|
|
|
|
|
|
IETF RFC 6045
Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID)
Last modified on Monday, November 8th, 2010
 Permanent link to RFC 6045
 Search GitHub Wiki for RFC 6045
 Show other RFCs mentioning RFC 6045
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) K. Moriarty
Request for Comments: 6045 EMC
Category: Informational November 2010
ISSN: 2070-1721
Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID)
 Abstract
Network security incidents, such as system compromises, worms,
viruses, phishing incidents, and denial of service, typically result
in the loss of service, data, and resources both human and system.
Network providers and Computer Security Incident Response Teams need
to be equipped and ready to assist in communicating and tracing
security incidents with tools and procedures in place before the
occurrence of an attack. Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID)
outlines a proactive inter-network communication method to facilitate
sharing incident handling data while integrating existing detection,
tracing, source identification, and mitigation mechanisms for a
complete incident handling solution. Combining these capabilities in
a communication system provides a way to achieve higher security
levels on networks. Policy guidelines for handling incidents are
recommended and can be agreed upon by a consortium using the security
recommendations and considerations.
RID has found use within the international research communities, but
has not been widely adopted in other sectors. This publication
provides the specification to those communities that have adopted it,
and communities currently considering solutions for real-time inter-
network defense. The specification may also accelerate development
of solutions where different transports or message formats are
required by leveraging the data elements and structures specified
here.
Moriarty Informational PAGE 1 
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
Status of This Memo
This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
published for informational purposes.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents
approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet
Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/RFC 6045.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Moriarty Informational PAGE 2
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ....................................................4
1.1. Normative and Informative ..................................6
1.2. Terminology ................................................6
1.3. Attack Types and RID Messaging .............................6
2. RID Integration with Network Provider Technologies ..............8
3. Characteristics of Attacks ......................................9
3.1. Integrating Trace Approaches ..............................11
3.2. Superset of Packet Information for Traces .................11
4. Communication between Network Providers ........................12
4.1. Inter-Network Provider RID Messaging ......................14
4.2. RID Network Topology ......................................16
4.3. Message Formats ...........................................17
4.3.1. RID Data Types .....................................17
4.3.1.1. Boolean ...................................17
4.3.2. RID Messages and Transport .........................18
4.3.3. IODEF-RID Schema ...................................19
4.3.3.1. RequestStatus Class .......................21
4.3.3.2. IncidentSource Class ......................23
4.3.3.3. RIDPolicy Class ...........................24
4.3.4. RID Namespace ......................................29
4.4. RID Messages ..............................................29
4.4.1. TraceRequest .......................................29
4.4.2. RequestAuthorization ...............................30
4.4.3. Result .............................................31
4.4.4. Investigation Request ..............................33
4.4.5. Report .............................................35
4.4.6. IncidentQuery ......................................36
4.5. RID Communication Exchanges ...............................37
4.5.1. Upstream Trace Communication Flow ..................39
4.5.1.1. RID TraceRequest Example ..................40
4.5.1.2. RequestAuthorization Message Example ......44
4.5.1.3. Result Message Example ....................44
4.5.2. Investigation Request Communication Flow ...........47
4.5.2.1. Investigation Request Example .............48
4.5.2.2. RequestAuthorization Message Example ......50
4.5.3. Report Communication ...............................51
4.5.3.1. Report Example ............................51
4.5.4. IncidentQuery Communication Flow ...................54
4.5.4.1. IncidentQuery Example .....................54
5. RID Schema Definition ..........................................55
Moriarty Informational PAGE 3
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
6. Security Considerations ........................................60
6.1. Message Transport .........................................62
6.2. Message Delivery Protocol - Integrity and Authentication ..63
6.3. Transport Communication ...................................63
6.4. Authentication of RID Protocol ............................64
6.4.1. Multi-Hop TraceRequest Authentication ..............65
6.5. Consortiums and Public Key Infrastructures ................66
6.6. Privacy Concerns and System Use Guidelines ................67
7. IANA Considerations ............................................72
8. Summary ........................................................72
9. References .....................................................73
9.1. Normative References ......................................73
9.2. Informative References ....................................74
Acknowledgements ..................................................75
Sponsor Information ...............................................75
1. Introduction
Incident handling involves the detection, reporting, identification,
and mitigation of an attack, whether it be a system compromise,
socially engineered phishing attack, or a denial-of-service (DoS)
attack. When an attack is detected, the response may include simply
filing a report, notification to the source of the attack, a request
for mitigation, or the request to locate the source. One of the more
difficult cases is that in which the source of an attack is unknown,
requiring the ability to trace the attack traffic iteratively
upstream through the network for the possibility of any further
actions to take place. In cases when accurate records of an active
session between the victim system and the attacker or source system
are available, the source is easy to identify. The problem of
tracing incidents becomes more difficult when the source is obscured
or spoofed, logs are deleted, and the number of sources is
overwhelming. If the source of an attack is known or identified, it
may be desirable to request actions be taken to stop or mitigate the
effects of the attack.
Current approaches to mitigating the effects of security incidents
are aimed at identifying and filtering or rate-limiting packets from
attackers who seek to hide the origin of their attack by source
address spoofing from multiple locations. Measures can be taken at
network provider (NP) edge routers providing ingress, egress, and
broadcast filtering as a recommended best practice in [RFC 2827].
Network providers have devised solutions, in-house or commercial, to
trace attacks across their backbone infrastructure to either identify
the source on their network or on the next upstream network in the
path to the source. Techniques such as collecting packets as traffic
traverses the network have been implemented to provide the capability
Moriarty Informational PAGE 4
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
to trace attack traffic after an incident has occurred. Other
methods use packet-marking techniques or flow-based traffic analysis
to trace traffic across the network in real time. The single-network
trace mechanisms use similar information across the individual
networks to trace traffic. Problems may arise when an attempt is
made to have a trace continued through the next upstream network
since the trace mechanism and management may vary.
In the case in which the traffic traverses multiple networks, there
is currently no established communication mechanism for continuing
the trace. If the next upstream network has been identified, a phone
call might be placed to contact the network administrators in an
attempt to have them continue the trace. A communication mechanism
is needed to facilitate the transfer of information to continue
traces accurately and efficiently to upstream networks. The
communication mechanism described in this paper, Real-time Inter-
network Defense (RID), takes into consideration the information
needed by various single-network trace implementations and the
requirement for network providers to decide if a TraceRequest should
be permitted to continue. The data in RID messages is represented in
an Extensible Markup Language (XML) [XML1.0] document using the
Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF) and RID. By
following this model, integration with other aspects of the network
for incident handling is simplified. Finally, methods are
incorporated into the communication system to indicate what actions
need to be taken closest to the source in order to halt or mitigate
the effects of the attack at hand. RID is intended to provide a
method to communicate the relevant information between Computer
Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) while being compatible with
a variety of existing and possible future detection tracing and
response approaches.
At this point, RID has found use within the international research
communities, but has not been widely adopted in other sectors. This
publication provides the specification to those communities that have
adopted it, and communities currently considering solutions for real-
time inter-network defense. The specification may also accelerate
development of solutions where different transports or message
formats are required by leveraging the data elements and structures
specified here.
Security and privacy considerations are of high concern since
potentially sensitive information may be passed through RID messages.
RID messaging takes advantage of XML security and privacy policy
information set in the RID schema. The RID schema acts as an XML
envelope to support the communication of IODEF documents for
exchanging or tracing information regarding security incidents. RID
messages are encapsulated for transport, which is defined in a
Moriarty Informational PAGE 5
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
separate document [RFC 6046]. The authentication, integrity, and
authorization features each layer has to offer are used to achieve a
necessary level of security.
1.1. Normative and Informative
The XML schema [XMLschema] and transport requirements contained in
this document are normative; all other information provided is
intended as informative. More specifically, the following sections
of this document are intended as informative: Sections 1, 2, and 3;
and the sub-sections of 4 including the introduction to 4, 4.1, and
4.2. The following sections of this document are normative: The
sub-sections of 4 including 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5; Section 5; and
Section 6.
1.2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119].
1.3. Attack Types and RID Messaging
RID messaging is intended for use in coordinating incident handling
to locate the source of an attack and stop or mitigate the effects of
the attack. The attack types include system or network compromises,
denial-of-service attacks, or other malicious network traffic. RID
is essentially a messaging system coordinating attack detection,
tracing mechanisms, and the incident handling responses to locate the
source of traffic. If a source address is spoofed, a more detailed
trace of a packet (RID TraceRequest) would be required to locate the
true source. If the source address is valid, the incident handling
may only involve the use of routing information to determine what
network provider is closest to the source (RID Investigation request)
and can assist with the remediation. The type of RID message used to
locate a source is determined by the validity of the source address.
RID message types are discussed in Section 4.3.
DoS [DoS] attacks are characterized by large amounts of traffic
destined for particular Internet locations and can originate from a
single or multiple sources. An attack from multiple sources is known
as a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack. Because DDoS
attacks can originate from multiple sources, tracing such an attack
can be extremely difficult or nearly impossible. Many TraceRequests
may be required to accomplish the task and may require the use of
dedicated network resources to communicate incident handling
information to prevent a DoS attack against the RID system and
network used for tracing and remediation. Provisions are suggested
Moriarty Informational PAGE 6
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
to reduce the load and prevent the same trace from occurring twice on
a single-network backbone discussed in Section 4 on communication
between NPs. The attacks can be launched from systems across the
Internet unified in their efforts or by compromised systems enlisted
as "zombies" that are controlled by servers, thereby providing
anonymity to the controlling server of the attack. This scenario may
require multiple RID traces, one to locate the zombies and an
additional one to locate the controlling server. DDoS attacks do not
necessarily spoof the source of an attack since there are a large
number of source addresses, which make it difficult to trace anyway.
DDoS attacks can also originate from a single system or a subset of
systems that spoof the source address in packet headers in order to
mask the identity of the attack source. In this case, an iterative
trace through the upstream networks in the path of the attack traffic
may be required.
RID traces may also be used to locate a system used in an attack to
compromise another system. Compromising a system can be accomplished
through one of many attack vectors, using various techniques from a
remote host or through local privilege escalation attempts. The
attack may exploit a system or application level vulnerability that
may be the result of a design flaw or a configuration issue. A
compromised system, as described above, can be used to later attack
other systems. A single RID Investigation request may be used in
this case since it is probable that the source address is valid.
Identifying the sources of system compromises may be difficult since
an attacker may access the compromised system from various sources.
The attacker may also take measures to hide their tracks by deleting
log files or by accessing the system through a series of compromised
hosts. Iterative RID traces may be required for each of the
compromised systems used to obscure the source of the attack. If the
source address is valid, an Investigation request may be used in lieu
of a full RID TraceRequest.
Once an attack has been reported, CSIRTs may want to query other
CSIRTs if they have detected an attack or simply report that one has
taken place. The Report message can be used to file a report without
an action taken, and an IncidentQuery can be used to ask if an attack
has been seen by another CSIRT.
System compromises may result from other security incident types such
as worms, Trojans, or viruses. It is often the case that an incident
goes unreported even if valid source address information is available
because it is difficult to take any action to mitigate or stop the
attack. Incident handling is a difficult task for an NP and even at
some client locations due to network size and resource limitations.
Moriarty Informational PAGE 7
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
2. RID Integration with Network Provider Technologies
For the purpose of this document, a network provider (NP) shall be
defined as a backbone infrastructure manager of a network. The
network provider's Computer Security Incident Response Team shall be
referred to as the CSIRT. The backbone may be that of an
organization providing network (Internet or private) access to
commercial, personal, government, or educational institutions, or the
backbone provider of the connected network. The connected network
provider is an extension meant to include Intranet and Extranet
providers as well as instances such as a business or educational
institute's private network.
NPs typically manage and monitor their networks through a centralized
network management system (NMS). The acronym "NMS" will be used to
generically represent management systems on a network used for the
management of network resources. An incident handling system (IHS)
is used to communicate RID messages and may be integrated with an NMS
as well as other components of the network. The components of the
network that may be integrated through the RID messaging system
include attack or event detection, network tracing, and network
devices to stop the effects of an attack.
The detection of security incidents may rely on manual reporting,
automated intrusion detection tools, and variations in traffic types
or levels on a network. Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) may be
integrated into the IHS to create IODEF documents or RID messages to
facilitate security incident handling. Detection of a security
incident is outside the scope of this paper; however, it should be
possible to integrate detection methods with RID messaging.
RID messaging in an IHS is intended to be flexible in order to
accommodate various traceback systems currently in use as well as
those that may evolve with technology. RID is intended to
communicate the necessary information needed by a trace mechanism to
the next upstream NP in the path of a trace. Therefore, a RID
message must carry the superset of data required for all tracing
systems. If possible, the trace may need to inspect packets to
determine a pattern, which could assist reverse path identification.
This may be accomplished by inspecting packet header information such
as the source and destination IP addresses, ports, and protocol flags
to determine if there is a way to distinguish the packets being
traced from other packets. A description of the incident along with
any available automated trace data should trigger an alert to the
NP's CSIRT for further investigation. The various technologies used
to trace traffic across a network are described in Section 3.1.
Moriarty Informational PAGE 8
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
Another area of integration is the ability to mitigate or stop attack
traffic once a source has been located. Any automated solution
should consider the possible side effects to the network. A change
control process or a central point for configuration management might
be used to ensure that the security of the network and necessary
functionality are maintained and that equipment configuration changes
are documented. Automated solutions may depend upon the capabilities
and current configuration management solutions on a particular
network. The solutions may be based on HTTP/TLS (Transport Layer
Security) or an appropriate protocol defined in the transport
specification.
3. Characteristics of Attacks
The goal of tracing a security incident may be to identify the source
or to find a point on the network as close to the origin of the
incident as possible. A security incident may be defined as a system
compromise, a worm or Trojan infection, or a single- or multiple-
source denial-of-service attack. Incident tracing can be used to
identify the source(s) of an attack in order to halt or mitigate the
undesired behavior. The communication system, RID, described in this
paper can be used to trace any type of security incident and allows
for actions to be taken when the source of the attack or a point
closer to the source is known or has been identified. The purpose of
tracing an attack would be to halt or mitigate the effects of the
attack through methods such as filtering or rate-limiting the traffic
close to the source or by using methods such as taking the host or
network offline. Care must also be taken to ensure that the system
is not abused and to use proper analysis in determining if attack
traffic is, in fact, attack traffic at each NP along the path of a
trace.
Tracing security incidents can be a difficult task since attackers go
to great lengths to obscure their identity. In the case of a
security incident, the true source might be identified through an
existing established connection to the attacker's point of origin.
