|
|
|
|
|
|
IETF RFC 5191
Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA)
Last modified on Monday, May 12th, 2008
 Permanent link to RFC 5191
 Search GitHub Wiki for RFC 5191
 Show other RFCs mentioning RFC 5191
Network Working Group D. Forsberg
Request for Comments: 5191 Nokia
Category: Standards Track Y. Ohba, Ed.
Toshiba
B. Patil
H. Tschofenig
Nokia Siemens Networks
A. Yegin
Samsung
May 2008
Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA)
 Status of This Memo
This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
Abstract
This document defines the Protocol for Carrying Authentication for
Network Access (PANA), a network-layer transport for Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) to enable network access authentication
between clients and access networks. In EAP terms, PANA is a
UDP-based EAP lower layer that runs between the EAP peer and the EAP
authenticator.
Forsberg, et al. Standards Track PAGE 1 
RFC 5191 PANA May 2008
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ....................................................3
1.1. Specification of Requirements ..............................4
2. Terminology .....................................................4
3. Protocol Overview ...............................................6
4. Protocol Details ................................................7
4.1. Authentication and Authorization Phase .....................7
4.2. Access Phase ..............................................11
4.3. Re-Authentication Phase ...................................11
4.4. Termination Phase .........................................13
5. Processing Rules ...............................................13
5.1. Fragmentation .............................................13
5.2. Sequence Number and Retransmission ........................14
5.3. PANA Security Association .................................15
5.4. Message Authentication ....................................17
5.5. Message Validity Check ....................................17
5.6. PaC Updating Its IP Address ...............................19
5.7. Session Lifetime ..........................................19
6. Message Format .................................................20
6.1. IP and UDP Headers ........................................20
6.2. PANA Message Header .......................................20
6.3. AVP Format ................................................22
7. PANA Messages ..................................................24
7.1. PANA-Client-Initiation (PCI) ..............................27
7.2. PANA-Auth-Request (PAR) ...................................28
7.3. PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN) ....................................28
7.4. PANA-Termination-Request (PTR) ............................28
7.5. PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA) .............................29
7.6. PANA-Notification-Request (PNR) ...........................29
7.7. PANA-Notification-Answer (PNA) ............................29
8. AVPs in PANA ...................................................29
8.1. AUTH AVP ..................................................30
8.2. EAP-Payload AVP ...........................................30
8.3. Integrity-Algorithm AVP ...................................31
8.4. Key-Id AVP ................................................31
8.5. Nonce AVP .................................................31
8.6. PRF-Algorithm AVP .........................................32
8.7. Result-Code AVP ...........................................32
8.8. Session-Lifetime AVP ......................................32
8.9. Termination-Cause AVP .....................................33
9. Retransmission Timers ..........................................33
9.1. Transmission and Retransmission Parameters ................35
10. IANA Considerations ...........................................35
10.1. PANA UDP Port Number .....................................36
10.2. PANA Message Header ......................................36
10.2.1. Message Type ......................................36
10.2.2. Flags .............................................36
Forsberg, et al. Standards Track PAGE 2
RFC 5191 PANA May 2008
10.3. AVP Header ...............................................36
10.3.1. AVP Code ..........................................37
10.3.2. Flags .............................................37
10.4. AVP Values ...............................................37
10.4.1. Result-Code AVP Values ............................37
10.4.2. Termination-Cause AVP Values ......................38
11. Security Considerations .......................................38
11.1. General Security Measures ................................38
11.2. Initial Exchange .........................................40
11.3. EAP Methods ..............................................40
11.4. Cryptographic Keys .......................................40
11.5. Per-Packet Ciphering .....................................41
11.6. PAA-to-EP Communication ..................................41
11.7. Liveness Test ............................................41
11.8. Early Termination of a Session ...........................42
12. Acknowledgments ...............................................42
13. References ....................................................42
13.1. Normative References .....................................42
13.2. Informative References ...................................43
1. Introduction
Providing secure network access service requires access control based
on the authentication and authorization of the clients and the access
networks. Client-to-network authentication provides parameters that
are needed to police the traffic flow through the enforcement points.
A protocol is needed to carry authentication methods between the
client and the access network.
The scope of this work is identified as designing a network-layer
transport for network access authentication methods. The Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) [RFC 3748] provides such authentication
methods. In other words, PANA carries EAP, which can carry various
authentication methods. By the virtue of enabling the transport of
EAP above IP, any authentication method that can be carried as an EAP
method is made available to PANA and hence to any link-layer
technology. There is a clear division of labor between PANA (an EAP
lower layer), EAP, and EAP methods as described in [RFC 3748].
Various environments and usage models for PANA are identified in
Appendix A of [RFC 4058]. Potential security threats for
network-layer access authentication protocol are discussed in
[RFC 4016]. These have been essential in defining the requirements
[RFC 4058] of the PANA protocol. Note that some of these requirements
are imposed by the chosen payload, EAP [RFC 3748].
Forsberg, et al. Standards Track PAGE 3
RFC 5191 PANA May 2008
There are components that are part of a complete secure network
access solution but are outside of the PANA protocol specification,
including PANA Authentication Agent (PAA) discovery, authentication
method choice, PANA Authentication Agent-Enforcement Point (PAA-EP)
protocol, access control filter creation, and data traffic
protection. These components are described in separate documents
(see [RFC 5193] and [RFC 5192]).
1.1. Specification of Requirements
In this document, several words are used to signify the requirements
of the specification. These words are often capitalized. The key
words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD",
"SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document
are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119].
2. Terminology
PANA Client (PaC):
The client side of the protocol that resides in the access device
(e.g., laptop, PDA, etc.). It is responsible for providing the
credentials in order to prove its identity (authentication) for
network access authorization. The PaC and the EAP peer are
colocated in the same access device.
