policy administration and thus is also not defined in this document.
If both IPsec v2 and v3 are supported by both endpoints of a block
storage protocol connection, the use of IPsec v3 is RECOMMENDED.
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3.1. Authentication Requirements
The authentication requirements for IKEv1 are unchanged by this
document but are restated here for context, along with the
authentication requirements for IKEv2:
a. Peer authentication using a pre-shared cryptographic key MUST be
supported. Certificate-based peer authentication using digital
signatures MAY be supported. For IKEv1 [RFC 2409], peer
authentication using the public key encryption methods specified
in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 of [RFC 2409] SHOULD NOT be used.
b. When digital signatures are used for authentication, all IKEv1
and IKEv2 negotiators SHOULD use Certificate Request Payload(s)
to specify the certificate authority and SHOULD check the
certificate validity via the pertinent Certificate Revocation
List (CRL) or the use of the Online Certificate Status Protocol
(OCSP) [RFC 6960] before accepting a PKI certificate for use in
authentication. OCSP support within the IKEv2 protocol is
specified in [RFC 4806].
c. IKEv1 implementations MUST support Main Mode and SHOULD support
Aggressive Mode. Main Mode with the pre-shared key
authentication method SHOULD NOT be used when either the
initiator or the target uses dynamically assigned IP addresses.
While in many cases pre-shared keys offer good security,
situations in which dynamically assigned addresses are used force
the use of a group pre-shared key, which creates vulnerability to
a man-in-the-middle attack. These requirements do not apply to
IKEv2 because it has no modes.
d. In the IKEv1 Phase 2 Quick Mode, in exchanges for creating the
Phase 2 SA, the Identification Payload MUST be present. This
requirement does not apply to IKEv2 because it has no modes.
e. The following identification type requirements apply to IKEv1.
ID_IPV4_ADDR, ID_IPV6_ADDR (if the protocol stack supports IPv6),
and ID_FQDN Identification Types MUST be supported; ID_USER_FQDN
SHOULD be supported. The IP Subnet, IP Address Range,
ID_DER_ASN1_DN, and ID_DER_ASN1_GN Identification Types SHOULD
NOT be used. The ID_KEY_ID Identification Type MUST NOT be used.
f. When IKEv2 is supported, the following identification
requirements apply. ID_IPV4_ADDR, ID_IPV6_ADDR (if the protocol
stack supports IPv6), and ID_FQDN Identification Types MUST be
supported; ID_RFC822_ADDR SHOULD be supported. The
ID_DER_ASN1_DN and ID_DER_ASN1_GN Identification Types SHOULD NOT
be used. The ID_KEY_ID Identification Type MUST NOT be used.
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The reasons for the identification requirements in items e and f
above are as follows:
o IP Subnet and IP Address Range are too broad to usefully identify
an iSCSI endpoint.
o The _DN and _GN types are X.500 identities; it is usually better
to use an identity from subjectAltName in a PKI certificate.
o ID_KEY_ID is an opaque identifier that is not interoperable among
different IPsec implementations as specified. Heterogeneity in
some block storage protocol implementations can be expected (e.g.,
iSCSI initiator vs. iSCSI target implementations), and hence
heterogeneity among IPsec implementations is important.
3.2. DH Group and PRF Requirements
This document does not change the support requirements for Diffie-
Hellman (DH) groups and Pseudo-Random Functions (PRFs). See
[RFC 4109] for IKEv1 requirements and [RFC 4307] for IKEv2
requirements. Implementers are advised to check for subsequent RFCs
that update either of these RFCs, as such updates may change these
requirements.
When DH groups are used, a DH group of at least 2048 bits SHOULD be
offered as a part of all proposals to create IPsec security
associations for both IKEv1 and IKEv2.
RFC 3723 requires that support for perfect forward secrecy in the
IKEv1 Quick Mode key exchange MUST be implemented. This document
extends that requirement to IKEv2; support for perfect forward
secrecy in the CREATE_CHILD_SA key exchange MUST be implemented for
the use of IPsec with block storage protocols.
4. Security Considerations
This entire document is about security.