However, the attacker may not connect to the compromised system for a
long period of time after the initial compromise or may access the
system through a series of compromised hosts spread across the
network. Other methods of obscuring the source may include targeting
the host with the same attack from multiple sources using both valid
and spoofed source addresses. This tactic can be used to compromise
a machine and leave the difficult task of locating the true origin
for the administrators. Security incidents, including DDoS attacks,
can be difficult or nearly impossible to trace because of the nature
of the attack. Some of the difficulties in tracing attacks include
the following:
Moriarty Informational PAGE 9
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
o the attack originates from multiple sources;
o the attack may include various types of traffic meant to consume
server resources, such as a SYN flood attack without a significant
increase in bandwidth utilization;
o the type of traffic could include valid destination services,
which cannot be blocked since they are essential services to
business, such as DNS servers at an NP or HTTP requests sent to an
organization connected to the Internet;
o the attack may utilize varying types of packets including TCP,
UDP, ICMP, or other IP protocols;
o the attack may be from "zombies", which then require additional
searches to locate a controlling server as the true origin of the
attack;
o the attack may use a very small number of packets from any
particular source, thus making a trace after the fact nearly
impossible.
If the source(s) of the attack cannot be determined from IP address
information or tracing the increased bandwidth utilization, it may be
possible to trace the traffic based on the type of packets seen by
the client. In the case of packets with spoofed source addresses, it
is no longer a trivial task to identify the source of an attack. In
the case of an attack using valid source addresses, methods such as
the traceroute utility can be used to fairly accurately identify the
path of the traffic between the source and destination of an attack.
If the true source has been identified, actions should be taken to
halt or mitigate the effects of the attack by reporting the incident
to the NP or the upstream NP closest to the source. In the case of a
spoofed source address, other methods can be used to trace back to
the source of an attack. The methods include packet filtering,
packet hash comparisons, IP marking techniques, ICMP traceback, and
packet flow analysis. As in the case of attack detection, tracing
traffic across a single network is a function that can be used with
RID in order to provide the network with the ability to trace spoofed
traffic to the source, while RID provides all the necessary
information to accommodate the approach used on any single network to
accomplish this task. RID can also be used to report attack traffic
close to the source where the IP address used was determined to be
valid or simply to report that an incident occurred.
Moriarty Informational PAGE 10
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
3.1. Integrating Trace Approaches
There have been many separate research initiatives to solve the
problem of tracing upstream packets to detect the true source of
attack traffic. Upstream packet tracing is currently confined to the
borders of a network or an NP's network. Traces require access to
network equipment and resources, thus potentially limiting a trace to
a specific network. Once a trace reaches the boundaries of a
network, the network manager or NP adjacent in the upstream trace
must be contacted in order to continue the trace. NPs have been
working on individual solutions to accomplish upstream tracing within
their own network environments. The tracing mechanisms implemented
thus far have included proprietary or custom solutions requiring
specific information such as IP packet header data, hash values of
the attack packets, or marked packets. Hash values are used to
compare a packet against a database of packets that have passed
through the network as described in "Hash-Based IP Traceback"
[HASH-IPtrace]. Other research solutions involve marking packets as
explained in "ICMP Traceback Messages" [ICMPtrace], "Practical
network support for IP traceback" [NTWK-IPtrace], the IP Flow
Information eXport (IPFIX) protocol [RFC 3917], and IP marking
[IPtrace]. The single-network traceback solutions were considered in
developing RID to determine the information needed to accomplish an
inter-network trace where different solutions may be in place.
3.2. Superset of Packet Information for Traces
In order for network traffic to be traced across a network, an
example packet from the attack must be sent along with the
TraceRequest or Investigation request. According to the research for
hash-based IP traceback, all of the non-changing fields of an IP
header along with 8 bytes of payload are required to provide enough
information to uniquely trace the path of a packet. The non-changing
fields of the packet header and the 8 bytes of payload are the
superset of data required by most single-network tracing systems
used; limiting the shared data to the superset of the packet header
and 8 bytes of payload prevents the need for sharing potentially
sensitive information that may be contained in the data portion of a
packet.
The RecordItem class in the IODEF is used to store a hexadecimal
formatted packet including all packet header information plus 8 bytes
of payload, or the entire packet contents. The above trace systems
do not require a full packet, but it may be useful in some cases, so
the option is given to allow a full packet to be included in the data
model.
Moriarty Informational PAGE 11
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
If a subset of a packet is used, the research presented in "Hash-
Based IP Traceback" [HASH-IPtrace] provides guidelines to establish a
minimum requirement for distinguishing packets. The full packet and
content SHOULD be provided, but the minimum requirement MUST be
provided. The research from [HASH-IPtrace] found that the first 28
invariant bytes of a packet (masked IP header plus the first 8 bytes
of the payload) are sufficient to differentiate almost all non-
identical IPv4 packets. RID requires the first 28 invariant bytes of
an IPv4 packet in order to perform a trace. RID requires the first
48 invariant bytes for an IPv6 packet in order to distinguish the
packet in a trace. Reference [HASH-IPtrace] for additional details.
The input mechanism for packets to be traced should be flexible to
allow intrusion detection systems or packet sniffers to provide the
information. The system creating the RID message should also use the
packet information to populate the Incident class information in
order to avoid human error and also allow a system administrator to
override the automatically populated information.
4. Communication between Network Providers
Note: The Introduction, and Sub-sections 4.1 and 4.2, are
informative, with the exception of references to IODEF/RID Transport
[RFC 6046]. Sub-sections 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 are normative.
Expediting the communication between CSIRTs is essential when
responding to a security-related incident, which may cross network
access points (Internet backbones) between providers. As a result of
the urgency involved in this inter-NP security incident
communication, there must be an effective system in place to
facilitate the interaction. This communication policy or system
should involve multiple means of communication to avoid a single
point of failure. Email is one way to transfer information about the
incident, packet traces, etc. However, email may not be received in
a timely fashion or be acted upon with the same urgency as a phone
call or other communication mechanism.
Each NP should dedicate a phone number to reach a member of their
respective CSIRT. The phone number could be dedicated to inter-NP
incident communications and must be a hotline that provides a 24x7
live response. The phone line should reach someone who would have
the authority, expertise, and the means to expedite the necessary
action to investigate the incident. This may be a difficult policy
to establish at smaller NPs due to resource limitations, so another
solution may be necessary. An outside group may be able to serve
this function if given the necessary access to the NP's network. The
outside resource should be able to mitigate or alleviate the
financial limitations and any lack of experienced resource personnel.
Moriarty Informational PAGE 12
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
A technical solution to trace traffic across a single NP may include
homegrown or commercial systems for which RID messaging must
accommodate the input requirements. The IHS used on the NP's
backbone by the CSIRT to coordinate the trace across the single
network requires a method to accept and process RID messages and
relay TraceRequests to the system, as well as to wait for responses
from the system to continue the RID request process as appropriate.
In this scenario, each NP would maintain its own RID/IHS and
integrate with a management station used for network monitoring and
analysis. An alternative for NPs lacking sufficient resources may be
to have a neutral third party with access to the NP's network
resources who could be used to perform the incident handling
functions. This could be a function of a central organization
operating as a CSIRT for the Internet as a whole or within a
consortium that may be able to provide centralized resources.
Consortiums would consist of a group of NPs and/or CSIRTs that agree
to participate in the RID communication protocol with an agreed-upon
policy and communication protocol facilitating the secure transport
of IODEF/RID XML documents. Transport for RID messages is specified
in the IODEF/RID Transport [RFC 6046] document.
One goal of RID is to prevent the need to permit access to other
networks' equipment through the use of a standard messaging mechanism
to enable IHSs to communicate incident handling information to other
networks in a consortium or in neighboring networks. The third party
mentioned above may be used in this technical solution to assist in
facilitating incident handling and possibly traceback through smaller
NPs. The RID messaging mechanism may be a logical or physical out-
of-band network to ensure that the communication is secure and
unaffected by the state of the network under attack. The two
management methods would accommodate the needs of larger NPs to
maintain full management of their network, and the third-party option
could be available to smaller NPs who lack the necessary human
resources to perform incident handling operations. The first method
enables the individual NPs to involve their network operations staff
to authorize the continuance of a trace or other necessary response
to a RID communication request through their network via a
notification and alerting system. The out-of-band logical solution
for messaging may be permanent virtual circuits configured with a
small amount of bandwidth dedicated to RID communications between
NPs.
The network used for the communication should consist of out-of-band
or protected channels (direct communication links) or encrypted
channels dedicated to the transport of RID messages. The
communication links would be direct connections between network peers
who have agreed-upon use and abuse policies through the use of a
consortium. Consortiums might be linked through policy comparisons
Moriarty Informational PAGE 13
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
and additional agreements to form a larger web or iterative network
of peers that correlates to the traffic paths available over the
larger web of networks. The maintenance of the individual links is
the responsibility of the two network peers hosting the link.
Contact information, IP addresses of RID systems, and other
information must be coordinated between bilateral peers by a
consortium and may use existing databases, such as the Routing
Arbiter. The security, configuration, and Confidence rating schemes
of the RID messaging peers must be negotiated by peers and must meet
certain overall requirements of the fully connected network
(Internet, government, education, etc.) through the peering and/or a
consortium-based agreement.
RID messaging established with clients of an NP may be negotiated in
a contract as part of a value-added service or through a service
level agreement (SLA). Further discussion is beyond the scope of
this document and may be more appropriately handled in network
peering or service level agreements.
Procedures for incident handling need to be established and well
known by anyone that may be involved in incident response. The
procedures should also contain contact information for internal
escalation procedures, as well as for external assistance groups such
as a CSIRT, CERT Coordination Center (CERT/CC), Global Information
Assurance Certification (GIAC), and the FBI or other assisting
government organization in the country of the investigation.
4.1. Inter-Network Provider RID Messaging
In order to implement a messaging mechanism between RID communication
systems or IHSs, a standard protocol and format is required to ensure
inter-operability between vendors. The messages would have to meet
several requirements in order to be meaningful as they traverse
multiple networks. RID provides the framework necessary for
communication between networks involved in the incident handling,
possible traceback, and mitigation of a security incident. Several
message types described in Section 4.3 are necessary to facilitate
the handling of a security incident. The message types include the
Report, IncidentQuery, TraceRequest, RequestAuthorization, Result,
and the Investigation request message. The Report message is used
when an incident is to be filed on a RID system or associated
database, where no further action is required. An IncidentQuery
message is used to request information on a particular incident. A
TraceRequest message is used when the source of the traffic may have
been spoofed. In that case, each network provider in the upstream
path who receives a TraceRequest will issue a trace across the
network to determine the upstream source of the traffic. The
RequestAuthorization and Result messages are used to communicate the
Moriarty Informational PAGE 14
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
status and result of a TraceRequest or Investigation request. The
Investigation request message would only involve the RID
communication systems along the path to the source of the traffic and
not the use of network trace systems. The Investigation request
leverages the bilateral relationships or a consortium's
interconnections to mitigate or stop problematic traffic close to the
source. Routes could determine the fastest path to a known source IP
address in the case of an Investigation request. A message sent
between RID systems for a TraceRequest or an Investigation request to
stop traffic at the source through a bordering network would require
the information enumerated below:
1. Enough information to enable the network administrators to make a
decision about the importance of continuing the trace.
2. The incident or IP packet information needed to carry out the
trace or investigation.
3. Contact information of the origin of the RID communication. The
contact information could be provided through the Autonomous
System Number (ASN) [RFC 1930] or Network Information Center (NIC)
handle information listed in the Registry for Internet Numbers or
other Internet databases.
4. Network path information to help prevent any routing loops through
the network from perpetuating a trace. If a RID system receives a
TraceRequest containing its own information in the path, the trace
must cease and the RID system should generate an alert to inform
the network operations staff that a tracing loop exists.
5. A unique identifier for a single attack. This identifier should
be used to correlate traces to multiple sources in a DDoS attack.
Use of the communication network and the RID protocol must be for
pre-approved, authorized purposes only. It is the responsibility of
each participating party to adhere to guidelines set forth in both a
global use policy for this system and one established through the
peering agreements for each bilateral peer or agreed-upon consortium
guidelines. The purpose of such policies is to avoid abuse of the
system; the policies shall be developed by a consortium of
participating entities. The global policy may be dependent on the
domain it operates under; for example, a government network or a
commercial network such as the Internet would adhere to different
guidelines to address the individual concerns. Privacy issues must
be considered in public networks such as the Internet. Privacy
issues are discussed in the Security Considerations section, along
with other requirements that must be agreed upon by participating
entities.
Moriarty Informational PAGE 15
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
RID requests must be legitimate security-related incidents and not
used for purposes such as sabotage or censorship. An example of such
abuse of the system would include a request to rate-limit legitimate
traffic to prevent information from being shared between users on the
Internet (restricting access to online versions of papers) or
restricting access from a competitor's product in order to sabotage a
business.
The RID system should be configurable to either require user input or
automatically continue traces. This feature would enable a network
manager to assess the available resources before continuing a trace.
A trace initiated from a TraceRequest may cause adverse effects on a
network. If the Confidence rating is low, it may not be in the NP's
best interest to continue the trace. The Confidence ratings must
adhere to the specifications for selecting the percentage used to
avoid abuse of the system. TraceRequests must be issued by
authorized individuals from the initiating network, set forth in
policy guidelines established through peering or SLA.
4.2. RID Network Topology
The most basic topology for communicating RID systems would be a
direct connection or a bilateral relationship as illustrated below.
___________ __________
| | | |
| RID |__________-------------___________| RID |
|_________| | NP Border | |________|
-------------
Figure 1. Direct Peer Topology
Within the consortium model, several topologies might be agreed upon
and used. One would leverage bilateral network peering relationships
of the members of the consortium. The peers for RID would match that
of routing peers, and the logical network borders would be used.
This approach may be necessary for an iterative trace where the
source is unknown. The model would look like the above diagram;
however, there may be an extensive number of interconnections of
bilateral relationships formed. Also within a consortium model, it
may be useful to establish an integrated mesh of networks to pass RID
messages. This may be beneficial when the source address is known,
and an interconnection may provide a faster route to reach the
closest upstream peer to the source of the attack traffic. An
example is illustrated below.
Moriarty Informational PAGE 16
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
_______ _______ _______
| | | | | |
__| RID |____-------------____| RID |____-------------____| RID |__
|_____| | NP Border | |_____| | NP Border | |_____|
| ------------- ------------- |
|_______________________________________________________|
Direct connection to network that is not an immediate network peer
Figure 2. Mesh Peer Topology
By using a fully meshed model in a consortium, broadcasting RID
requests would be possible, but not advisable. By broadcasting a
request, RID peers that may not have carried the attack traffic on
their network would be asked to perform a trace for the potential of
decreasing the time in which the true source was identified. As a
result, many networks would have utilized unnecessary resources for a
TraceRequest that may have also been unnecessary.
4.3. Message Formats
Section 4.3.2 describes the six RID message types, which are based on
the IODEF model [RFC 5070]. The messages are generated and received
on RID communication systems on the NP's network. The messages may
originate from IODEF messages from intrusion detection servers,
CSIRTs, analysts, etc. A RID message uses the IODEF framework with
the RID extension, which is encapsulated for transport [RFC 6046].