PANA Authentication Agent (PAA):
The protocol entity in the access network whose responsibility it
is to verify the credentials provided by a PANA client (PaC) and
authorize network access to the access device. The PAA and the
EAP authenticator (and optionally the EAP server) are colocated in
the same node. Note the authentication and authorization
procedure can, according to the EAP model, also be offloaded to
the back end Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA)
infrastructure.
Forsberg, et al. Standards Track PAGE 4
RFC 5191 PANA May 2008
PANA Session:
A PANA session is established between the PANA Client (PaC) and
the PANA Authentication Agent (PAA), and it terminates as a result
of an authentication and authorization or liveness test failure, a
message delivery failure after retransmissions reach maximum
values, session lifetime expiration, an explicit termination
message or any event that causes discontinuation of the access
service. A fixed session identifier is maintained throughout a
session. A session cannot be shared across multiple network
interfaces.
Session Lifetime:
A duration that is associated with a PANA session. For an
established PANA session, the session lifetime is bound to the
lifetime of the current authorization given to the PaC. The
session lifetime can be extended by a new round of EAP
authentication before it expires. Until a PANA session is
established, the lifetime SHOULD be set to a value that allows the
PaC to detect a failed session in a reasonable amount of time.
Session Identifier:
This identifier is used to uniquely identify a PANA session on the
PaC and the PAA. It is included in PANA messages to bind the
message to a specific PANA session. This bidirectional identifier
is allocated by the PAA in the initial request message and freed
when the session terminates. The session identifier is assigned
by the PAA and is unique within the PAA.
PANA Security Association (PANA SA):
A PANA security association is formed between the PaC and the PAA
by sharing cryptographic keying material and associated context.
The formed duplex security association is used to protect the
bidirectional PANA signaling traffic between the PaC and PAA.
Enforcement Point (EP):
A node on the access network where per-packet enforcement policies
(i.e., filters) are applied on the inbound and outbound traffic of
access devices. The EP and the PAA may be colocated. EPs should
prevent data traffic from and to any unauthorized client, unless
that data traffic is either PANA or one of the other allowed
traffic types (e.g., Address Resolution Protocol (ARP), IPv6
neighbor discovery, DHCP, etc.).
Forsberg, et al. Standards Track PAGE 5
RFC 5191 PANA May 2008
Master Session Key (MSK):
A key derived by the EAP peer and the EAP server and transported
to the EAP authenticator [RFC 3748].
For additional terminology definitions, see the PANA framework
document [RFC 5193].
3. Protocol Overview
The PANA protocol is run between a client (PaC) and a server (PAA) in
order to perform authentication and authorization for the network
access service.
The protocol messaging consists of a series of requests and answers,
some of which may be initiated by either end. Each message can carry
zero or more AVPs (Attribute-Value Pairs) within the payload. The
main payload of PANA is EAP, which performs authentication. PANA
helps the PaC and PAA establish an EAP session.
PANA is a UDP-based protocol. It has its own retransmission
mechanism to reliably deliver messages.
PANA messages are sent between the PaC and PAA as part of a PANA
session. A PANA session consists of distinct phases:
o Authentication and authorization phase: This is the phase that
initiates a new PANA session and executes EAP between the PAA and
PaC. The PANA session can be initiated by both the PaC and the
PAA. The EAP payload (which carries an EAP method inside) is what
is used for authentication. The PAA conveys the result of
authentication and authorization to the PaC at the end of this
phase.
o Access phase: After successful authentication and authorization,
the access device gains access to the network and can send and
receive IP traffic through the EP(s). At any time during this
phase, the PaC and PAA may optionally send PANA notification
messages to test liveness of the PANA session on the peer.
Forsberg, et al. Standards Track PAGE 6
RFC 5191 PANA May 2008
o Re-authentication phase: During the access phase, the PAA may, and
the PaC should, initiate re-authentication if they want to update
the PANA session lifetime before the PANA session lifetime
expires. EAP is carried by PANA to perform re-authentication.
This phase may be optionally triggered by both the PaC and the PAA
without any respect to the session lifetime. The
re-authentication phase is a sub-phase of the access phase. The
session moves to this sub-phase from the access phase when
re-authentication starts, and returns back there upon successful
re-authentication.
o Termination phase: The PaC or PAA may choose to discontinue the
access service at any time. An explicit disconnect message can be
sent by either end. If either the PaC or the PAA disconnects
without engaging in termination messaging, it is expected that
either the expiration of a finite session lifetime or failed
liveness tests would clean up the session at the other end.
Cryptographic protection of messages between the PaC and PAA is
possible as soon as EAP in conjunction with the EAP method exports a
shared key. That shared key is used to create a PANA SA. The PANA
SA helps generate per-message authentication codes that provide
integrity protection and authentication.
4. Protocol Details
The following sections explain in detail the various phases of a PANA
session.
4.1. Authentication and Authorization Phase
The main task of the authentication and authorization phase is to
establish a PANA session and carry EAP messages between the PaC and
the PAA. The PANA session can be initiated by either the PaC or the
PAA.
PaC-initiated Session:
When the PaC initiates a PANA session, it sends a
PANA-Client-Initiation message to the PAA. When the PaC is not
configured with an IP address of the PAA before initiating the
PANA session, DHCP [RFC 5192] is used as the default method for
dynamically configuring the IP address of the PAA. Alternative
methods for dynamically discovering the IP address of the PAA may
be used for PaC-initiated sessions, but they are outside the scope
of this specification. The PAA that receives the
PANA-Client-Initiation message MUST respond to the PaC with a
PANA-Auth-Request message.
Forsberg, et al. Standards Track PAGE 7
RFC 5191 PANA May 2008
PAA-initiated Session:
When the PAA knows the IP address of the PaC, it MAY send an
unsolicited PANA-Auth-Request to the PaC. The details of how PAA
can learn the IP address of the PaC are outside the scope of this
specification.