The security considerations sections of all of the referenced RFCs
apply, and particular note should be taken of the security
considerations for the encryption transforms whose requirement levels
are changed by this RFC:
o AES GMAC [RFC 4543] (new requirement -- SHOULD be supported when
IKEv2 is supported),
o 3DES CBC [RFC 2451] (changed from "MUST be supported" to "MAY be
supported"),
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o AES CTR [RFC 3686] (changed from "SHOULD be supported" to "MAY be
supported"),
o AES CBC [RFC 3602] (new requirement -- MUST be supported), and
o AES GCM [RFC 4106] (new requirement -- SHOULD be supported when
IKEv2 is supported).
Of particular interest are the security considerations concerning the
use of AES GCM [RFC 4106] and AES GMAC [RFC 4543]; both modes are
vulnerable to catastrophic forgery attacks if a nonce is ever
repeated with a given key.
The requirement level for 3DES CBC has been reduced, based on
considerations for high-speed implementations; 3DES CBC remains an
optional encryption transform that may be suitable for
implementations limited to operating at lower speeds where the
required rekeying frequency for 3DES is acceptable.
The requirement level for AES CTR has been reduced, based solely on
hardware implementation considerations that favor AES GCM, as opposed
to changes in AES CTR's security properties. AES CTR remains an
optional security transform that is suitable for use in general, as
it does not share 3DES CBC's requirement for frequent rekeying when
operating at high data rates.
Key sizes with comparable strength SHOULD be used for the
cryptographic algorithms and transforms for any individual IPsec
security association. See Section 5.6 of [SP800-57] for further
discussion.
5. References
5.1. Normative References
[RFC 2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC 2401] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.
[RFC 2404] Madson, C. and R. Glenn, "The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within
ESP and AH", RFC 2404, November 1998.
[RFC 2406] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "IP Encapsulating Security
Payload (ESP)", RFC 2406, November 1998.
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[RFC 2407] Piper, D., "The Internet IP Security Domain of
Interpretation for ISAKMP", RFC 2407, November 1998.
[RFC 2409] Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange
(IKE)", RFC 2409, November 1998.
[RFC 2410] Glenn, R. and S. Kent, "The NULL Encryption Algorithm and
Its Use With IPsec", RFC 2410, November 1998.
[RFC 2451] Pereira, R. and R. Adams, "The ESP CBC-Mode Cipher
Algorithms", RFC 2451, November 1998.
[RFC 3566] Frankel, S. and H. Herbert, "The AES-XCBC-MAC-96 Algorithm
and Its Use With IPsec", RFC 3566, September 2003.
[RFC 3602] Frankel, S., Glenn, R., and S. Kelly, "The AES-CBC Cipher
Algorithm and Its Use with IPsec", RFC 3602,
September 2003.
[RFC 3686] Housley, R., "Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
Counter Mode With IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload
(ESP)", RFC 3686, January 2004.
[RFC 3720] Satran, J., Meth, K., Sapuntzakis, C., Chadalapaka, M.,
and E. Zeidner, "Internet Small Computer Systems Interface
(iSCSI)", RFC 3720, April 2004.
[RFC 3723] Aboba, B., Tseng, J., Walker, J., Rangan, V., and F.
Travostino, "Securing Block Storage Protocols over IP",
RFC 3723, April 2004.
[RFC 3821] Rajagopal, M., Rodriguez, E., and R. Weber, "Fibre Channel
Over TCP/IP (FCIP)", RFC 3821, July 2004.
[RFC 3822] Peterson, D., "Finding Fibre Channel over TCP/IP (FCIP)
Entities Using Service Location Protocol version 2
(SLPv2)", RFC 3822, July 2004.
[RFC 3947] Kivinen, T., Swander, B., Huttunen, A., and V. Volpe,
"Negotiation of NAT-Traversal in the IKE", RFC 3947,
January 2005.
[RFC 4018] Bakke, M., Hufferd, J., Voruganti, K., Krueger, M., and T.
Sperry, "Finding Internet Small Computer Systems Interface
(iSCSI) Targets and Name Servers by Using Service Location
Protocol version 2 (SLPv2)", RFC 4018, April 2005.