Each RID message type, along with an example, is described in the
following sections. The IODEF-RID schema is introduced in
Section 4.3.3 to support the RID message types in Section 4.3.2.
4.3.1. RID Data Types
RID is derived from the IODEF data model and inherits all of the data
types defined in the IODEF model. One data type is added by RID:
BOOLEAN.
4.3.1.1. Boolean
A boolean value is represented by the BOOLEAN data type.
The BOOLEAN data type is implemented as "xs:boolean" [XMLschema] in
the schema.
Moriarty Informational PAGE 17
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
4.3.2. RID Messages and Transport
The six RID message types follow:
1. TraceRequest. This message is sent to the RID system next in the
upstream trace. It is used to initiate a TraceRequest or to
continue a TraceRequest to an upstream network closer to the
source address of the origin of the security incident. The
TraceRequest would trigger a traceback on the network to locate
the source of the attack traffic.
2. RequestAuthorization. This message is sent to the initiating RID
system from each of the upstream NPs' RID systems to provide
information on the request status in the current network.
3. Result. This message is sent to the initiating RID system through
the network of RID systems in the path of the trace as
notification that the source of the attack was located. The
Result message is also used to provide the notification of actions
taken for an Investigation request.
4. Investigation. This message type is used when the source of the
traffic is believed not to be spoofed. The purpose of the
Investigation request message is to leverage the existing peer
relationships in order to notify the network provider closest to
the source of the valid traffic of a security-related incident for
any necessary actions to be taken.
5. Report. This message is used to report a security incident, for
which no action is requested. This may be used for the purpose of
correlating attack information by CSIRTs, statistics and trending
information, etc.
6. IncidentQuery. This message is used to request information about
an incident or incident type from a trusted RID system. The
response is provided through the Report message.
When a system receives a RID message, it must be able to determine
the type of message and parse it accordingly. The message type is
specified in the RIDPolicy class. The RIDPolicy class may also be
used by the transport protocol to facilitate the communication of
security incident data to trace, investigate, query, or report
information regarding security incidents.
Moriarty Informational PAGE 18
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
4.3.3. IODEF-RID Schema
There are three classes included in the RID extension required to
facilitate RID communications. The RequestStatus class is used to
indicate the approval status of a TraceRequest or Investigation
request; the IncidentSource class is used to report whether or not a
source was found and to identify the source host(s) or network(s);
and the RIDPolicy class provides information on the agreed-upon
policies and specifies the type of communication message being used.
The RID schema acts as an envelope for the IODEF schema to facilitate
RID communications. The intent in maintaining a separate schema and
not using the AdditionalData extension of IODEF is the flexibility of
sending messages between RID hosts. Since RID is a separate schema
that includes the IODEF schema, the RID information acts as an
envelope, and then the RIDPolicy class can be easily extracted for
use by the transport protocol. The security requirements of sending
incident information across the network include the use of
encryption. The RIDPolicy information is not required to be
encrypted, so separating out this data from the IODEF extension
removes the need for decrypting and parsing the entire IODEF and RID
document to determine how it should be handled at each RID host.
The purpose of the RIDPolicy class is to specify the message type for
the receiving host, facilitate the policy needs of RID, and provide
routing information in the form of an IP address of the destination
RID system.
The policy information and guidelines are discussed in Section 6.6.
The policy is defined between RID peers and within or between
consortiums. The RIDPolicy is meant to be a tool to facilitate the
defined policies. This MUST be used in accordance with policy set
between clients, peers, consortiums, and/or regions. Security,
privacy, and confidentiality MUST be considered as specified in this
document.
Moriarty Informational PAGE 19
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
The RID schema is defined as follows:
+------------------+
| RID |
+------------------+
| ANY |
| |<>---{0..1}----[ RIDPolicy ]
| ENUM restriction |
| ENUM type |<>---{0..1}----[ RequestStatus ]
| STRING meaning |
| |<>---{0..1}----[ IncidentSource ]
+------------------+
Figure 3. The RID Schema
The aggregate classes that constitute the RID schema in the iodef-rid
namespace are as follows:
RIDPolicy
Zero or One. The RIDPolicy class is used by all message types to
facilitate policy agreements between peers, consortiums, or
federations, as well as to properly route messages.
RequestStatus
Zero or One. The RequestStatus class is used only in
RequestAuthorization messages to report back to the originating
RID system if the trace will be continued by each RID system that
received a TraceRequest in the path to the source of the traffic.
IncidentSource
Zero or One. The IncidentSource class is used in the Result
message only. The IncidentSource provides the information on the
identified source host or network of an attack trace or
investigation.
Each of the three listed classes may be the only class included in
the RID class, hence the option for zero or one. In some cases,
RIDPolicy MAY be the only class in the RID definition when used by
the transport protocol [RFC 6046], as that information should be as
small as possible and may not be encrypted. The RequestStatus
message MUST be able to stand alone without the need for an IODEF
document to facilitate the communication, limiting the data
transported to the required elements per [RFC 6046].
Moriarty Informational PAGE 20
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
4.3.3.1. RequestStatus Class
The RequestStatus class is an aggregate class in the RID class.
+--------------------------------+
| RequestStatus |
+--------------------------------+
| |
| ENUM restriction |
| ENUM AuthorizationStatus |
| ENUM Justification |
| STRING ext-AuthorizationStatus |
| STRING ext-Justification |
| |
+--------------------------------+
Figure 4. The RequestStatus Class
The RequestStatus class has five attributes:
restriction
OPTIONAL. ENUM. This attribute indicates the disclosure
guidelines to which the sender expects the recipient to adhere.
This guideline provides no real security since it is the choice of
the recipient of the document to honor it. This attribute follows
the same guidelines as "restriction" used in IODEF.
AuthorizationStatus
REQUIRED. ENUM. The listed values are used to provide a response
to the requesting CSIRT of the status of a TraceRequest in the
current network.
1. Approved. The trace was approved and will begin in the
current NP.
2. Denied. The trace was denied in the current NP. The next
closest NP can use this message to filter traffic from the
upstream NP using the example packet to help mitigate the
effects of the attack as close to the source as possible. The
RequestAuthorization message must be passed back to the
originator and a Result message used from the closest NP to the
source to indicate actions taken in the IODEF History class.
Moriarty Informational PAGE 21
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
3. Pending. Awaiting approval; a timeout period has been reached,
which resulted in this Pending status and RequestAuthorization
message being generated.
4. ext-value. An escape value used to extend this attribute. See
IODEF [RFC 5070], Section 5.1.
Justification
OPTIONAL. ENUM. Provides a reason for a Denied or Pending
message.
1. SystemResource. A resource issue exists on the systems that
would be involved in the request.
2. Authentication. The enveloped digital signature [RFC 3275]
failed to validate.
3. AuthenticationOrigin. The detached digital signature for the
original requestor on the IP packet failed to validate.
4. Encryption. Unable to decrypt the request.
5. Other. There were other reasons this request could not be
processed.
6. ext-value. An escape value used to extend this attribute. See
IODEF [RFC 5070], Section 5.1.
AuthorizationStatus-ext
OPTIONAL. STRING. A means by which to extend the
AuthorizationStatus attribute. See IODEF [RFC 5070], Section 5.1.
Justification-ext
OPTIONAL. STRING. A means by which to extend the Justification
attribute. See IODEF [RFC 5070], Section 5.1.
Moriarty Informational PAGE 22
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
4.3.3.2. IncidentSource Class
The IncidentSource class is an aggregate class in the RID class.
+-------------------+
| IncidentSource |
+-------------------+
| |
| ENUM restriction |
| |<>-------------[ SourceFound ]
| |
| |<>---{0..*}----[ Node ]
| |
+-------------------+
Figure 5. The IncidentSource Class
The elements that constitute the IncidentSource class follow:
SourceFound
One. BOOLEAN. The Source class indicates if a source was
identified. If the source was identified, it is listed in the
Node element of this class.
True. Source of incident was identified.
False. Source of incident was not identified.
Node
One. The Node class is used to identify a host or network device,
in this case to identify the system communicating RID messages.
The base definition of this class is reused from the IODEF
specification [RFC 5070], Section 3.16.
The IncidentSource class has one attribute:
restriction
OPTIONAL. ENUM. This attribute indicates the disclosure
guidelines to which the sender expects the recipient to adhere.
This guideline provides no real security since it is the choice of
the recipient of the document to honor it. This attribute follows
the same guidelines as "restriction" used in IODEF.
Moriarty Informational PAGE 23
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
4.3.3.3. RIDPolicy Class
The RIDPolicy class facilitates the delivery of RID messages and is
also referenced for transport in the transport document [RFC 6046].
+------------------------+
| RIDPolicy |
+------------------------+
| |
| ENUM restriction |<>-------------[ Node ]
| ENUM MsgType |
| ENUM MsgDestination |<>---{0..1}----[ IncidentID ]
| ENUM ext-MsgType |
| ENUM ext-MsgDestination|<>---{1..*}----[ PolicyRegion ]
| |
| |<>---{1..*}----[ TrafficType ]
| |
+------------------------+
Figure 6. The RIDPolicy Class
The aggregate elements that constitute the RIDPolicy class are as
follows:
Node
One. The Node class is used to identify a host or network device,
in this case to identify the system communicating RID messages.
The base definition of this class is reused from the IODEF
specification [RFC 5070], Section 3.16.
IncidentID
Zero or one. Global reference pointing back to the IncidentID
defined in the IODEF data model. The IncidentID includes the name
of the CSIRT, an incident number, and an instance of that
incident. The instance number is appended with a dash separating
the values and is used in cases for which it may be desirable to
group incidents. Examples of incidents that may be grouped would
be botnets, DDoS attacks, multiple hops of compromised systems
found during an investigation, etc.
PolicyRegion
One or many. REQUIRED. The values for the attribute "region" are
used to determine what policy area may require consideration
before a trace can be approved. The PolicyRegion may include
Moriarty Informational PAGE 24
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
multiple selections from the attribute list in order to fit all
possible policy considerations when crossing regions, consortiums,
or networks.
region
One. ENUM.
1. ClientToNP. An enterprise network initiated the request.
2. NPToClient. An NP passed a RID request to a client or an
enterprise attached network to the NP based on the service
level agreements.
3. IntraConsortium. A trace that should have no restrictions
within the boundaries of a consortium with the agreed-upon use
and abuse guidelines.
4. PeerToPeer. A trace that should have no restrictions between
two peers but may require further evaluation before continuance
beyond that point with the agreed-upon use and abuse
guidelines.
5. BetweenConsortiums. A trace that should have no restrictions
between consortiums that have established agreed-upon use and
abuse guidelines.
6. AcrossNationalBoundaries. This selection must be set if the
trace type is anything but a trace of attack traffic with
malicious intent. This must also be set if the traffic request
is based upon regulations of a specific nation that would not
apply to all nations. This is different from the
"BetweenConsortiums" setting since it may be possible to have
multiple nations as members of the same consortium, and this
option must be selected if the traffic is of a type that may
have different restrictions in other nations.
7. ext-value. An escape value used to extend this attribute. See
IODEF [RFC 5070], Section 5.1.
Moriarty Informational PAGE 25
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
TrafficType
One or many. REQUIRED. The values for the attribute "type" are
meant to assist in determining if a trace is appropriate for the
NP receiving the request to continue the trace. Multiple values
may be selected for this element; however, where possible, it
should be restricted to one value that would most accurately
describe the traffic type.
type
One. ENUM.
1. Attack. This option should only be selected if the traffic is
related to a network-based attack. The type of attack MUST
also be listed in more detail in the IODEF Method and Impact
classes for further clarification to assist in determining if
the trace can be continued ([RFC 5070], Sections 3.9 and
3.10.1).
2. Network. This option MUST only be selected when the trace is
related to NP network traffic or routing issues.
3. Content. This category MUST be used only in the case in which
the request is related to the content and regional restrictions
on accessing that type of content exist. This is not malicious
traffic but may include determining what sources or
destinations accessed certain materials available on the
Internet, including, but not limited to, news, technology, or
inappropriate content.
4. OfficialBusiness. This option MUST be used if the traffic
being traced is requested or is affiliated with any government
or other official business request. This would be used during
an investigation by government authorities or other government
traces to track suspected criminal or other activities.
5. Other. If this option is selected, a description of the
traffic type MUST be provided so that policy decisions can be
made to continue or stop the trace. The information should be
provided in the IODEF message in the Expectation class or in
the History class using a HistoryItem log.
6. ext-value. An escape value used to extend this attribute. See
IODEF [RFC 5070], Section 5.1.
Moriarty Informational PAGE 26
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
The RIDPolicy class has five attributes:
restriction
OPTIONAL. ENUM. This attribute indicates the disclosure
guidelines to which the sender expects the recipient to adhere.
This guideline provides no real security since it is the choice of
the recipient of the document to honor it. This attribute follows
the same guidelines as "restriction" used in IODEF.
MsgType
REQUIRED. ENUM. The type of RID message sent. The six types of
messages are described in Section 4.3.2 and can be noted as one of
the six selections below.
1. TraceRequest. This message may be used to initiate a
TraceRequest or to continue a TraceRequest to an upstream
network closer to the source address of the origin of the
security incident.
2. RequestAuthorization. This message is sent to the initiating
RID system from each of the upstream RID systems to provide
information on the request status in the current network.
3. Result. This message indicates that the source of the attack
was located and the message is sent to the initiating RID
system through the RID systems in the path of the trace.
4. Investigation. This message type is used when the source of
the traffic is believed to be valid. The purpose of the
Investigation request is to leverage the existing peer or
consortium relationships in order to notify the NP closest to
the source of the valid traffic that some event occurred, which
may be a security-related incident.
5. Report. This message is used to report a security incident,
for which no action is requested in the IODEF Expectation
class. This may be used for the purpose of correlating attack
information by CSIRTs, statistics and trending information,
etc.
6. IncidentQuery. This message is used to request information
from a trusted RID system about an incident or incident type.
Moriarty Informational PAGE 27
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
Additionally, there is an extension attribute to add new
enumerated values:
- ext-value. An escape value used to extend this attribute. See
IODEF [RFC 5070], Section 5.1.
MsgDestination
REQUIRED. ENUM. The destination required at this level may
either be the RID messaging system intended to receive the
request, or, in the case of an Investigation request, the source
of the incident. In the case of an Investigation request, the RID
system that can help stop or mitigate the traffic may not be
known, and the message may have to traverse RID messaging systems
by following the routing path to the RID system closest to the
source of the attack traffic. The Node element lists either the
RID system or the IP address of the source, and the meaning of the
value in the Node element is determined by the MsgDestination
element.
1. RIDSystem. The address listed in the Node element of the
RIDPolicy class is the next upstream RID system that will
receive the RID message.