A session identifier for the session is assigned by the PAA and
carried in the initial PANA-Auth-Request message. The same session
identifier MUST be carried in the subsequent messages exchanged
between the PAA and PaC throughout the session.
When the PaC receives the initial PANA-Auth-Request message from a
PAA, it responds with a PANA-Auth-Answer message, if it wishes to
continue the PANA session. Otherwise, it silently discards the
PANA-Auth-Request message.
The initial PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages MUST have
the 'S' (Start) bit set, regardless of whether the session is
initiated by the PaC or the PAA. Non-initial PANA-Auth-Request and
PANA-Auth-Answer messages as well as any other messages MUST NOT have
the 'S' (Start) bit set.
It is recommended that the PAA limit the rate at which it processes
incoming PANA-Client-Initiation messages to provide robustness
against denial of service (DoS) attacks. The details of rate
limiting are outside the scope of this specification.
If a PANA SA needs to be established with use of a key-generating EAP
method, the Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) and integrity algorithms to
be used for PANA_AUTH_KEY derivation (see Section 5.3) and AUTH AVP
calculation (see Section 5.4) are negotiated as follows: the PAA
sends the initial PANA-Auth-Request carrying one or more
PRF-Algorithm AVPs and one or more Integrity-Algorithm AVPs for the
PRF and integrity algorithms supported by it, respectively. The PaC
then selects one PRF algorithm and one integrity algorithm from these
AVPs carried in the initial PANA-Auth-Request, and it responds with
the initial PANA-Auth-Answer carrying one PRF-Algorithm AVP and one
Integrity-Algorithm AVP for the selected algorithms. The negotiation
is protected after the MSK is available, as described in Section 5.3.
If the PAA wants to stay stateless in response to a
PANA-Client-Initiation message, it doesn't include an EAP-Payload AVP
in the initial PANA-Auth-Request message, and it should not
retransmit the message on a timer. For this reason, the PaC MUST
retransmit the PANA-Client-Initiation message until it receives the
second PANA-Auth-Request message (not a retransmission of the initial
one) from the PAA.
Forsberg, et al. Standards Track PAGE 8
RFC 5191 PANA May 2008
It is possible that both the PAA and the PaC initiate the PANA
session at the same time, i.e., the PAA sends the initial PANA-Auth-
Request message without solicitation while the PaC sends a
PANA-Client-Initiation message. To resolve the race condition, the
PAA MUST silently discard the PANA-Client-Initiation message received
from the PaC after it has sent the initial PANA-Auth-Request message.
The PAA uses the source IP address and the source port number of the
PANA-Client-Initiation message to identify the PaC among multiple
PANA-Client-Initiation messages sent from different PaCs.
EAP messages are carried in PANA-Auth-Request messages.
PANA-Auth-Answer messages are simply used to acknowledge receipt of
the requests. As an optimization, a PANA-Auth-Answer message sent
from the PaC MAY include the EAP message. This optimization SHOULD
NOT be used when it takes time to generate the EAP message (due to,
e.g., intervention of human input), in which case returning an
PANA-Auth-Answer message without piggybacking an EAP message can
avoid unnecessary retransmission of the PANA-Auth-Request message.
A Nonce AVP MUST be included in the first PANA-Auth-Request and
PANA-Auth-Answer messages following the initial PANA-Auth-Request and
PANA-Auth-Answer messages (i.e., with the 'S' (Start) bit set), and
MUST NOT be included in any other message, except during
re-authentication procedures (see Section 4.3).
The result of PANA authentication is carried in the last
PANA-Auth-Request message sent from the PAA to the PaC. This message
carries the EAP authentication result and the result of PANA
authentication. The last PANA-Auth-Request message MUST be
acknowledged with a PANA-Auth-Answer message. The last
PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages MUST have the 'C'
(Complete) bit set, and any other message MUST NOT have the 'C'
(Complete) bit set. Figure 1 shows an example sequence in the
authentication and authorization phase for a PaC-initiated session.
Forsberg, et al. Standards Track PAGE 9
RFC 5191 PANA May 2008
PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]
---------------------------------------------------------------------
-----> PANA-Client-Initiation(0)
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x)[PRF-Algorithm,Integrity-Algorithm]
// The 'S' (Start) bit set
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x)[PRF-Algorithm, Integrity-Algorithm]
// The 'S' (Start) bit set
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+1)[Nonce, EAP-Payload]
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+1)[Nonce] // No piggybacking EAP
-----> PANA-Auth-Request(y)[EAP-Payload]
<----- PANA-Auth-Answer(y)
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+2)[EAP-Payload]
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+2)[EAP-Payload]
// Piggybacking EAP
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+3)[Result-Code, EAP-Payload,
Key-Id, Session-Lifetime, AUTH]
// The 'C' (Complete) bit set
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+3)[Key-Id, AUTH]
// The 'C' (Complete) bit set
Figure 1: Example sequence for the authentication and authorization
phase for a PaC-initiated session ("Piggybacking EAP" is
the case in which an EAP-Payload AVP is carried in PAN)
If a PANA SA needs to be established with use of a key-generating EAP
method and an MSK is successfully generated, the last
PANA-Auth-Request message with the 'C' (Complete) bit set MUST
contain a Key-Id AVP and an AUTH AVP for the first derivation of keys
in the session, and any subsequent message MUST contain an AUTH AVP.
EAP authentication can fail at a pass-through authenticator without
sending an EAP Failure message [RFC 4137]. When this occurs, the PAA
SHOULD silently terminate the session, expecting that a session
timeout on the PaC will clean up the state on the PaC.