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[RFC 4106] Viega, J. and D. McGrew, "The Use of Galois/Counter Mode
(GCM) in IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
RFC 4106, June 2005.
[RFC 4109] Hoffman, P., "Algorithms for Internet Key Exchange
version 1 (IKEv1)", RFC 4109, May 2005.
[RFC 4172] Monia, C., Mullendore, R., Travostino, F., Jeong, W., and
M. Edwards, "iFCP - A Protocol for Internet Fibre Channel
Storage Networking", RFC 4172, September 2005.
[RFC 4173] Sarkar, P., Missimer, D., and C. Sapuntzakis,
"Bootstrapping Clients using the Internet Small Computer
System Interface (iSCSI) Protocol", RFC 4173,
September 2005.
[RFC 4174] Monia, C., Tseng, J., and K. Gibbons, "The IPv4 Dynamic
Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) Option for the Internet
Storage Name Service", RFC 4174, September 2005.
[RFC 4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.
[RFC 4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
RFC 4303, December 2005.
[RFC 4304] Kent, S., "Extended Sequence Number (ESN) Addendum to
IPsec Domain of Interpretation (DOI) for Internet Security
Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP)",
RFC 4304, December 2005.
[RFC 4307] Schiller, J., "Cryptographic Algorithms for Use in the
Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2)", RFC 4307,
December 2005.
[RFC 4543] McGrew, D. and J. Viega, "The Use of Galois Message
Authentication Code (GMAC) in IPsec ESP and AH", RFC 4543,
May 2006.
[RFC 5040] Recio, R., Metzler, B., Culley, P., Hilland, J., and D.
Garcia, "A Remote Direct Memory Access Protocol
Specification", RFC 5040, October 2007.
[RFC 5041] Shah, H., Pinkerton, J., Recio, R., and P. Culley, "Direct
Data Placement over Reliable Transports", RFC 5041,
October 2007.
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[RFC 5042] Pinkerton, J. and E. Deleganes, "Direct Data Placement
Protocol (DDP) / Remote Direct Memory Access Protocol
(RDMAP) Security", RFC 5042, October 2007.
[RFC 5043] Bestler, C. and R. Stewart, "Stream Control Transmission
Protocol (SCTP) Direct Data Placement (DDP) Adaptation",
RFC 5043, October 2007.
[RFC 5044] Culley, P., Elzur, U., Recio, R., Bailey, S., and J.
Carrier, "Marker PDU Aligned Framing for TCP
Specification", RFC 5044, October 2007.
[RFC 5046] Ko, M., Chadalapaka, M., Hufferd, J., Elzur, U., Shah, H.,
and P. Thaler, "Internet Small Computer System Interface
(iSCSI) Extensions for Remote Direct Memory Access
(RDMA)", RFC 5046, October 2007.
[RFC 5048] Chadalapaka, M., "Internet Small Computer System Interface
(iSCSI) Corrections and Clarifications", RFC 5048,
October 2007.
[RFC 5282] Black, D. and D. McGrew, "Using Authenticated Encryption
Algorithms with the Encrypted Payload of the Internet Key
Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) Protocol", RFC 5282,
August 2008.
[RFC 5996] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen,
"Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)",
RFC 5996, September 2010.
[RFC 6960] Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A.,
Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key
Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP",
RFC 6960, June 2013.
[RFC 7143] Chadalapaka, M., Satran, J., Meth, K., and D. Black,
"Internet Small Computer System Interface (iSCSI) Protocol
(Consolidated)", RFC 7143, April 2014.
[RFC 7145] Ko, M. and A. Nezhinsky, "Internet Small Computer System
Interface (iSCSI) Extensions for the Remote Direct Memory
Access (RDMA) Specification", RFC 7145, April 2014.
[SP800-57] Barker, E., Barker, W., Burr, W., Polk, W., and M. Smid,
"NIST Special Publication 800-57: Recommendation for Key
Management - Part 1: General (Revision 3)", July 2012,
<http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-57/
sp800-57_part1_rev3_general.pdf>.