2. SourceOfIncident. The address listed in the Node element of
the RIDPolicy class is the incident source. The IP address is
used to determine the path of RID systems that will be used to
find the closest RID system to the source of an attack in which
the IP address used by the source is believed to be valid and
an Investigation request message is used. This is not to be
confused with the IncidentSource class, as the defined value
here is from an initial trace or Investigation request, not the
source used in a Result message.
3. ext-value. An escape value used to extend this attribute. See
IODEF [RFC 5070], Section 5.1.
MsgType-ext
OPTIONAL. STRING. A means by which to extend the MsgType
attribute. See IODEF [RFC 5070], Section 5.1.
MsgDestination-ext
OPTIONAL. STRING. A means by which to extend the MsgDestination
attribute. See IODEF [RFC 5070], Section 5.1.
Moriarty Informational PAGE 28
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
4.3.4. RID Namespace
The RID schema declares a namespace of "iodef-rid-1.0" and registers
it per [XMLnames]. Each IODEF-RID document MUST use the "iodef-
rid-1.0" namespace in the top-level element RID-Document. It can be
referenced as follows:
<RID-Document
version="1.00" lang="en-US"
xmlns:iodef-rid="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-1.0"
xsi:schemaLocation=http://www.iana.org/assignments/xml-registry/
schema/iodef-rid-1.0.xsd">
4.4. RID Messages
The IODEF model is followed as specified in [RFC 5070] for each of the
RID message types. The RID schema is used in combination with IODEF
documents to facilitate RID communications. Each message type varies
slightly in format and purpose; hence, the requirements vary and are
specified for each. All classes, elements, attributes, etc., that
are defined in the IODEF-Document are valid in the context of a RID
message; however, some listed as optional in IODEF are mandatory for
RID as listed for each message type. The IODEF model MUST be fully
implemented to ensure proper parsing of all RID messages.
Note: The implementation of the RID system may obtain some of the
information needed to fill in the content required for each message
type automatically from packet input to the system or default
information such as that used in the EventData class.
4.4.1. TraceRequest
Description: This message or document is sent to the network
management station next in the upstream trace once the upstream
source of the traffic has been identified.
The following information is required for TraceRequest messages and
is provided through:
RID Information:
RIDPolicy
RID message type, IncidentID, and destination
policy information
IODEF Information:
Time Stamps (DetectTime, StartTime, EndTime, ReportTime).
Moriarty Informational PAGE 29
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
Incident Identifier (Incident class, IncidentID).
Trace number - used for multiple traces of a single
incident; must be noted.
Confidence rating of security incident (Impact and Confidence
class).
System class is used to list both the Source and Destination
Information used in the attack and must note if the traffic
is spoofed, thus requiring an upstream TraceRequest in RID.
Expectation class should be used to request any specific
actions to be taken close to the source.
Path information of nested RID systems, beginning with the
request originator used in the trace using IODEF EventData
with category set to "infrastructure".
Event, Record, and RecordItem classes to include example
packets and other information related to the incident.
Note: Event information included here requires a second
instance of EventData in addition to that used to convey NP
path contact information.
Standards for encryption and digital signatures [RFC 3275],
[XMLsig]:
Digital signature from initiating RID system, passed to all
systems in upstream trace using XML digital signature.
A DDoS attack can have many sources, resulting in multiple traces to
locate the sources of the attack. It may be valid to continue
multiple traces for a single attack. The path information would
enable the administrators to determine if the exact trace had already
passed through a single network. The Incident Identifier must also
be used to identify multiple TraceRequests from a single incident.
If a single TraceRequest results in divergent paths of TraceRequests,
a separate instance number MUST be used under the same IncidentID.
The IncidentID instance number of IODEF can be used to correlate
related incident data that is part of a larger incident.
4.4.2. RequestAuthorization
Description: This message is sent to the initiating RID system from
the next upstream NP's RID system to provide information on the
request status in the current network.
Moriarty Informational PAGE 30
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
The following information is required for RequestAuthorization
messages and is provided through:
RID Information:
RIDPolicy
RID message type, IncidentID, and destination
policy information
Status of TraceRequest
RequestStatus class in RID schema
Standards for encryption and digital signatures [RFC 3275],
[XMLsig]:
Digital signature of responding NP for authenticity of Trace
Status Message, from the NP creating this message using XML
digital signature.
A message is sent back to the initiating RID system of the trace as
status notification. This message verifies that the next RID system
in the path has received the message from the previous system in the
path. This message also verifies that the trace is now continuing,
has stopped, or is pending in the next upstream RID system. The
Pending status would be automatically generated after a 2-minute
timeout without system-predefined or administrator action taken to
approve or disapprove the trace continuance. If a Request is denied,
the originator and sending peer (if they are not the same) MUST both
receive the message. This enables the sending peer the option to
take action to stop or mitigate the traffic as close to the source as
possible.
4.4.3. Result
Description: This message indicates that the trace or investigation
has been completed and provides the result. The Result message
includes information on whether or not a source was found and the
source information through the IncidentSource class. The Result
information MUST go back to the originating RID system that began the
investigation or trace. An NP may use any number of incident
handling data sources to ascertain the true source of an attack. All
of the possible information sources may or may not be readily tied
into the RID communications system.
Moriarty Informational PAGE 31
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
The following information is required for Result messages and will be
provided through:
RID Information:
RIDPolicy
RID message type, IncidentID, and destination
policy information
Incident Source
The IncidentSource class of the RID schema is used to note
if a source was identified and provide the source
address(es).
IODEF Information:
Time Stamps (DetectTime, StartTime, EndTime, ReportTime).
Incident Identifier (Incident class, IncidentID).
Trace number - used for multiple traces of a single
incident; must be noted.
Confidence rating of security incident (Impact and Confidence
class).
System class is used to list both the Source and Destination
Information used in the attack and must note if the traffic
is spoofed, thus requiring an upstream TraceRequest in RID.
History class "atype" attribute is used to note any actions
taken.
History class also notes any other background information
including notes about the confidence level or rating of the
result information.
Path information of nested RID systems, beginning with the
request originator used in the trace using IODEF EventData
with category set to "infrastructure". The last NP listed
is the NP that located the source of the traffic (the NP
sending the Result message).
Event, Record, and RecordItem classes to include example
packets and other information related to the incident
(optional).
Note: Event information included here requires a second
instance of EventData in addition to that used to convey NP
path contact information.
Moriarty Informational PAGE 32
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
Standards for encryption and digital signatures [RFC 3275]:
Digital signature of source NP for authenticity of Result
Message, from the NP creating this message using XML digital
signature.
A message is sent back to the initiating RID system to notify the
associated CSIRT that the source has been located. The actual source
information may or may not be included, depending on the policy of
the network in which the client or host is attached. Any action
taken by the NP to act upon the discovery of the source of a trace
should be included. The NP may be able to automate the adjustment of
filters at their border router to block outbound access for the
machine(s) discovered as a part of the attack. The filters may be
comprehensive enough to block all Internet access until the host has
taken the appropriate action to resolve any security issues or to
rate-limit the ingress traffic as close to the source as possible.
Security and privacy considerations discussed in Section 6 MUST be
taken into account.
Note: The History class has been expanded in IODEF to accommodate all
of the possible actions taken as a result of a RID TraceRequest or
Investigation request using the "iodef:atype", or action type,
attribute. The History class should be used to note all actions
taken close to the source of a trace or incident using the most
appropriate option for the type of action along with a description.
The "atype" attribute in the Expectation class can also be used to
request an appropriate action when a TraceRequest or Investigation
request is made.
4.4.4. Investigation Request
Description: This message type is used when the source of the traffic
is believed not to be spoofed. The purpose of the Investigation
request message is to leverage the existing bilateral peer
relationships in order to notify the network provider closest to the
source of the valid traffic that some event occurred, which may be a
security-related incident.
The following information is required for Investigation request
messages and is provided through:
RID Information:
RID Policy
RID message type, IncidentID, and destination
policy information
Moriarty Informational PAGE 33
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
IODEF Information:
Time Stamps (DetectTime, StartTime, EndTime, ReportTime).
Incident Identifier (Incident class, IncidentID).
Trace number - used for multiple traces of a single
incident; must be noted.
Confidence rating of security incident (Impact and Confidence
class).
System class is used to list both the Source and Destination
Information used in the attack and must note if the traffic
is spoofed, thus requiring an upstream TraceRequest in RID.
Expectation class should be used to request any specific
actions to be taken close to the source.
Path information of nested RID systems, beginning with the
request originator used in the trace using IODEF EventData
with category set to "infrastructure".
Event, Record, and RecordItem classes to include example
packets and other information related to the incident.
Note: Event information included here requires a second
instance of EventData in addition to that used to convey NP
path contact information.
Standards for encryption and digital signatures [RFC 3275]:
Digital signature from initiating RID system, passed to all
systems in upstream trace using XML digital signature.
Security considerations would include the ability to encrypt
[XMLencrypt] the contents of the Investigation request message using
the public key of the destination RID system. The incident number
would increase as if it were a TraceRequest message in order to
ensure uniqueness within the system. The relaying peers would also
append their Autonomous System (AS) or RID system information as the
request message was relayed along the web of network providers so
that the Result message could utilize the same path as the set of
trust relationships for the return message, thus indicating any
actions taken. The request would also be recorded in the state
tables of both the initiating and destination NP RID systems. The
destination NP is responsible for any actions taken as a result of
the request in adherence to any service level agreements or internal
policies. The NP should confirm that the traffic actually originated
from the suspected system before taking any action and confirm the
Moriarty Informational PAGE 34
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
reason for the request. The request may be sent directly to a known
RID system or routed by the source address of the attack using the
message destination of RIDPolicy, SourceOfIncident.
Note: All intermediate parties must be able to view RIDPolicy
information in order to properly direct RID messages.
4.4.5. Report
Description: This message or document is sent to a RID system to
provide a report of a security incident. This message does not
require any actions to be taken, except to file the report on the
receiving RID system or associated database.
The following information is required for Report messages and will be
provided through:
RID Information:
RID Policy RID message type, IncidentID, and destination
policy information
The following data is recommended if available and can be provided
through:
IODEF Information:
Time Stamps (DetectTime, StartTime, EndTime, ReportTime).
Incident Identifier (Incident class, IncidentID).
Trace number - used for multiple traces of a single
incident; must be noted.
Confidence rating of security incident (Impact and Confidence
class).
System class is used to list both the Source and Destination
Information used in the attack.
Event, Record, and RecordItem classes to include example
packets and other information related to the incident
(optional).
Standards for encryption and digital signatures [RFC 3275]:
Digital signature from initiating RID system, passed to all
systems receiving the report using XML digital signature.
Moriarty Informational PAGE 35
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
Security considerations would include the ability to encrypt
[XMLencrypt] the contents of the Report message using the public key
of the destination RID system. Senders of a Report message should
note that the information may be used to correlate security incident
information for the purpose of trending, pattern detection, etc., and
may be shared with other parties unless otherwise agreed upon with
the receiving RID system. Therefore, sending parties of a Report
message may obfuscate or remove destination addresses or other
sensitive information before sending a Report message. A Report
message may be sent either to file an incident report or in response
to an IncidentQuery, and data sensitivity must be considered in both
cases. The NP path information is not necessary for this message, as
it will be communicated directly between two trusted RID systems.
4.4.6. IncidentQuery
Description: The IncidentQuery message is used to request incident
information from a trusted RID system. The request can include the
incident number, if known, or detailed information about the
incident. If the incident number is known, the Report message
containing the incident information can easily be returned to the
trusted requestor using automated methods. If an example packet or
other unique information is included in the IncidentQuery, the return
report may be automated; otherwise, analyst intervention may be
required.
The following information must be used for an IncidentQuery message
and is provided through:
RID Information:
RID Policy
RID message type, IncidentID, and destination
policy information
IODEF Information (optional):
Time Stamps (DetectTime, StartTime, EndTime, ReportTime).
Incident Identifier (Incident class, IncidentID).
Trace number - used for multiple traces of a single
incident; must be noted.
Confidence rating of security incident (Impact and Confidence
class).
System class is used to list both the Source and Destination
Information used in the attack.
Moriarty Informational PAGE 36
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
Event, Record, and RecordItem classes to include example
packets and other information related to the incident
(optional).
Standards for encryption and digital signatures [RFC 3275]:
Digital signature from initiating RID system, passed to all
systems receiving the IncidentQuery using XML digital
signature. If a packet is not included, the signature may be
based on the RIDPolicy class.
The proper response to the IncidentQuery message is a Report message.
Multiple incidents may be returned for a single query if an incident
type is requested. In this case, the receiving system would send an
IODEF document containing multiple incidents or all instances of an
incident. The system sending the reply may pre-set a limit to the
number of documents returned in one report. The recommended limit
is 5, to prevent the documents from becoming too large. Other
transfer methods may be suited better than RID for large transfers of
data. The Confidence rating may be used in the IncidentQuery message
to select only incidents with an equal or higher Confidence rating
than what is specified. This may be used for cases when information
is gathered on a type of incident but not on specifics about a single
incident. Source and Destination Information may not be needed if
the IncidentQuery is intended to gather data about a specific type of
incident as well.
4.5. RID Communication Exchanges
The following section outlines the communication flows for RID and
also provides examples of messages. The proper response to a
TraceRequest is a RequestAuthorization message. The
RequestAuthorization message lets the requestor know if the trace
will continue through the next upstream network. If there is a
problem with the request, such as a failure to validate the digital
signature or decrypt the request, a RequestAuthorization message MUST
be sent to the requestor and the downstream peer (if they are not one
and the same) providing the reason why the message could not be
processed. Assuming that the trace continued, additional
TraceRequests with the response of a RequestAuthorization message
would occur passing the request upstream in the path to the source of
the traffic related to the incident. Once a source is found, a
Result message is sent to the originator of the trace, as determined
by the NP path information provided through the document instance of
EventData, where contact is set to "infrastructure". The NP path
information is also used when sending the RequestAuthorization
messages to the first entry (the trace originator) and the last
nested entry (the downstream peer). The Result message is encrypted
Moriarty Informational PAGE 37
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
[XMLencrypt] for the originator providing information about the
incident source and any actions taken. If the originator fails to
decrypt or authenticate the Result message, a RequestAuthorization
message is sent in response; otherwise, no return message is sent.
If a RequestAuthorization message is sent with the RequestStatus set
to Denied, a downstream peer receiving this message may choose to
take action to stop or mitigate the traffic at that point in the
network, as close to the source as possible. If the downstream peer
chooses this option, it would send a Result message to the trace
originator.
Note: For each example listed below, [RFC 5735] addresses were used.
Assume that each IP address listed is actually a separate network
range held by different NPs. Addresses were used from /27 network
ranges.
Moriarty Informational PAGE 38
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
4.5.1. Upstream Trace Communication Flow
The diagram below outlines the RID TraceRequest communication flow
between RID systems on different networks tracing an attack.