There is a case where EAP authentication succeeds with producing an
EAP Success message, but network access authorization fails due to,
e.g., authorization rejected by a AAA server or authorization locally
rejected by the PAA. When this occurs, the PAA MUST send the last
PANA-Auth-Request with a result code PANA_AUTHORIZATION_REJECTED. If
an MSK is available, the last PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer
messages with the 'C' (Complete) bit set MUST be protected with an
AUTH AVP and carry a Key-Id AVP. The PANA session MUST be terminated
immediately after the last PANA-Auth message exchange.
For reasons described in Section 3 of [RFC 5193], the PaC may need to
reconfigure the IP address after a successful authentication and
authorization phase to obtain an IP address that is usable for
Forsberg, et al. Standards Track PAGE 10
RFC 5191 PANA May 2008
exchanging data traffic through EP. In this case, the PAA sets the
'I' (IP Reconfiguration) bit of PANA-Auth-Request messages in the
authentication and authorization phase to indicate to the PaC the
need for IP address reconfiguration. How IP address reconfiguration
is performed is outside the scope of this document.
4.2. Access Phase
Once the authentication and authorization phase successfully
completes, the PaC gains access to the network and can send and
receive IP data traffic through the EP(s), and the PANA session
enters the access phase. In this phase, PANA-Notification-Request
and PANA-Notification-Answer messages with the 'P' (Ping) bit set
(ping request and ping answer messages, respectively) can be used for
testing the liveness of the PANA session on the PANA peer. Both the
PaC and the PAA are allowed to send a ping request to the
communicating peer whenever they need to ensure the availability of
the session on the peer, and they expect the peer to return a ping
answer message. The ping request and answer messages MUST be
protected with an AUTH AVP when a PANA SA is available. A ping
request MUST NOT be sent in the authentication and authorization
phase, re-authentication phase, and termination phase.
Implementations MUST limit the rate of performing this test. The PaC
and the PAA can handle rate limitation on their own, they do not have
to perform any coordination with each other. There is no negotiation
of timers for this purpose. Additionally, an implementation MAY rate
limit processing the incoming ping requests. It should be noted that
if a PAA or PaC that considers its connectivity lost after a
relatively small number of unresponsive pings is coupled with a peer
that is aggressively rate limiting the ping request and answer
messages, then false-positives could result. Therefore, a PAA or PaC
should not rely on frequent ping operation to quickly determine loss
of connectivity.
4.3. Re-Authentication Phase
The PANA session in the access phase can enter the re-authentication
phase to extend the current session lifetime by re-executing EAP.
Once the re-authentication phase successfully completes, the session
re-enters the access phase. Otherwise, the session is terminated.
When the PaC initiates re-authentication, it sends a
PANA-Notification-Request message with the 'A' (re-Authentication)
bit set (a re-authentication request message) to the PAA. This
message MUST contain the session identifier assigned to the session
being re-authenticated. If the PAA already has an established PANA
session for the PaC with the matching session identifier, it MUST
Forsberg, et al. Standards Track PAGE 11
RFC 5191 PANA May 2008
first respond with a PANA-Notification-Answer message with the 'A'
(re-Authentication) bit set (a re-authentication answer message),
followed by a PANA-Auth-Request message that starts a new EAP
authentication. If the PAA cannot identify the session, it MUST
silently discard the message. The first PANA-Auth-Request and
PANA-Auth-Answer messages in the re-authentication phase MUST have
the 'S' (Start) bit cleared and carry a Nonce AVP.
The PaC may receive a PANA-Auth-Request before receiving the answer
to its outstanding re-authentication request message. This condition
can arise due to packet re-ordering or a race condition between the
PaC and PAA when they both attempt to engage in re-authentication.
The PaC MUST keep discarding the received PANA-Auth-Requests until it
receives the answer to its request.
When the PAA initiates re-authentication, it sends a
PANA-Auth-Request message containing the session identifier for the
PaC. The PAA MUST initiate EAP re-authentication before the current
session lifetime expires.
Re-authentication of an ongoing PANA session MUST NOT reset the
sequence numbers.
For any re-authentication, if there is an established PANA SA,
re-authentication request and answer messages and subsequent
PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages MUST be protected
with an AUTH AVP. The final PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer
messages and any subsequent PANA message MUST be protected by using
the key generated from the latest EAP authentication.
Forsberg, et al. Standards Track PAGE 12
RFC 5191 PANA May 2008
PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]
---------------------------------------------------------------------
-----> PANA-Notification-Request(q)[AUTH]
// The 'A' (re-Authentication) bit set
<----- PANA-Notification-Answer(q)[AUTH]
// The 'A' (re-Authentication) bit set
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(p)[EAP-Payload, Nonce, AUTH]
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(p)[AUTH, Nonce]
-----> PANA-Auth-Request(q+1)[EAP-Payload, AUTH]
<----- PANA-Auth-Answer(q+1)[AUTH]
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(p+1)[EAP-Payload, AUTH]
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(p+1)[EAP-Payload, AUTH]
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(p+2)[Result-Code, EAP-Payload,
Key-Id, Session-Lifetime, AUTH]
// The 'C' (Complete) bit set
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(p+2)[Key-Id, AUTH]
// The 'C' (Complete) bit set
Figure 2: Example sequence for the re-authentication phase initiated
by PaC
4.4. Termination Phase
A procedure for explicitly terminating a PANA session can be
initiated either from the PaC (i.e., disconnect indication) or from
the PAA (i.e., session revocation). The PANA-Termination-Request and
PANA-Termination-Answer message exchanges are used for
disconnect-indication and session-revocation procedures.
The reason for termination is indicated in the Termination-Cause AVP.
When there is an established PANA SA between the PaC and the PAA, all
messages exchanged during the termination phase MUST be protected
with an AUTH AVP. When the sender of the PANA-Termination-Request
message receives a valid acknowledgment, all states maintained for
the PANA session MUST be terminated immediately.