Black & Koning Standards Track PAGE 15
RFC 7146 RFC 3723 Reqs Update for IPsec v3 April 2014
[triple-des-birthday]
McGrew, D., "Impossible plaintext cryptanalysis and
probable-plaintext collision attacks of 64-bit block
cipher modes (Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2012/
623)", November 2012, <http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/623>.
[triple-des-spec]
American Bankers Association (ABA), "American National
Standard for Financial Services X9.52-1998 - Triple Data
Encryption Algorithm Modes of Operation", July 1998.
5.2. Informative References
[RFC 3721] Bakke, M., Hafner, J., Hufferd, J., Voruganti, K., and M.
Krueger, "Internet Small Computer Systems Interface
(iSCSI) Naming and Discovery", RFC 3721, April 2004.
[RFC 4806] Myers, M. and H. Tschofenig, "Online Certificate Status
Protocol (OCSP) Extensions to IKEv2", RFC 4806,
February 2007.
[RFC 5045] Bestler, C. and L. Coene, "Applicability of Remote Direct
Memory Access Protocol (RDMA) and Direct Data Placement
(DDP)", RFC 5045, October 2007.
[RFC 5047] Chadalapaka, M., Hufferd, J., Satran, J., and H. Shah,
"DA: Datamover Architecture for the Internet Small
Computer System Interface (iSCSI)", RFC 5047,
October 2007.
[RFC 5387] Touch, J., Black, D., and Y. Wang, "Problem and
Applicability Statement for Better-Than-Nothing Security
(BTNS)", RFC 5387, November 2008.
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RFC 7146 RFC 3723 Reqs Update for IPsec v3 April 2014
Appendix A. Block Cipher Birthday Bounds
This appendix provides the birthday bounds for the 3DES and AES
ciphers based on [triple-des-birthday], which states: "Theory advises
against using a w-bit block cipher to encrypt more than 2^(w/2)
blocks with a single key; this is known as the birthday bound".
For a cipher with a 64-bit block size (e.g., 3DES), w = 64, so the
birthday bound is 2^32 blocks. As each block contains 8 (2^3) bytes,
the birthday bound is 2^35 bytes = 2^5 gibibytes, i.e., 32 GiB, where
1 gibibyte (GiB) = 2^30 bytes. Note that a gigabyte (decimal
quantity) is not the same as a gibibyte (binary quantity); 1 gigabyte
(GB) = 10^6 bytes.
For a cipher with a 128-bit block size (e.g., AES), w = 128, so the
birthday bound is 2^64 blocks. As each block contains 16 (2^4)
bytes, the birthday bound is 2^68 bytes = 2^8 exbibytes, i.e.,
256 EiB, where 1 exbibyte (EiB) = 2^60 bytes. Note that an exabyte
(decimal quantity) is not the same as an exbibyte (binary quantity);
1 exabyte (EB) = 10^9 bytes.
Appendix B. Contributors
David McGrew's observations about the birthday bound implications of
3DES's 64-bit block size on the ipsec@ietf.org mailing list led to
changing from 3DES CBC to AES CBC as the mandatory-to-implement
encryption algorithm, based on the birthday bound discussion in
Appendix A.
The original authors of RFC 3723 were Bernard Aboba, Joshua Tseng,
Jesse Walker, Venkat Rangan, and Franco Travostino. Comments from
Francis Dupont, Yaron Sheffer, Tom Talpey, Sean Turner, and Tom Yu
have improved this document and are gratefully acknowledged.
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RFC 7146 RFC 3723 Reqs Update for IPsec v3 April 2014
Authors' Addresses
David L. Black
EMC Corporation
176 South St.
Hopkinton, MA 01748
USA
Phone: +1 508 293-7953
EMail: david.black@emc.com
Paul Koning
Dell
300 Innovative Way
Nashua, NH 03062
USA
Phone: +1 603 249-7703
EMail: paul_koning@Dell.com
Black & Koning Standards Track PAGE 18
RFC TOTAL SIZE: 37991 bytes
PUBLICATION DATE: Saturday, April 5th, 2014
LEGAL RIGHTS: The IETF Trust (see BCP 78)
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