Attack Dest NP-1 NP-2 NP-3 Attack Src
1. Attack | Attack
reported | detected
2. Initiate trace
3. Locate origin
through
upstream NP
4. o---TraceRequest----->
5. Trace
Initiated
6. <-RequestAuthorization-o
7. Locate origin
through
upstream NP
8. o---TraceRequest--->
9. Trace Initiated
10. <----------RequestAuthorization----o
<---RequestAuth---o
11. Locate attack
source on network X
12. <------------Result----------------o
Figure 7. TraceRequest Communication Flow
Before a trace is initiated, the RID system should verify if an
instance of the trace or a similar request is not active. The traces
may be resource intensive; therefore, providers need to be able to
detect potential abuse of the system or unintentional resource
drains. Information such as the Source and Destination Information,
associated packets, and the incident may be desirable to maintain for
a period of time determined by administrators.
Moriarty Informational PAGE 39
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
The communication flow demonstrates that a RequestAuthorization
message is sent to both the downstream peer and the original
requestor. If a TraceRequest is denied, the downstream peer has the
option to take an action and respond with a Result message. The
originator of the request may follow up with the downstream peer of
the NP involved using an Investigation request to ensure that an
action is taken if no response is received. Nothing precludes the
originator of the request from initiating a new TraceRequest
bypassing the NP that denied the request, if a trace is needed beyond
that point. Another option may be for the initiator to send an
Investigation request to an NP upstream of the NP that denied the
request if enough information was gathered to discern the true source
of the attack traffic from the incident handling information.
4.5.1.1. RID TraceRequest Example
The example listed is of a TraceRequest based on the incident report
example from the IODEF document. The RID extension classes were
included as appropriate for a TraceRequest message using the
RIDPolicy class. The example given is that of a CSIRT reporting a
DoS attack in progress to the upstream NP. The request asks the next
NP to continue the trace and have the traffic mitigated closer to the
source of the traffic.
In the following example, use of [XMLsig] to generate digital
signatures does not currently provide digest algorithm agility, as
[XMLsig] only supports SHA-1. A future version of [XMLsig] may
support additional digest algorithms to support digest algorithm
agility.
<iodef-rid:RID xmlns:iodef-rid="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-1.0"
xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0">
<iodef-rid:RIDPolicy MsgType="TraceRequest"
MsgDestination="RIDSystem">
<iodef-rid:PolicyRegion region="IntraConsortium"/>
<iodef:Node>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.3</iodef:Address>
</iodef:Node>
<iodef-rid:TrafficType type="Attack"/>
<iodef:IncidentID name="CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#207-1
</iodef:IncidentID>
</iodef-rid:RIDPolicy>
</iodef-rid:RID>
Moriarty Informational PAGE 40
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
<!-- IODEF-Document accompanied by the above RID -->
<iodef:IODEF-Document version="1.00"
xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0">
<iodef:Incident restriction="need-to-know" purpose="traceback">
<iodef:IncidentID name="CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#207-1
</iodef:IncidentID>
<iodef:DetectTime>2004-02-02T22:49:24+00:00</iodef:DetectTime>
<iodef:StartTime>2004-02-02T22:19:24+00:00</iodef:StartTime>
<iodef:ReportTime>2004-02-02T23:20:24+00:00</iodef:ReportTime>
<iodef:Description>Host involved in DoS attack</iodef:Description>
<iodef:Assessment>
<iodef:Impact severity="low" completion="failed" type="dos"/>
</iodef:Assessment>
<iodef:Contact role="creator" type="organization">
<iodef:ContactName>Constituency-contact for 192.0.2.35
</iodef:ContactName>
<iodef:Email>Constituency-contact@192.0.2.35</iodef:Email>
</iodef:Contact>
<iodef:EventData>
<iodef:Flow>
<iodef:System category="source">
<iodef:Node>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.35
</iodef:Address>
</iodef:Node>
<iodef:Service>
<iodef:port>38765</iodef:port>
</iodef:Service>
</iodef:System>
<iodef:System category="target">
<iodef:Node>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.67
</iodef:Address>
</iodef:Node>
<iodef:Service>
<iodef:port>80</iodef:port>
</iodef:Service>
</iodef:System>
</iodef:Flow>
<iodef:Expectation severity="high" action="rate-limit-host">
<iodef:Description>
Rate-limit traffic close to source
</iodef:Description>
</iodef:Expectation>
Moriarty Informational PAGE 41
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
<iodef:Record>
<iodef:RecordData>
<iodef:Description>
The IPv4 packet included was used in the described attack
</iodef:Description>
<iodef:RecordItem dtype="ipv4-packet">450000522ad9
0000ff06c41fc0a801020a010102976d0050103e020810d9
4a1350021000ad6700005468616e6b20796f7520666f7220
6361726566756c6c792072656164696e6720746869732052
46432e0a
</iodef:RecordItem>
</iodef:RecordData>
</iodef:Record>
</iodef:EventData>
<iodef:History>
<iodef:HistoryItem>
<iodef:DateTime>2001-09-14T08:19:01+00:00</iodef:DateTime>
<iodef:IncidentID name="CSIRT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
CSIRT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#207-1
</iodef:IncidentID>
<iodef:Description>
Notification sent to next upstream NP closer to 192.0.2.35
</iodef:Description>
</iodef:HistoryItem>
</iodef:History>
</iodef:Incident>
</iodef:IODEF-Document>
Moriarty Informational PAGE 42
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
<!-- Digital signature accompanied by above RID and IODEF -->
<Envelope xmlns="urn:envelope"
xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0"
xmlns:iodef-rid="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-1.0">
<iodef:IODEF-Document>
<iodef:Incident>
<iodef:EventData>
<iodef:Record>
<iodef:RecordData>
<iodef:RecordItem type="ipv4-packet">450000522ad9
0000ff06c41fc0a801020a010102976d0050103e020810d9
4a1350021000ad6700005468616e6b20796f7520666f7220
6361726566756c6c792072656164696e6720746869732052
46432e0a
</iodef:RecordItem>
</iodef:RecordData>
</iodef:Record>
</iodef:EventData>
</iodef:Incident>
</iodef:IODEF-Document>
<Signature xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
<SignedInfo>
<CanonicalizationMethod
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/
REC-xml-c14n-20010315#WithComments"/>
<SignatureMethod
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#dsa-sha1"/>
<Reference URI="">
<Transforms>
<Transform Algorithm=
"http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature"/>
</Transforms>
<DigestMethod
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
<DigestValue>KiI5+6SnFAs429VNwsoJjHPplmo=</DigestValue>
</Reference>
</SignedInfo>
<SignatureValue>
VvyXqCzjoW0m2NdxNeToXQcqcSM80W+JMW+Kn01cS3z3KQwCPeswzg==
</SignatureValue>
Moriarty Informational PAGE 43
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
<KeyInfo>
<KeyValue>
<DSAKeyValue>
<P>/KaCzo4Syrom78z3EQ5SbbB4sF7ey80etKII864WF64B81uRpH5t9j
QTxeEu0ImbzRMqzVDZkVG9xD7nN1kuFw==</P>
<Q>li7dzDacuo67Jg7mtqEm2TRuOMU=</Q>
<G>Z4Rxsnqc9E7pGknFFH2xqaryRPBaQ01khpMdLRQnG541Awtx/XPaF5
Bpsy4pNWMOHCBiNU0NogpsQW5QvnlMpA==</G>
<Y>VFWTD4I/aKni4YhDyYxAJozmj1iAzPLw9Wwd5B+Z9J5E7lHjcAJ+bs
HifTyYdnj+roGzy4o09YntYD8zneQ7lw==</Y>
</DSAKeyValue>
</KeyValue>
</KeyInfo>
</Signature>
</Envelope>
4.5.1.2. RequestAuthorization Message Example
The example RequestAuthorization message is in response to the
TraceRequest message listed above. The NP that received the request
is responding to approve the trace continuance in their network.
<iodef-rid:RID xmlns:iodef-rid="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-1.0"
xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0">
<iodef-rid:RIDPolicy MsgType="RequestAuthorization"
MsgDestination="RIDSystem">
<iodef-rid:PolicyRegion region="IntraConsortium"/>
<iodef:Node>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.67</iodef:Address>
</iodef:Node>
<iodef-rid:TrafficType type="Attack"/>
<iodef:IncidentID name="CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#207-1
</iodef:IncidentID>
</iodef-rid:RIDPolicy>
<iodef-rid:RequestStatus AuthorizationStatus="Approved"/>
</iodef-rid:RID>
4.5.1.3. Result Message Example
The example Result message is in response to the TraceRequest listed
above. This message type only comes after a RequestAuthorization
within the TraceRequest flow of messages. It may be a direct
response to an Investigation request. This message provides
information about the source of the attack and the actions taken to
mitigate the traffic.
Moriarty Informational PAGE 44
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
<iodef-rid:RID xmlns:iodef-rid="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-1.0"
xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0">
<iodef-rid:RIDPolicy MsgType="Result"
MsgDestination="RIDSystem">
<iodef-rid:PolicyRegion region="IntraConsortium"/>
<iodef:Node>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.67</iodef:Address>
</iodef:Node>
<iodef-rid:TrafficType type="Attack"/>
<iodef:IncidentID name="CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#207-1
</iodef:IncidentID>
</iodef-rid:RIDPolicy>
<iodef-rid:IncidentSource>
<iodef-rid:SourceFound>true</iodef-rid:SourceFound>
<iodef:Node>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.37</iodef:Address>
</iodef:Node>
</iodef-rid:IncidentSource>
</iodef-rid:RID>
<!-- IODEF-Document accompanied by the above RID -->
<iodef:IODEF-Document version="1.00"
xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0">
<iodef:Incident restriction="need-to-know" purpose="traceback">
<iodef:IncidentID name="CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#207-1
</iodef:IncidentID>
<iodef:DetectTime>2004-02-02T22:49:24+00:00</iodef:DetectTime>
<iodef:StartTime>2004-02-02T22:19:24+00:00</iodef:StartTime>
<iodef:ReportTime>2004-02-02T23:20:24+00:00</iodef:ReportTime>
<iodef:Description>Host involved in DoS attack</iodef:Description>
<iodef:Assessment>
<iodef:Impact severity="low" completion="failed" type="dos"/>
</iodef:Assessment>
<iodef:Contact role="creator" type="organization">
<iodef:ContactName>Constituency-contact for 192.0.2.35
</iodef:ContactName>
<iodef:Email>Constituency-contact@192.0.2.35</iodef:Email>
</iodef:Contact>
<iodef:EventData>
<iodef:Contact role="admin" type="organization">
<iodef:ContactName>Admin-contact for 192.0.2.35
</iodef:ContactName>
<iodef:Email>Admin-contact@10.1.1.2</iodef:Email>
</iodef:Contact>
Moriarty Informational PAGE 45
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
<iodef:Flow>
<iodef:System category="intermediate">
<iodef:Node>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.35
</iodef:Address>
</iodef:Node>
</iodef:System>
</iodef:Flow>
<iodef:EventData>
<iodef:Contact role="admin" type="organization">
<iodef:ContactName>Admin-contact for 192.0.2.3
</iodef:ContactName>
<iodef:Email>Admin-contact@192.0.2.3</iodef:Email>
</iodef:Contact>
<iodef:Flow>
<iodef:System category="intermediate">
<iodef:Node>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.3
</iodef:Address>
</iodef:Node>
</iodef:System>
</iodef:Flow>
</iodef:EventData>
</iodef:EventData>
<iodef:EventData>
<iodef:Flow>
<iodef:System category="source">
<iodef:Node>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.35
</iodef:Address>
</iodef:Node>
<iodef:Service>
<iodef:port>38765</iodef:port>
</iodef:Service>
</iodef:System>
<iodef:System category="target">
<iodef:Node>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.67
</iodef:Address>
</iodef:Node>
<iodef:Service>
<iodef:port>80</iodef:port>
</iodef:Service>
</iodef:System>
</iodef:Flow>
Moriarty Informational PAGE 46
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
<iodef:Expectation severity="high" action="rate-limit-host">
<iodef:Description>
Rate-limit traffic close to source
</iodef:Description>
</iodef:Expectation>
<iodef:Record>
<iodef:RecordData>
<iodef:Description>
The IPv4 packet included was used in the described attack
</iodef:Description>
<iodef:RecordItem dtype="ipv4-packet">450000522ad9
0000ff06c41fc0a801020a010102976d0050103e020810d9
4a1350021000ad6700005468616e6b20796f7520666f7220
6361726566756c6c792072656164696e6720746869732052
46432e0a
</iodef:RecordItem>
</iodef:RecordData>
</iodef:Record>
</iodef:EventData>
<iodef:History>
<iodef:HistoryItem>
<iodef:DateTime>2004-02-02T22:53:01+00:00</iodef:DateTime>
<iodef:IncidentID name="CSIRT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
CSIRT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#207-1
</iodef:IncidentID>
<iodef:Description>
Notification sent to next upstream NP closer to 192.0.2.35
</iodef:Description>
</iodef:HistoryItem>
<iodef:HistoryItem action="rate-limit-host">
<iodef:DateTime>2004-02-02T23:07:21+00:00</iodef:DateTime>
<iodef:IncidentID name="CSIRT-FOR-NP3">
CSIRT-FOR-NP3#3291-1
</iodef:IncidentID>
<iodef:Description>
Host rate-limited for 24 hours
</iodef:Description>
</iodef:HistoryItem>
</iodef:History>
</iodef:Incident>
</iodef:IODEF-Document>
4.5.2. Investigation Request Communication Flow
The diagram below outlines the RID Investigation request
communication flow between RID systems on different networks for a
security incident with a known source address. The proper response
to an Investigation request is a Result message. If there is a
Moriarty Informational PAGE 47
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
problem with the request, such as a failure to validate the digital
signature or decrypt the request, a RequestAuthorization message is
sent to the requestor. The RequestAuthorization message should
provide the reason why the message could not be processed.
Attack Dest NP-1 NP-2 Attack Src
1. Attack | Attack
reported | detected
2. Determine source
of security incident
3. o---Investigation---->
4. Research
incident and
determine appropriate
actions to take
5. <-------Result-------o
Figure 8. Investigation Communication Flow
4.5.2.1. Investigation Request Example
The following example only includes the RID-specific details. The
IODEF and security measures are similar to the TraceRequest
information, with the exception that the source is known and the
receiving RID system is known to be close to the source. The source
known is indicated in the IODEF document, which allows for incident
sources to be listed as spoofed, if appropriate.