5. Processing Rules
5.1. Fragmentation
PANA does not provide fragmentation of PANA messages. Instead, it
relies on fragmentation provided by EAP methods and IP layer when
needed.
Forsberg, et al. Standards Track PAGE 13
RFC 5191 PANA May 2008
5.2. Sequence Number and Retransmission
PANA uses sequence numbers to provide ordered and reliable delivery
of messages.
The PaC and PAA maintain two sequence numbers: one is for setting the
sequence number of the next outgoing request; the other is for
matching the sequence number of the next incoming request. These
sequence numbers are 32-bit unsigned numbers. They are monotonically
incremented by 1 as new requests are generated and received, and
wrapped to zero on the next message after 2^32-1. Answers always
contain the same sequence number as the corresponding request.
Retransmissions reuse the sequence number contained in the original
packet.
The initial sequence numbers (ISN) are randomly picked by the PaC and
PAA as they send their very first request messages.
PANA-Client-Initiation message carries sequence number 0.
When a request message is received, it is considered valid in terms
of sequence numbers if and only if its sequence number matches the
expected value. This check does not apply to the
PANA-Client-Initiation message and the initial PANA-Auth-Request
message.
When an answer message is received, it is considered valid in terms
of sequence numbers if and only if its sequence number matches that
of the currently outstanding request. A peer can only have one
outstanding request at a time.
PANA request messages are retransmitted based on a timer until an
answer is received (in which case the retransmission timer is
stopped) or the number of retransmission reaches the maximum value
(in which case the PANA session MUST be terminated immediately).
The retransmission timers SHOULD be calculated as described in
Section 9, unless a given deployment chooses to use its own
retransmission timers optimized for the underlying link-layer
characteristics.
Unless dropped due to rate limiting, the PaC and PAA MUST respond to
all duplicate request messages received. The last transmitted answer
MAY be cached in case it is not received by the peer, which generates
a retransmission of the last request. When available, the cached
answer can be used instead of fully processing the retransmitted
request and forming a new answer from scratch.
Forsberg, et al. Standards Track PAGE 14
RFC 5191 PANA May 2008
5.3. PANA Security Association
A PANA SA is created as an attribute of a PANA session when EAP
authentication succeeds with a creation of an MSK. A PANA SA is not
created when the PANA authentication fails or no MSK is produced by
the EAP authentication method. When a new MSK is derived in the PANA
re-authentication phase, any key derived from the old MSK MUST be
updated to a new one that is derived from the new MSK. In order to
distinguish the new MSK from old ones, one Key-Id AVP MUST be carried
in the last PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages with the
'C' (Complete) bit set at the end of the EAP authentication, which
resulted in deriving a new MSK. The Key-Id AVP is of type Unsigned32
and MUST contain a value that uniquely identifies the MSK within the
PANA session. The last PANA-Auth-Answer message with the 'C'
(Complete) bit set in response to the last PANA-Auth-Request message
with the 'C' (Complete) bit set MUST contain a Key-Id AVP with the
same MSK identifier carried in the request. The last
PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages with a Key-Id AVP
MUST also carry an AUTH AVP whose value is computed by using the new
PANA_AUTH_KEY derived from the new MSK. Although the specification
does not mandate a particular method for calculation of the Key-Id
AVP value, a simple method is to use monotonically increasing
numbers.
The PANA session lifetime is bounded by the authorization lifetime
granted by the authentication server (same as the MSK lifetime). The
lifetime of the PANA SA (hence the PANA_AUTH_KEY) is the same as the
lifetime of the PANA session. The created PANA SA is deleted when
the corresponding PANA session is terminated.
PANA SA attributes as well as PANA session attributes are listed
below:
PANA Session attributes:
* Session Identifier
* IP address and UDP port number of the PaC
* IP address and UDP port number of the PAA
* Sequence number for the next outgoing request
* Sequence number for the next incoming request
* Last transmitted message payload
* Retransmission interval
Forsberg, et al. Standards Track PAGE 15
RFC 5191 PANA May 2008
* Session lifetime
* PANA SA attributes
PANA SA attributes:
* Nonce generated by PaC (PaC_nonce)
* Nonce generated by PAA (PAA_nonce)
* MSK
* MSK Identifier
* PANA_AUTH_KEY
* Pseudo-random function
* Integrity algorithm
The PANA_AUTH_KEY is derived from the available MSK, and it is used
to integrity protect PANA messages. The PANA_AUTH_KEY is computed in
the following way:
PANA_AUTH_KEY = prf+(MSK, "IETF PANA"|I_PAR|I_PAN|
PaC_nonce|PAA_nonce|Key_ID)
where:
- The prf+ function is defined in IKEv2 [RFC 4306]. The pseudo-random
function to be used for the prf+ function is negotiated using
PRF-Algorithm AVP in the initial PANA-Auth-Request and
PANA-Auth-Answer exchange with 'S' (Start) bit set.
- MSK is the master session key generated by the EAP method.
- "IETF PANA" is the ASCII code representation of the non-NULL
terminated string (excluding the double quotes around it).
- I_PAR and I_PAN are the initial PANA-Auth-Request and
PANA-Auth-Answer messages (the PANA header and the following PANA
AVPs) with 'S' (Start) bit set, respectively.
- PaC_nonce and PAA_nonce are values of the Nonce AVP carried in the
first non-initial PANA-Auth-Answer and PANA-Auth-Request messages
in the authentication and authorization phase or the first
PANA-Auth-Answer and PANA-Auth-Request messages in the
re-authentication phase, respectively.
Forsberg, et al. Standards Track PAGE 16
RFC 5191 PANA May 2008
- Key_ID is the value of the Key-Id AVP.