<iodef-rid:RID xmlns:iodef-rid="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-1.0"
xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0">
<iodef-rid:RIDPolicy MsgType="Investigation"
MsgDestination="SourceOfIncident">
<iodef-rid:PolicyRegion region="PeerToPeer"/>
<iodef:Node>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.98</iodef:Address>
</iodef:Node>
<iodef-rid:TrafficType type="Attack"/>
<iodef:IncidentID name="CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#208-1
</iodef:IncidentID>
</iodef-rid:RIDPolicy>
</iodef-rid:RID>
Moriarty Informational PAGE 48
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
<!-- IODEF-Document accompanied by the above RID -->
<iodef:IODEF-Document version="1.00"
xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0">
<iodef:Incident restriction="need-to-know" purpose="other">
<iodef:IncidentID name="CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#208-1
</iodef:IncidentID>
<iodef:DetectTime>2004-02-05T08:13:33+00:00</iodef:DetectTime>
<iodef:StartTime>2004-02-05T08:13:31+00:00</iodef:StartTime>
<iodef:EndTime>2004-02-05T08:13:33+00:00</iodef:EndTime>
<iodef:ReportTime>2004-02-05T08:13:35+00:00</iodef:ReportTime>
<iodef:Description>Host involved in DoS attack</iodef:Description>
<iodef:Assessment>
<iodef:Impact severity="low" completion="failed" type="recon"/>
</iodef:Assessment>
<iodef:Contact role="creator" type="organization">
<iodef:ContactName>Constituency-contact for 192.0.2.35
</iodef:ContactName>
<iodef:Email>Constituency-contact@10.1.1.2</iodef:Email>
</iodef:Contact>
<iodef:EventData>
<iodef:Flow>
<iodef:System category="source">
<iodef:Node>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.35
</iodef:Address>
</iodef:Node>
<iodef:Service>
<iodef:port>41421</iodef:port>
</iodef:Service>
</iodef:System>
<iodef:System category="target">
<iodef:Node>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.67
</iodef:Address>
</iodef:Node>
<iodef:Service>
<iodef:port>80</iodef:port>
</iodef:Service>
</iodef:System>
</iodef:Flow>
<iodef:Expectation severity="high" action="investigate">
<iodef:Description>
Investigate whether source has been compromised
</iodef:Description>
</iodef:Expectation>
</iodef:EventData>
Moriarty Informational PAGE 49
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
<iodef:History>
<iodef:HistoryItem>
<iodef:DateTime>2004-02-05T08:19:01+00:00</iodef:DateTime>
<iodef:IncidentID name="CSIRT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
CSIRT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#208-1
</iodef:IncidentID>
<iodef:Description>
Investigation request sent to NP for 192.0.2.35
</iodef:Description>
</iodef:HistoryItem>
</iodef:History>
</iodef:Incident>
</iodef:IODEF-Document>
4.5.2.2. RequestAuthorization Message Example
The example RequestAuthorization message is in response to the
Investigation request listed above. The NP that received the request
was unable to validate the digital signature used to authenticate the
sending RID system.
<iodef-rid:RID xmlns:iodef-rid="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-1.0"
xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0">
<iodef-rid:RIDPolicy MsgType="RequestAuthorization"
MsgDestination="RIDSystem">
<iodef-rid:PolicyRegion region="IntraConsortium"/>
<iodef:Node>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.67</iodef:Address>
</iodef:Node>
<iodef-rid:TrafficType type="Attack"/>
<iodef:IncidentID name="CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#208-1
</iodef:IncidentID>
</iodef-rid:RIDPolicy>
<iodef-rid:RequestStatus AuthorizationStatus="Denied"
Justification="Authentication"/>
</iodef-rid:RID>
Moriarty Informational PAGE 50
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
4.5.3. Report Communication
The diagram below outlines the RID Report communication flow between
RID systems on different networks.
NP-1 NP-2
1. Generate incident information
and prepare Report message
2. o-------Report------->
3. File report in database
Figure 9. Report Communication Flow
The Report communication flow is used to provide information on
specific incidents detected on the network. Incident information may
be shared between CSIRTs or participating RID hosts using this
format. When a report is received, the RID system must verify that
the report has not already been filed. The incident number and
incident data, such as the hexadecimal packet and incident class
information, can be used to compare with existing database entries.
The Report message typically does not have a response. If there is a
problem with the Report message, such as a failure to validate the
digital signature [RFC 3275] or decrypt the request, a
RequestAuthorization message is sent to the requestor. The
RequestAuthorization message should provide the reason why the
message could not be processed.
4.5.3.1. Report Example
The following example only includes the RID-specific details. This
report is an unsolicited Report message that includes an IPv4 packet.
The IODEF document and digital signature would be similar to the
TraceRequest information.
Moriarty Informational PAGE 51
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
<iodef-rid:RID xmlns:iodef-rid="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-1.0"
xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0">
<iodef-rid:RIDPolicy MsgType="Report" MsgDestination="RIDSystem">
<iodef-rid:PolicyRegion region="PeerToPeer"/>
<iodef:Node>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.130</iodef:Address>
</iodef:Node>
<iodef-rid:TrafficType type="Attack"/>
<iodef:IncidentID name="CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#209-1
</iodef:IncidentID>
</iodef-rid:RIDPolicy>
</iodef-rid:RID>
<!-- IODEF-Document accompanied by the above RID -->
<iodef:IODEF-Document version="1.00"
xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0">
<iodef:Incident restriction="need-to-know" purpose="reporting">
<iodef:IncidentID name="CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#209-1
</iodef:IncidentID>
<iodef:DetectTime>2004-02-05T10:21:08+00:00</iodef:DetectTime>
<iodef:StartTime>2004-02-05T10:21:05+00:00</iodef:StartTime>
<iodef:EndTime>2004-02-05T10:35:00+00:00</iodef:EndTime>
<iodef:ReportTime>2004-02-05T10:27:38+00:00</iodef:ReportTime>
<iodef:Description>Host illicitly accessed admin account
</iodef:Description>
<iodef:Assessment>
<iodef:Impact severity="high" completion="succeeded"
type="admin"/>
<iodef:Confidence rating="high"/>
</iodef:Assessment>
<iodef:Contact role="creator" type="organization">
<iodef:ContactName>Constituency-contact for 192.0.2.35
</iodef:ContactName>
<iodef:Email>Constituency-contact@10.1.1.2</iodef:Email>
</iodef:Contact>
<iodef:EventData>
<iodef:Flow>
<iodef:System category="source">
<iodef:Node>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.35
</iodef:Address>
</iodef:Node>
Moriarty Informational PAGE 52
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
<iodef:Service>
<iodef:port>32821</iodef:port>
</iodef:Service>
</iodef:System>
<iodef:System category="target">
<iodef:Node>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.67
</iodef:Address>
</iodef:Node>
<iodef:Service>
<iodef:port>22</iodef:port>
</iodef:Service>
</iodef:System>
</iodef:Flow>
</iodef:EventData>
<iodef:History>
<iodef:HistoryItem>
<iodef:DateTime>2004-02-05T10:28:00+00:00</iodef:DateTime>
<iodef:IncidentID name="CSIRT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
CSIRT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#209-1
</iodef:IncidentID>
<iodef:Description>
Incident report sent to NP for 192.0.2.35
</iodef:Description>
</iodef:HistoryItem>
</iodef:History>
</iodef:Incident>
</iodef:IODEF-Document>
Moriarty Informational PAGE 53
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
4.5.4. IncidentQuery Communication Flow
The diagram below outlines the RID IncidentQuery communication flow
between RID systems on different networks.
NP-1 NP-2
1. Generate a request for
information on a specific
incident number or incident type
2. o---IncidentQuery--->
3. Verify policy information
and determine if matches exist
for requested information
4. <-------Report------o
5. Associate report to request
by incident number or type
and file report(s).
Figure 10. IncidentQuery Communication Flow
The IncidentQuery message communication receives a response of a
Report message. If the Report message is empty, the responding host
did not have information available to share with the requestor. The
incident number and responding RID system, as well as the transport,
assist in the association of the request and response since a report
can be filed and is not always solicited. If there is a problem with
the IncidentQuery message, such as a failure to validate the digital
signature or decrypt the request, a RequestAuthorization message is
sent to the requestor. The RequestAuthorization message should
provide the reason why the message could not be processed.
4.5.4.1. IncidentQuery Example
The IncidentQuery request may be received in several formats as a
result of the type of query being performed. If the incident number
is the only information provided, the IODEF document and IP packet
data may not be needed to complete the request. However, if a type
of incident is requested, the incident number remains NULL, and the
Moriarty Informational PAGE 54
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
IP packet data will not be included in the IODEF RecordItem class;
the other incident information is the main source for comparison. In
the case in which an incident number may not be the same between
CSIRTs, the incident number and/or IP packet information can be
provided and used for comparison on the receiving RID system to
generate (a) Report message(s).
<iodef-rid:RID xmlns:iodef-rid="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-1.0"
xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0">
<iodef-rid:RIDPolicy MsgType="IncidentQuery"
MsgDestination="RIDSystem">
<iodef-rid:PolicyRegion region="PeerToPeer"/>
<iodef:Node>
<iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.3</iodef:Address>
</iodef:Node>
<iodef-rid:TrafficType type="Attack"/>
<iodef:IncidentID name="CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#210-1
</iodef:IncidentID>
</iodef-rid:RIDPolicy>
</iodef-rid:RID>
5. RID Schema Definition
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<xs:schema xmlns:iodef-rid="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-1.0"
xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0"
xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-1.0"
elementFormDefault="qualified" attributeFormDefault="unqualified">
<xs:import namespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0"
schemaLocation="http://www.iana.org/assignments/xml-registry/
schema/iodef-rid-1.0.xsd"/>
<xs:import namespace="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
schemaLocation=
"http://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core/xmldsig-core-schema.xsd"/>
<!-- ****************************************************************
*********************************************************************
*** Real-time Inter-network Defense - RID XML Schema ***
*** Namespace - iodef-rid, August 2006 ***
*** The namespace is defined to support transport of IODEF ***
*** documents for exchanging incident information. ***
*********************************************************************
-->
Moriarty Informational PAGE 55
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
<!--RID acts as an envelope for IODEF documents to support the exchange
of messages-->
<!--
====== Real-Time Inter-network Defense - RID ======
==== Suggested definition for RID messaging ======
-->
<xs:annotation>
<xs:documentation>XML Schema wrapper for IODEF</xs:documentation>
</xs:annotation>
<xs:element name="RID" type="iodef-rid:RIDType"/>
<xs:complexType name="RIDType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element ref="iodef-rid:RIDPolicy" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef-rid:RequestStatus" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef-rid:IncidentSource" minOccurs="0"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
<!--Used in RequestAuthorization Message for RID-->
<xs:element name="RequestStatus" type="iodef-rid:RequestStatusType"/>
<xs:complexType name="RequestStatusType">
<xs:attribute name="AuthorizationStatus" use="required">
<xs:simpleType>
<xs:restriction base="xs:NMTOKEN">
<xs:whiteSpace value="collapse"/>
<xs:enumeration value="Approved"/>
<xs:enumeration value="Denied"/>
<xs:enumeration value="Pending"/>
<xs:enumeration value="ext-value"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:attribute>
<xs:attribute name="ext-AuthorizationStatus"
type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
Moriarty Informational PAGE 56
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
<xs:attribute name="Justification">
<xs:simpleType>
<xs:restriction base="xs:NMTOKEN">
<xs:whiteSpace value="collapse"/>
<xs:enumeration value="SystemResource"/>
<xs:enumeration value="Authentication"/>
<xs:enumeration value="AuthenticationOrigin"/>
<xs:enumeration value="Encryption"/>
<xs:enumeration value="Other"/>
<xs:enumeration value="ext-value"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:attribute>
<xs:attribute name="ext-Justification"
type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
<xs:attribute name="restriction" type="iodef:restriction-type"/>
</xs:complexType>
<!--Incident Source Information for Result Message-->
<xs:element name="IncidentSource" type="iodef-rid:IncidentSourceType"/>
<xs:complexType name="IncidentSourceType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element ref="iodef-rid:SourceFound"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:Node" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
<xs:attribute name="restriction" type="iodef:restriction-type"/>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:element name="SourceFound" type="xs:boolean"/>
<!--
====== Real-Time Inter-network Defense Policy - RIDPolicy ======
====== Definition for RIDPolicy for messaging
-->
<xs:annotation>
<xs:documentation>RID Policy used for transport of
messages</xs:documentation>
</xs:annotation>
Moriarty Informational PAGE 57
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
<!-- RIDPolicy information with setting information listed in RID
documentation -->
<xs:element name="RIDPolicy" type="iodef-rid:RIDPolicyType"/>
<xs:complexType name="RIDPolicyType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element ref="iodef-rid:PolicyRegion" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:Node"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef-rid:TrafficType" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xs:element ref="iodef:IncidentID" minOccurs="0"/>
</xs:sequence>
<xs:attribute name="MsgType" use="required">
<xs:simpleType>
<xs:restriction base="xs:NMTOKEN">
<xs:whiteSpace value="collapse"/>
<xs:enumeration value="TraceRequest"/>
<xs:enumeration value="RequestAuthorization"/>
<xs:enumeration value="Result"/>
<xs:enumeration value="Investigation"/>
<xs:enumeration value="Report"/>
<xs:enumeration value="IncidentQuery"/>
<xs:enumeration value="ext-value"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:attribute>
<xs:attribute name="ext-MsgType" type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
<xs:attribute name="MsgDestination" use="required">
<xs:simpleType>
<xs:restriction base="xs:NMTOKEN">
<xs:whiteSpace value="collapse"/>
<xs:enumeration value="RIDSystem"/>
<xs:enumeration value="SourceOfIncident"/>
<xs:enumeration value="ext-value"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:attribute>
<xs:attribute name="ext-MsgDestination" type="xs:string"
use="optional"/>
</xs:complexType>
Moriarty Informational PAGE 58
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
<xs:element name="PolicyRegion">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:attribute name="region" use="required">
<xs:simpleType>
<xs:restriction base="xs:NMTOKEN">
<xs:whiteSpace value="collapse"/>
<xs:enumeration value="ClientToNP"/>
<xs:enumeration value="NPToClient"/>
<xs:enumeration value="IntraConsortium"/>
<xs:enumeration value="PeerToPeer"/>
<xs:enumeration value="BetweenConsortiums"/>
<xs:enumeration value="AcrossNationalBoundaries"/>
<xs:enumeration value="ext-value"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:attribute>
<xs:attribute name="ext-region"
type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="TrafficType" default="Attack">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:attribute name="type" use="required">
<xs:simpleType>
<xs:restriction base="xs:NMTOKEN">
<xs:whiteSpace value="collapse"/>
<xs:enumeration value="Attack"/>
<xs:enumeration value="Network"/>
<xs:enumeration value="Content"/>
<xs:enumeration value="OfficialBusiness"/>
<xs:enumeration value="Other"/>
<xs:enumeration value="ext-value"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:attribute>
<xs:attribute name="ext-type"
type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
</xs:schema>
Moriarty Informational PAGE 59
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
6. Security Considerations
Communication between NPs' RID systems must be protected. RID has
many security considerations built into the design of the protocol,
several of which are described in the following sub-sections. For a
complete view of security, considerations need to include the
availability, confidentiality, and integrity concerns for the
transport, storage, and exchange of information.