The length of PANA_AUTH_KEY depends on the integrity algorithm in
use. See Section 5.4 for the detailed usage of the PANA_AUTH_KEY.
5.4. Message Authentication
A PANA message can contain an AUTH AVP for cryptographically
protecting the message.
When an AUTH AVP is included in a PANA message, the Value field of
the AUTH AVP is calculated by using the PANA_AUTH_KEY in the
following way:
AUTH AVP value = PANA_AUTH_HASH(PANA_AUTH_KEY, PANA_PDU)
where PANA_PDU is the PANA message including the PANA header, with
the AUTH AVP Value field first initialized to 0. PANA_AUTH_HASH
represents the integrity algorithm negotiated using
Integrity-Algorithm AVP in the initial PANA-Auth-Request and
PANA-Auth-Answer exchange with 'S' (Start) bit set. The PaC and PAA
MUST use the same integrity algorithm to calculate an AUTH AVP they
originate and receive.
5.5. Message Validity Check
When a PANA message is received, the message is considered to be
invalid, at least when one of the following conditions are not met:
o Each field in the message header contains a valid value including
sequence number, message length, message type, flags, session
identifier, etc.
o The message type is one of the expected types in the current
state. Specifically, the following messages are unexpected and
invalid:
* In the authentication and authorization phase:
+ PANA-Client-Initiation after completion of the initial
PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer exchange with 'S'
(Start) bit set.
+ Re-authentication request.
+ Ping request.
Forsberg, et al. Standards Track PAGE 17
RFC 5191 PANA May 2008
+ The last PANA-Auth-Request with 'C' (Complete) bit set
before completion of the initial PANA-Auth-Request and
PANA-Auth-Answer exchange with 'S' (Start) bit set.
+ The initial PANA-Auth-Request with 'S' (Start) bit set after
a PaC receives a valid non-initial PANA-Auth-Request with
'S' (Start) bit cleared.
+ PANA-Termination-Request.
* In the re-authentication phase:
+ PANA-Client-Initiation.
+ The initial PANA-Auth-Request.
* In the access phase:
+ PANA-Auth-Request.
+ PANA-Client-Initiation.
* In the termination phase:
+ PANA-Client-Initiation.
+ All requests but PANA-Termination-Request and ping request.
o The message payload contains a valid set of AVPs allowed for the
message type. There is no missing AVP that needs to be included
in the payload, and no AVP, which needs to be at a fixed position,
is included in a position different from this fixed position.
o Each AVP is recognized and decoded correctly.
o Once the PANA authentication succeeds in using a key-generating
EAP method, the PANA-Auth-Request message that carries the EAP
Success and any subsequent message in that session contains an
AUTH AVP. The AVP value matches the hash value computed against
the received message.
Invalid messages MUST be discarded in order to provide robustness
against DoS attacks.
Forsberg, et al. Standards Track PAGE 18
RFC 5191 PANA May 2008
5.6. PaC Updating Its IP Address
A PaC's IP address used for PANA can change in certain situations,
e.g., when IP address reconfiguration is needed for the PaC to obtain
an IP address after successful PANA authentication (see Section 3 of
[RFC 5193]) or when the PaC moves from one IP link to another within
the same PAA's realm. In order to maintain the PANA session, the PAA
needs to be notified about the change of PaC address.
After the PaC has changed its IP address used for PANA, it MUST send
any valid PANA message. If the message that carries the new PaC IP
address in the Source Address field of the IP header is valid, the
PAA MUST update the PANA session with the new PaC address. If there
is an established PANA SA, the message MUST be protected with an AUTH
AVP.
5.7. Session Lifetime
The authentication and authorization phase determines the PANA
session lifetime, and the lifetime is indicated to the PaC when the
network access authorization succeeds. For this purpose, when the
last PANA-Auth-Request message (i.e., with the 'C' (Complete) bit
set) in authentication and authorization phase or re-authentication
phase carries a Result-Code AVP with a value of PANA_SUCCESS, a
Session-Lifetime AVP MUST also be carried in the message. A
Session-Lifetime AVP MUST be ignored when included in other PANA
messages.
The lifetime is a non-negotiable parameter that can be used by the
PaC to manage PANA-related state. The PaC MUST initiate the
re-authentication phase before the current session lifetime expires,
if it wants to extend the session.
The PaC and the PAA MAY use information obtained outside PANA (e.g.,
lower-layer indications) to expedite the detection of a disconnected
peer. Availability and reliability of such indications MAY depend on
a specific link-layer or network topology and are therefore only
hints. A PANA peer SHOULD use the ping request and answer exchange
to verify that a peer is, in fact, no longer alive, unless
information obtained outside PANA is being used to expedite the
detection of a disconnected peer.
The session lifetime parameter is not related to the transmission of
ping request messages. These messages can be used for asynchronously
verifying the liveness of the peer. The decision to send a ping
request message is made locally and does not require coordination
between the peers.
Forsberg, et al. Standards Track PAGE 19
RFC 5191 PANA May 2008
6. Message Format
This section defines message formats for PANA protocol.
6.1. IP and UDP Headers
Any PANA message is unicast between the PaC and the PAA.
For any PANA message sent from the peer that has initiated the PANA
session, the UDP source port is set to any number on which the peer
can receive incoming PANA messages, and the destination port is set
to the assigned PANA port number (716). For any PANA message sent
from the other peer, the source port is set to the assigned PANA port
number (716), and the destination port is copied from the source port
of the last received message. In case both the PaC and PAA initiate
the session (i.e., PANA-Client-Initiation and unsolicited PANA-Auth-
Request messages cross each other), then the PaC is identified as the
initiator. All PANA peers MUST listen on the assigned PANA port
number (716).