When considering the transport of RID messages, an out-of-band
network, either logical or physical, would prevent outside attacks
against RID communication. An out-of-band connection would be ideal,
but not necessarily practical. Authenticated encrypted tunnels
between RID systems MUST be used to provide confidentiality,
integrity, authenticity, and privacy for the data. Trust
relationships are based on consortiums and established trust
relationships of public key infrastructure (PKI) cross-certifications
of consortiums. By using RIDPolicy information, TLS, and the XML
security features of encryption [XMLencrypt] and digital signatures
[RFC 3275], [XMLsig], RID takes advantage of existing security
standards. The standards provide clear methods to ensure that
messages are secure, authenticated, and authorized, and that the
messages meet policy and privacy guidelines and maintain integrity.
As specified in the relevant sections of this document, the XML
digital signature [RFC 3275] and XML encryption [XMLencrypt] are used
in the following cases:
XML Digital Signature
o The originator of the TraceRequest or Investigation request MUST
use a detached signature to sign at least one of the original IP
packets included in the RecordItem class data to provide
authentication to all upstream participants in the trace of the
origin. All IP packets provided by the originator may be signed,
and additional packets added by upstream peers in the trace may be
signed by the peer adding the data, while maintaining the IP
packet and detached signature from the original requestor. This
signature MUST be passed to all recipients of the TraceRequest.
o For all message types, the full IODEF/RID document MUST be signed
using an enveloped signature by the sending peer to provide
authentication and integrity to the receiving RID system.
Moriarty Informational PAGE 60
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
XML Encryption
o The IODEF/RID document may be encrypted to provide an extra layer
of security between peers so that the message is not only
encrypted for the transport, but also while stored. This behavior
would be agreed upon between peers or a consortium, or determined
on a per-message basis, depending on security requirements. It
should be noted that there are cases for transport where the
RIDPolicy class needs to be presented in clear text, as detailed
in the transport document [RFC 6046].
o An Investigation request, or any other message type that may be
relayed through RID systems other than the intended destination as
a result of trust relationships, may be encrypted for the intended
recipient. This may be necessary if the RID network is being used
for message transfer, the intermediate parties do not need to have
knowledge of the request contents, and a direct communication path
does not exist. In that case, the RIDPolicy class is used by
intermediate parties and is maintained in clear text.
o The action taken in the Result message may be encrypted using the
key of the request originator. In that case, the intermediate
parties can view the RIDPolicy information and know the trace has
been completed and do not need to see the action. If the use of
encryption were limited to sections of the message, the History
class information would be encrypted. Otherwise, it is
RECOMMENDED to encrypt the entire IODEF/RID document, using an
enveloped signature, for the originator of the request. The
existence of the Result message for an incident would tell any
intermediate parties used in the path of the incident
investigation that the incident handling has been completed.
The formation of policies is a very important aspect of using a
messaging system like RID to exchange potentially sensitive
information. Many considerations should be involved for peering
parties, and some guidelines to protect the data, systems, and
transport are covered in this section. Policies established should
provide guidelines for communication methods, security, and fall-back
procedures.
The security considerations for the storage and exchange of
information in RID messaging may include adherence to local,
regional, or national regulations in addition to the obligations to
protect client information during an investigation. RID Policy is a
necessary tool for listing the requirements of messages to provide a
method to categorize data elements for proper handling. Controls are
also provided for the sending entity to protect messages from third
parties through XML encryption.
Moriarty Informational PAGE 61
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
RID provides a method to exchange incident handling request and
Report messages to peer networks. Network administrators, who have
the ability to base the decision on the available resources and other
factors of their network, maintain control of incident investigations
within their own network. Thus, RID provides the ability for
participating networks to manage their own security controls,
leveraging the information listed in RIDPolicy.
6.1. Message Transport
The transport specifications are fully defined in a separate document
[RFC 6046]. The specified transport protocols MUST use encryption to
provide an additional level of security and integrity, while
supporting mutual authentication through bi-directional certificate
usage. Any subsequent transport method defined should take advantage
of existing standards for ease of implementation and integration of
RID systems. Session encryption for the transport of RID messages is
enforced in the transport specification. The privacy and security
considerations are addressed fully in RID to protect sensitive
portions of documents and provide a method to authenticate the
messages. Therefore, RID messages do not rely on the security
provided by the transport layer alone. The encryption requirements
and considerations for RID are discussed at the beginning of
Section 6 of this document.
XML security functions such as the digital signature [RFC 3275] and
encryption [XMLencrypt] provide a standards-based method to encrypt
and digitally sign RID messages. RID messages specify system use and
privacy guidelines through the RIDPolicy class. A public key
infrastructure (PKI) provides the base for authentication and
authorization, encryption, and digital signatures to establish trust
relationships between members of a RID consortium or a peering
consortium.
XML security functions such as the digital signature [RFC 3275] and
encryption [XMLencrypt] can be used within the contents of the
message for privacy and security in cases for which certain elements
must remain encrypted or signed as they traverse the path of a trace.
For example, the digital signature on a TraceRequest can be used to
verify the identity of the trace originator. The use of the XML
security features in RID messaging is in accordance with the
specifications for the IODEF model; however, the use requirements may
differ since RID also incorporates communication of security incident
information.
Moriarty Informational PAGE 62
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
6.2. Message Delivery Protocol - Integrity and Authentication
The RID protocol must be able to guarantee delivery and meet the
necessary security requirements of a state-of-the-art protocol. In
order to guarantee delivery, TCP should be considered as the
underlying protocol within the current network standard practices.
Security considerations must include the integrity, authentication,
privacy, and authorization of the messages sent between RID
communication systems or IHSs. The communication between RID systems
must be authenticated and encrypted to ensure the integrity of the
messages and the RID systems involved in the trace. Another concern
that needs to be addressed is authentication for a request that
traverses multiple networks. In this scenario, systems in the path
of the multi-hop TraceRequest need to authorize a trace from not only
their neighbor network, but also from the initiating RID system as
discussed in Section 6.4. Several methods can be used to ensure
integrity and privacy of the communication.
The transport mechanism selected MUST follow the defined transport
protocol [RFC 6046] when using RID messaging to ensure consistency
among the peers. Consortiums may vary their selected transport
mechanisms and thus must decide upon a mutual protocol to use for
transport when communicating with peers in a neighboring consortium
using RID. RID systems MUST implement and deploy HTTPS as defined in
the transport document [RFC 6046] and optionally support other
protocols such as the Blocks Extensible Exchange Protocol (BEEP).
RID, the XML security functions, and transport protocols must
properly integrate with a public key infrastructure (PKI) managed by
the consortium or one managed by a trusted entity. For the Internet,
an example of an existing effort that could be leveraged to provide
the supporting PKI could be the American Registry for Internet
Numbers (ARIN) and the Regional Internet Registry's (RIR's) PKI
hierarchy. Security and privacy considerations related to
consortiums are discussed in Sections 6.5 and 6.6.
6.3. Transport Communication
Out-of-band communications dedicated to NP interaction for RID
messaging would provide additional security as well as guaranteed
bandwidth during a denial-of-service attack. For example, an out-of-
band channel may consist of logical paths defined over the existing
network. Out-of-band communications may not be possible between all
network providers, but should be considered to protect the network
management systems used for RID messaging. Methods to protect the
data transport may also be provided through session encryption.
Moriarty Informational PAGE 63
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
In order to address the integrity and authenticity of messages,
transport encryption MUST be used to secure the traffic sent between
RID systems. Systems with predefined relationships for RID would
include those who peer within a consortium with agreed-upon
appropriate use regulations and for peering consortiums. Trust
relationships may also be defined through a bridged or hierarchical
PKI in which both peers belong.
Systems used to send authenticated RID messages between networks MUST
use a secured system and interface to connect to a border network's
RID systems. Each connection to a RID system MUST meet the security
requirements agreed upon through the consortium regulations, peering,
or SLAs. The RID system MUST only listen for and send RID messages
on the designated port, which also MUST be over an encrypted tunnel
meeting the minimum requirement of algorithms and key lengths
established by the consortium, peering, or SLA. The selected
cryptographic algorithms for symmetric encryption, digital
signatures, and hash functions MUST meet minimum security levels of
the times. The encryption strength MUST adhere to import and export
regulations of the involved countries for data exchange.
6.4. Authentication of RID Protocol
In order to ensure the authenticity of the RID messages, a message
authentication scheme is used to secure the protocol. XML security
functions utilized in RID require a trust center such as a PKI for
the distribution of credentials to provide the necessary level of
security for this protocol. Layered transport protocols also utilize
encryption and rely on a trust center. Public key certificate pairs
issued by a trusted Certification Authority (CA) MAY be used to
provide the necessary level of authentication and encryption for the
RID protocol. The CA used for RID messaging must be trusted by all
involved parties and may take advantage of similar efforts, such as
the Internet2 federated PKI or the ARIN/RIR effort to provide a PKI
to network providers. The PKI used for authentication would also
provide the necessary certificates needed for encryption used for the
RID transport protocol [RFC 6046].
The use of pre-shared keys may be considered for authentication. If
this option is selected, the specifications set forth in "Pre-Shared
Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)" [RFC 4279] MUST
be followed.
Hosts receiving a RID message MUST be able to verify that the sender
of the request is valid and trusted. Using digital signatures on a
hash of the RID message with an X.509 version 3 certificate issued by
a trusted party MUST be used to authenticate the request. The X.509
version 3 specifications as well as the digital signature
Moriarty Informational PAGE 64
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
specifications and path validation standards set forth in [RFC 5280]
MUST be followed in order to interoperate with a PKI designed for
similar purposes. The IODEF specification MUST be followed for
digital signatures to provide the authentication and integrity
aspects required for secure messaging between network providers. The
use of digital signatures in RID XML messages MUST follow the World
Wide Web Consortium (W3C) recommendations for signature syntax and
processing when either the XML encryption [XMLencrypt] or digital
signature [XMLsig], [RFC 3275] is used within a document. Transport
specifications are detailed in a separate document [RFC 6046].
It might be helpful to define an extension to the authentication
scheme that uses attribute certificates [RFC 5755] in such a way that
an application could automatically determine whether human
intervention is needed to authorize a request; however, the
specification of such an extension is out of scope for this document.
6.4.1. Multi-Hop TraceRequest Authentication
Bilateral trust relations between network providers ensure the
authenticity of requests for TraceRequests from immediate peers in
the web of networks formed to provide the traceback capability. A
network provider several hops into the path of the RID trace must
trust the information from its own trust relationships as well as the
previous trust relationships in the downstream path. For practical
reasons, the NPs may want to prioritize incident handling events
based upon the immediate peer for a TraceRequest, the originator, and
the listed Confidence rating for the incident. In order to provide a
higher assurance level of the authenticity of the TraceRequest, the
originating RID system is included in the TraceRequest along with
contact information and the information of all RID systems in the
path the trace has taken. This information is provided through the
IODEF EventData class nesting the list of systems and contacts
involved in a trace, while setting the category attribute to
"infrastructure".
A second measure MUST be taken to ensure the identity of the
originating RID system. The originating RID system MUST include a
digital signature in the TraceRequest sent to all systems in the
upstream path. The digital signature from the RID system is
performed on the RecordItem class of the IODEF following the XML
digital signature specifications from W3C [XMLsig] using a detached
signature. The signature MUST be passed to all parties that receive
a TraceRequest, and each party MUST be able to perform full path
validation on the digital signature. Full path validation verifies
the chaining relationship to a trusted root and also performs a
certificate revocation check. In order to accommodate that
requirement, the IP packet in the RecordItem data MUST remain
Moriarty Informational PAGE 65
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
unchanged as a request is passed along between providers and is the
only element for which the signature is applied. If additional
packets are included in the document at upstream peers, the initial
packet MUST still remain with the detached signature. The subsequent
packets may be signed by the peer adding the incident information for
the investigation. A second benefit to this requirement is that the
integrity of the filter used is ensured as it is passed to subsequent
NPs in the upstream trace of the packet. The trusted PKI also
provides the keys used to digitally sign the RecordItem class for
TraceRequests to meet the requirement of authenticating the original
request. Any host in the path of the trace should be able to verify
the digital signature using the trusted PKI.
In the case in which an enterprise network using RID sends a
TraceRequest to its provider, the signature from the enterprise
network MUST be included in the initial request. The NP may generate
a new request to send upstream to members of the NP consortium to
continue the trace. If the original request is sent, the originating
NP, acting on behalf of the enterprise network under attack, MUST
also digitally sign, with an enveloped signature, the full IODEF
document to assure the authenticity of the TraceRequest. An NP that
offers RID as a service may be using its own PKI to secure RID
communications between its RID system and the attached enterprise
networks. NPs participating in the trace MUST be able to determine
the authenticity of RID requests.
6.5. Consortiums and Public Key Infrastructures
Consortiums of NPs are an ideal way to establish a communication web
of trust for RID messaging. The consortium could provide centralized
resources, such as a PKI, and established guidelines for use of the
RID protocol. The consortium would also assist in establishing trust
relationships between the participating NPs to achieve the necessary
level of cooperation and experience-sharing among the consortium
entities. This may be established through PKI certificate policy
[RFC 3647] reviews to determine the appropriate trust levels between
organizations or entities. The consortium may also be used for other
purposes to better facilitate communication among NPs in a common
area (Internet, region, government, education, private networks,
etc.).
Using a PKI to distribute certificates used by RID systems provides
an already established method to link trust relationships between NPs
of consortiums that would peer with NPs belonging to a separate
consortium. In other words, consortiums could peer with other
consortiums to enable communication of RID messages between the
Moriarty Informational PAGE 66
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
participating NPs. The PKI along with Memorandums of Agreement could
be used to link border directories to share public key information in
a bridge, a hierarchy, or a single cross-certification relationship.
Consortiums also need to establish guidelines for each participating
NP to adhere to. The RECOMMENDED guidelines include:
o Physical and logical practices to protect RID systems;
o Network and application layer protection for RID systems and
communications;
o Proper use guidelines for RID systems, messages, and requests; and
o A PKI to provide authentication, integrity, and privacy.
The functions described for a consortium's role would parallel that
of a PKI federation. The PKI federations that currently exist are
responsible for establishing security guidelines and PKI trust
models. The trust models are used to support applications to share
information using trusted methods and protocols.
A PKI can also provide the same level of security for communication
between an end entity (enterprise, educational, or government
customer network) and the NP. The PKI may be a subordinate CA or in
the CA hierarchy from the NP's consortium to establish the trust
relationships necessary as the request is made to other connected
networks.
6.6. Privacy Concerns and System Use Guidelines
Privacy issues raise many concerns when information-sharing is
required to achieve the goal of stopping or mitigating the effects of
a security incident. The RIDPolicy class is used to automate the
enforcement of the privacy concerns listed within this document. The
privacy and system use concerns that MUST be addressed in the RID
system and other integrated components include the following:
Network Provider Concerns:
o Privacy of data monitored and/or stored on IDSs for attack
detection.
o Privacy of data monitored and stored on systems used to trace
traffic across a single network.
Moriarty Informational PAGE 67
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
Customer Attached Networks Participating in RID with NP:
o Customer networks may include an enterprise, educational,
government, or other attached networks to an NP participating in
RID and MUST be made fully aware of the security and privacy
considerations for using RID.
o Customers MUST know the security and privacy considerations in
place by their NP and the consortium of which the NP is a member.
o Customers MUST understand that their data can and will be sent to
other NPs in order to complete a trace unless an agreement stating
otherwise is made in the service level agreements between the
customer and NP.
Parties Involved in the Attack:
o Privacy of the identity of a host involved in an attack.
o Privacy of information such as the source and destination used for
communication purposes over the monitored or RID connected
network(s).
o Protection of data from being viewed by intermediate parties in
the path of an Investigation request MUST be considered.
Consortium Considerations:
o System use restricted to security incident handling within the
local region's definitions of appropriate traffic for the network
monitored and linked via RID in a single consortium also abiding
by the consortium's use guidelines.
o System use prohibiting the consortium's participating NPs from
inappropriately tracing non-attack traffic to locate sources or
mitigate traffic unlawfully within the jurisdiction or region.
Inter-Consortium Considerations:
o System use between peering consortiums MUST also adhere to any
government communication regulations that apply between those two
regions, such as encryption export and import restrictions. This
may include consortiums that are categorized as
"BetweenConsortiums" or "AcrossNationalBoundaries".
o System use between consortiums MUST NOT request traffic traces and
actions beyond the scope intended and permitted by law or
inter-consortium agreements.
Moriarty Informational PAGE 68
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
o System use between consortiums classified as
"AcrossNationalBoundaries" MUST respect national boundary issues
and limit requests to appropriate system use and not to achieve
their own agenda to limit or restrict traffic that is otherwise
permitted within the country in which the peering consortium
resides.
The security and privacy considerations listed above are for the
consortiums, NPs, and enterprises to agree upon. The agreed-upon
policies may be facilitated through use of the RIDPolicy class. Some
privacy considerations are addressed through the RID guidelines for
encryption and digital signatures as described at the beginning of
Section 6.
RID is useful in determining the true source of a packet that
traverses multiple networks or to communicate security incidents and
automate the response. The information obtained from the trace may
determine the identity of the source host or the network provider
used by the source of the traffic. It should be noted that the trace
mechanism used across a single-network provider may also raise
privacy concerns for the clients of the network. Methods that may
raise concern include those that involve storing packets for some
length of time in order to trace packets after the fact. Monitoring
networks for intrusions and for tracing capabilities also raises
concerns for potentially sensitive valid traffic that may be
traversing the monitored network. IDSs and single-network tracing
are outside of the scope of this document, but the concern should be
noted and addressed within the use guidelines of the network. Some
IDSs and single-network trace mechanisms attempt to properly address
these issues. RID is designed to provide the information needed by
any single-network trace mechanism. The provider's choice of a
single trace mechanism depends on resources, existing solutions, and
local legislation. Privacy concerns in regard to the single-network
trace must be dealt with at the client-to-NP level and are out of
scope for RID messaging.
The identity of the true source of an attack packet being traced
through RID could be sensitive. The true identity listed in a Result
message can be protected through the use of encryption [XMLencrypt]
enveloping the IODEF document and RID Result information, using the
public encryption key of the originating NP. Alternatively, the
action taken may be listed without the identity being revealed to the
originating NP. The ultimate goal of the RID communication system is
to stop or mitigate attack traffic, not to ensure that the identity
of the attack traffic is known to involved parties. The NP that
identifies the source should deal directly with the involved parties
and proper authorities in order to determine the guidelines for the
release of such information, if it is regarded as sensitive. In some
Moriarty Informational PAGE 69
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
situations, systems used in attacks are compromised by an unknown
source and, in turn, are used to attack other systems. In that
situation, the reputation of a business or organization may be at
stake, and the action taken may be the only additional information
reported in the Result message to the originating system. If the
security incident is a minor incident, such as a zombie system used
in part of a large-scale DDoS attack, ensuring the system is taken
off the network until it has been fixed may be sufficient. The
decision is left to the system users and consortiums to determine
appropriate data to be shared given that the goal of the
specification is to provide the appropriate technical options to
remain compliant. The textual descriptions should include details of
the incident in order to protect the reputation of the unknowing
attacker and prevent the need for additional investigation. Local,
state, or national laws may dictate the appropriate reporting action
for specific security incidents.
Privacy becomes an issue whenever sensitive data traverses a network.
For example, if an attack occurred between a specific source and
destination, then every network provider in the path of the trace
would become aware that the cyber attack occurred. In a targeted
attack, it may not be desirable that information about two nation
states that are battling a cyber war would become general knowledge
to all intermediate parties. However, it is important to allow the
traces to take place in order to halt the activity since the health
of the networks in the path could also be at stake during the attack.
This provides a second argument for allowing the Result message to
only include an action taken and not the identity of the offending
host. In the case of an Investigation request, where the originating
NP is aware of the NP that will receive the request for processing,
the free-form text areas of the document could be encrypted
[XMLencrypt] using the public key of the destination NP to ensure
that no other NP in the path can read the contents. The encryption
would be accomplished through the W3C [XMLencrypt] specification for
encrypting an element.
In some situations, all network traffic of a nation may be granted
through a single network provider. In that situation, options must
support sending Result messages from a downstream peer of that
network provider. That option provides an additional level of
abstraction to hide the identity and the NP of the identified source
of the traffic. Legal action may override this technical decision
after the trace has taken place, but that is out of the technical
scope of this document.
Privacy concerns when using an Investigation request to request
action close to the source of valid attack traffic needs to be
considered. Although the intermediate NPs may relay the request if
Moriarty Informational PAGE 70
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
there is no direct trust relationship to the closest NP to the
source, the intermediate NPs do not require the ability to see the
contents of the packet or the text description field(s) in the
request. This message type does not require any action by the
intermediate RID systems, except to relay the packet to the next NP
in the path. Therefore, the contents of the request may be encrypted
for the destination system. The intermediate NPs would only need to
know how to direct the request to the manager of the ASN in which the
source IP address belongs.
Traces must be legitimate security-related incidents and not used for
purposes such as sabotage or censorship. An example of such abuse of
the system would include a request to block or rate-limit legitimate
traffic to prevent information from being shared between users on the
Internet (restricting access to online versions of papers) or
restricting access from a competitor's product in order to sabotage a
business.
Intra-consortium RID communications raise additional issues,
especially when the peering consortiums reside in different regions
or nations. TraceRequests and requested actions to mitigate traffic
must adhere to the appropriate use guidelines and yet prevent abuse
of the system. First, the peering consortiums MUST identify the
types of traffic that can be traced between the borders of the
participating NPs of each consortium. The traffic traced should be
limited to security-incident-related traffic. Second, the traces
permitted within one consortium if passed to a peering consortium may
infringe upon the peering consortium's freedom of information laws.
An example would be a consortium in one country permitting a trace of
traffic containing objectionable material, outlawed within that
country. The RID trace may be a valid use of the system within the
confines of that country's network border; however, it may not be
permitted to continue across network boundaries where such content is
permitted under law. By continuing the trace in another country's
network, the trace and response could have the effect of improperly
restricting access to data. A continued trace into a second country
may break the laws and regulations of that nation. Any such traces
MUST cease at the country's border.
The privacy concerns listed in this section address issues among the
trusted parties involved in a trace within an NP, a RID consortium,
and peering RID consortiums. Data used for RID communications must
also be protected from parties that are not trusted. This protection
is provided through the authentication and encryption of documents as
they traverse the path of trusted servers. Each RID system MUST
perform a bi-directional authentication when sending a RID message
and use the public encryption key of the upstream or downstream peer
to send a message or document over the network. This means that the
Moriarty Informational PAGE 71
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
document is decrypted and re-encrypted at each RID system via TLS
over the transport protocol [RFC 6046]. The RID messages may be
decrypted at each RID system in order to properly process the request
or relay the information. Today's processing power is more than
sufficient to handle the minimal burden of encrypting and decrypting
relatively small typical RID messages.
7. IANA Considerations
This document uses URNs to describe XML namespaces and XML schemas
[XMLschema] conforming to a registry mechanism described in
[RFC 3688].
Registration request for the iodef-rid namespace:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-1.0
Registrant Contact: See the "Author's Address" section of this
document.
XML: None. Namespace URIs do not represent an XML specification.
Registration request for the iodef-rid XML schema:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:iodef-rid-1.0
Registrant Contact: See the "Author's Address" section of this
document.
XML: See Section 5, "RID Schema Definition", of this document.
8. Summary
Security incidents have always been difficult to trace as a result of
the spoofed sources, resource limitations, and bandwidth utilization
problems. Incident response is often slow even when the IP address
is known to be valid because of the resources required to notify the
responsible party of the attack and then to stop or mitigate the
attack traffic. Methods to identify and trace attacks near real time
are essential to thwarting attack attempts. Network providers need
policies and automated methods to combat the hacker's efforts. NPs
need automated monitoring and response capabilities to identify and
trace attacks quickly without resource-intensive side effects.
Integration with a centralized communication system to coordinate the
detection, tracing, and identification of attack sources on a single
network is essential. RID provides a way to integrate NP resources
for each aspect of attack detection, tracing, and source
Moriarty Informational PAGE 72
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
identification and extends the communication capabilities among
network providers. The communication is accomplished through the use
of flexible IODEF XML-based documents passed between IHSs or RID
systems. A TraceRequest or Investigation request is communicated to
an upstream NP and may result in an upstream trace or in an action to
stop or mitigate the attack traffic. The messages are communicated
among peers with security inherent to the RID messaging scheme
provided through existing standards such as XML encryption and
digital signatures. Policy information is carried in the RID message
itself through the use of the RIDPolicy. RID provides the timely
communication among NPs, which is essential for incident handling.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC 2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC 3275] Eastlake 3rd, D., Reagle, J., and D. Solo,
"(Extensible Markup Language) XML-Signature Syntax and
Processing", RFC 3275, March 2002.
[RFC 3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC
3688, January 2004.
[RFC 4279] Eronen, P., Ed., and H. Tschofenig, Ed., "Pre-Shared
Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
RFC 4279, December 2005.
[RFC 5070] Danyliw, R., Meijer, J., and Y. Demchenko, "The
Incident Object Description Exchange Format", RFC
5070, December 2007.
[RFC 5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation
List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[RFC 5755] Farrell, S., Housley, R., and S. Turner, "An Internet
Attribute Certificate Profile for Authorization",
RFC 5755, January 2010.
[RFC 6046] Moriarty, K. and B. Trammell, "Transport of Real-Time
Inter-Network Defense (RID) Messages," RFC 6046,
November 2010.
Moriarty Informational PAGE 73
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
[XML1.0] "Extensible Markup Language (XML) 1.0 (Second
Edition)". W3C Recommendation. T. Bray, E. Maler, J.
Paoli, and C.M. Sperberg-McQueen. October 2000.
http://www.w3.org/TR/2000/REC-xml-20001006.
[XMLnames] "Namespaces in XML 1.0 (Third Edition)". W3C
Recommendation. T. Bray, D. Hollander, A. Layman, R.
Tobin, H. Thompson. December 2009.
http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-xml-names/.
[XMLencrypt] "XML Encryption Syntax and Processing". W3C
Recommendation. T. Imamura, B. Dillaway, and E.
Simon. December 2002.
http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-core/.
[XMLschema] "XML Schema". E. Van der Vlist. O'Reilly. 2002.
[XMLsig] "XML-Signature Syntax and Processing (Second
Edition)". W3C Recommendation. M. Bartel, J. Boyer,
B. Fox, B. LaMacchia, and E. Simon. June 2008.
http://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core/#sec-Design.
9.2. Informative References
[RFC 1930] Hawkinson, J. and T. Bates, "Guidelines for creation,
selection, and registration of an Autonomous System
(AS)", BCP 6, RFC 1930, March 1996.
[RFC 2827] Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering:
Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP
Source Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827, May 2000.
[RFC 3647] Chokhani, S., Ford, W., Sabett, R., Merrill, C., and
S. Wu, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate Policy and Certification Practices
Framework", RFC 3647, November 2003.
[RFC 3917] Quittek, J., Zseby, T., Claise, B., and S. Zander,
"Requirements for IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX)",
RFC 3917, October 2004.
[RFC 5735] Cotton, M. and L. Vegoda, "Special Use IPv4
Addresses", BCP 153, RFC 5735, January 2010.
[IPtrace] "Advanced and Authenticated Marking Schemes for IP
Traceback". D. Song and A. Perrig. IEEE INFOCOM
2001.
Moriarty Informational PAGE 74
RFC 6045 RID November 2010
[HASH-IPtrace] "Hash-Based IP Traceback". A. Snoeren, C. Partridge,
L. Sanchez, C. Jones, F. Tchakountio, S. Kent, and W.
Strayer. SIGCOMM'01. August 2001.
[ICMPtrace] Bellovin, S., Leech, M., and T. Taylor, "ICMP
Traceback Messages", Work in Progress, February 2003.
[NTWK-IPtrace] "Practical network support for IP traceback". S.
Savage, D. Wetherall, A. Karlin, and T. Anderson.
SIGCOMM'00. August 2000.
[DoS] "Trends in Denial of Service Attack Technology". K.
Houle, G. Weaver, N. Long, and R. Thomas. CERT
Coordination Center. October 2001.
Acknowledgements
Many thanks to coworkers and the Internet community for reviewing and
commenting on the document as well as providing recommendations to
simplify and secure the protocol: Robert K. Cunningham, Ph.D, Cynthia
D. McLain, Dr. William Streilein, Iljitsch van Beijnum, Steve
Bellovin, Yuri Demchenko, Jean-Francois Morfin, Stephen Northcutt,
Jeffrey Schiller, Brian Trammell, Roman Danyliw, Tony Tauber, and
Sandra G. Dykes, Ph.D.
Sponsor Information
This work was sponsored by the Air Force under Air Force Contract
FA8721-05-C-0002, while working at MIT Lincoln Laboratory.
"Opinions, interpretations, conclusions, and recommendations are
those of the author and are not necessarily endorsed by the United
States Government".
Author's Address
Kathleen M. Moriarty
RSA, The Security Division of EMC
174 Middlesex Turnpike
Bedford, MA 01730
US
EMail: Moriarty_Kathleen@EMC.com
Moriarty Informational PAGE 75
Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID)
RFC TOTAL SIZE: 172817 bytes
PUBLICATION DATE: Monday, November 8th, 2010
LEGAL RIGHTS: The IETF Trust (see BCP 78)
|