6.2. PANA Message Header
A summary of the PANA message header format is shown below. The
fields are transmitted in network byte order.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reserved | Message Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Flags | Message Type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Session Identifier |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Sequence Number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AVPs ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
Reserved
This 16-bit field is reserved for future use. It MUST be set to
zero and ignored by the receiver.
Forsberg, et al. Standards Track PAGE 20
RFC 5191 PANA May 2008
Message Length
The Message Length field is two octets and indicates the length of
the PANA message including the header fields.
Flags
The Flags field is two octets. The following bits are assigned:
0 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|R S C A P I r r r r r r r r r r|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
R (Request)
If set, the message is a request. If cleared, the message is an
answer.
S (Start)
If set, the message is the first PANA-Auth-Request or
PANA-Auth-Answer in authentication and authorization phase. For
other messages, this bit MUST be cleared.
C (Complete)
If set, the message is the last PANA-Auth-Request or
PANA-Auth-Answer in authentication and authorization phase. For
other messages, this bit MUST be cleared.
A (re-Authentication)
If set, the message is a PANA-Notification-Request or
PANA-Notification-Answer to initiate re-authentication. For other
messages, this bit MUST be cleared.
P (Ping)
If set, the message is a PANA-Notification-Request or
PANA-Notification-Answer for liveness test. For other messages,
this bit MUST be cleared.
Forsberg, et al. Standards Track PAGE 21
RFC 5191 PANA May 2008
I (IP Reconfiguration)
If set, it indicates that the PaC is required to perform IP
address reconfiguration after successful authentication and
authorization phase to configure an IP address that is usable for
exchanging data traffic across EP. This bit is set by the PAA
only for PANA-Auth-Request messages in the authentication and
authorization phase. For other messages, this bit MUST be
cleared.
r (reserved)
These flag bits are reserved for future use. They MUST be set to
zero and ignored by the receiver.
Message Type
The Message Type field is two octets, and it is used in order to
communicate the message type with the message. Message Type
allocation is managed by IANA [IANAWEB].
Session Identifier
This field contains a 32-bit session identifier.
Sequence Number
This field contains a 32-bit sequence number.
AVPs
AVPs are a method of encapsulating information relevant to the
PANA message. See Section 6.3 for more information on AVPs.
6.3. AVP Format
Each AVP of type OctetString MUST be padded to align on a 32-bit
boundary, while other AVP types align naturally. A number of
zero-valued bytes are added to the end of the AVP Value field until a
word boundary is reached. The length of the padding is not reflected
in the AVP Length field [RFC 3588].
Forsberg, et al. Standards Track PAGE 22
RFC 5191 PANA May 2008
The fields in the AVP are sent in network byte order. The AVP format
is:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AVP Code | AVP Flags |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AVP Length | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Vendor-Id (opt) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Value ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
AVP Code
The AVP Code, together with the optional Vendor-Id field,
identifies an attribute that follows. If the V-bit is not set,
then the Vendor-Id is not present and the AVP Code refers to an
IETF attribute.
AVP Flags
The AVP Flags field is two octets. The following bits are
assigned:
0 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|V r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
V (Vendor)
The 'V' (Vendor) bit indicates whether the optional Vendor-Id
field is present in the AVP header. When set, the AVP Code
belongs to the specific vendor code address space. All AVPs
defined in this document MUST have the 'V' (Vendor) bit cleared.
r (reserved)
These flag bits are reserved for future use. They MUST be set to
zero and ignored by the receiver.
Forsberg, et al. Standards Track PAGE 23
RFC 5191 PANA May 2008
AVP Length
The AVP Length field is two octets, and indicates the number of
octets in the Value field. The length of the AVP Code, AVP
Length, AVP Flags, Reserved and Vendor-Id fields are not counted
in the AVP Length value.
Reserved
This two-octet field is reserved for future use. It MUST be set
to zero and ignored by the receiver.
Vendor-Id
The Vendor-Id field is present if the 'V' (Vendor) bit is set in
the AVP Flags field. The optional four-octet Vendor-Id field
contains the IANA assigned "SMI Network Management Private
Enterprise Codes" [IANAWEB] value, encoded in network byte order.
Any vendor wishing to implement a vendor-specific PANA AVP MUST
use their own Vendor-Id along with their privately managed AVP
address space, guaranteeing that they will not collide with any
other vendor's vendor-specific AVP(s) nor with future IETF
applications.
Value
The Value field is zero or more octets and contains information
specific to the Attribute. The format of the Value field is
determined by the AVP Code and Vendor-Id fields. The length of
the Value field is determined by the AVP Length field.
7. PANA Messages
Each Request/Answer message pair is assigned a sequence number, and
the sub-type (i.e., request or answer) is identified via the 'R'
(Request) bit in the Message Flags field of the PANA message header.
Forsberg, et al. Standards Track PAGE 24
RFC 5191 PANA May 2008
Every PANA message MUST contain a message type in its header's
Message Type field, which is used to determine the action that is to
be taken for a particular message. Figure 3 lists all PANA messages
defined in this document:
Message Name Abbrev. Message PaC<->PAA Ref.
Type
---------------------------------------------------------------------
PANA-Client-Initiation PCI 1 --------> 7.1
PANA-Auth-Request PAR 2 <-------> 7.2
PANA-Auth-Answer PAN 2 <-------> 7.3
PANA-Termination-Request PTR 3 <-------> 7.4
PANA-Termination-Answer PTA 3 <-------> 7.5
PANA-Notification-Request PNR 4 <-------> 7.6
PANA-Notification-Answer PNA 4 <-------> 7.7
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 3: Table of PANA Messages
The language used for PANA message definitions (i.e., AVPs valid for
that PANA message type), in Section 7.1 through Section 7.7, is
defined using ABNF [RFC 5234] as follows:
message-def = Message-Name LWSP "::=" LWSP PANA-message
Message-Name = PANA-name
PANA-name = ALPHA *(ALPHA / DIGIT / "-")
PANA-message = header LWSP *fixed LWSP *required
LWSP *optional LWSP *fixed
header = "<" LWSP "PANA-Header:" LWSP Message-Type
[r-bit] [s-bit] [c-bit] [a-bit] [p-bit] [i-bit]
LWSP ">"
Message-Type = 1*DIGIT
; The Message Type assigned to the message
r-bit = ",REQ"
; If present, the 'R' (Request) bit in the Message
; Flags is set, indicating that the message
; is a request, as opposed to an answer.
Forsberg, et al. Standards Track PAGE 25
RFC 5191 PANA May 2008
s-bit = ",STA"
; If present, the 'S' (Start) bit in the Message
; Flags is set, indicating that the message
; is the initial PAR or PAN in authentication
; and authorization phase.
c-bit = ",COM"
; If present, the 'C' bit in the Message
; Flags is set, indicating that the message
; is the final PAR and PAN in authentication
; and authorization phase or re-authentication
; phase.
a-bit = ",REA"
; If present, the 'A' (re-Authentication) bit
; in the Message Flags is set, indicating that
; the message is a re-authentication request or
; answer.
p-bit = ",PIN"
; If present, the 'P' (Ping) bit in the Message
; Flags is set, indicating that the message
; is a ping request or answer.
i-bit = ",IPR"
; If present, the 'I' (IP Reconfiguration) bit
; in the Message Flags is set, indicating that
; the PaC requires IP address reconfiguration
; after successful authentication and
; authorization phase.
fixed = [qual] "<" LWSP avp-spec LWSP ">"
; Defines the fixed position of an AVP.
required = [qual] "{" LWSP avp-spec LWSP "}"
; The AVP MUST be present and can appear
; anywhere in the message.
optional = [qual] "[" LWSP avp-name LWSP "]"
; The avp-name in the 'optional' rule cannot
; evaluate any AVP Name that is included
; in a fixed or required rule. The AVP can
; appear anywhere in the message.
Forsberg, et al. Standards Track PAGE 26
RFC 5191 PANA May 2008
qual = [min] "*" [max]
; See ABNF conventions, RFC 5234 Section 3.6.
; The absence of any qualifiers depends on whether
; it precedes a fixed, required, or optional
; rule. If a fixed or required rule has no
; qualifier, then exactly one such AVP MUST
; be present. If an optional rule has no
; qualifier, then 0 or 1 such AVP may be
; present.
;
; NOTE: "[" and "]" have a different meaning
; than in ABNF (see the optional rule, above).
; These braces cannot be used to express
; optional fixed rules (such as an optional
; AUTH at the end). To do this, the convention
; is '0*1fixed'.
min = 1*DIGIT
; The minimum number of times the element may
; be present. The default value is zero.
max = 1*DIGIT
; The maximum number of times the element may
; be present. The default value is infinity. A
; value of zero implies the AVP MUST NOT be
; present.
avp-spec = PANA-name
; The avp-spec has to be an AVP Name, defined
; in the base or extended PANA protocol
; specifications.
avp-name = avp-spec / "AVP"
; The string "AVP" stands for *any* arbitrary
; AVP Name, which does not conflict with the
; required or fixed position AVPs defined in
; the message definition.
7.1. PANA-Client-Initiation (PCI)
The PANA-Client-Initiation (PCI) message is used for PaC-initiated
session. The Sequence Number and Session Identifier fields in this
message MUST be set to zero (0).
PANA-Client-Initiation ::= < PANA-Header: 1 >
*[ AVP ]
Forsberg, et al. Standards Track PAGE 27
RFC 5191 PANA May 2008
7.2. PANA-Auth-Request (PAR)
The PANA-Auth-Request (PAR) message is either sent by the PAA or the
PaC.
The message MUST NOT have both the 'S' (Start) and 'C' (Complete)
bits set.
PANA-Auth-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 2,REQ[,STA][,COM][,IPR] >
[ EAP-Payload ]
[ Nonce ]
*[ PRF-Algorithm ]
*[ Integrity-Algorithm ]
[ Result-Code ]
[ Session-Lifetime ]
[ Key-Id ]
*[ AVP ]
0*1< AUTH >
7.3. PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN)
The PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN) message is sent by either the PaC or the
PAA in response to a PANA-Auth-Request message.
The message MUST NOT have both the 'S' (Start) and 'C' (Complete)
bits set.
PANA-Auth-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 2[,STA][,COM] >
[ Nonce ]
[ PRF-Algorithm ]
[ Integrity-Algorithm ]
[ EAP-Payload ]
[ Key-Id ]
*[ AVP ]
0*1< AUTH >
7.4. PANA-Termination-Request (PTR)
The PANA-Termination-Request (PTR) message is sent either by the PaC
or the PAA to terminate a PANA session.
PANA-Termination-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 3,REQ >
< Termination-Cause >
*[ AVP ]
0*1< AUTH >
Forsberg, et al. Standards Track PAGE 28
RFC 5191 PANA May 2008
7.5. PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA)
The PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA) message is sent either by the PaC
or the PAA in response to PANA-Termination-Request.
PANA-Termination-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 3 >
*[ AVP ]
0*1< AUTH >
7.6. PANA-Notification-Request (PNR)
The PANA-Notification-Request (PNR) message is used for signaling
re-authentication and performing liveness test. See Section 4.3 and
Section 4.2 for details on re-authentication and liveness test,
respectively.
The message MUST have one of the 'A' (re-Authentication) and 'P'
(Ping) bits exclusively set.
PANA-Notification-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 4,REQ[,REA][,PIN] >
*[ AVP ]
0*1< AUTH >
7.7. PANA-Notification-Answer (PNA)
The PANA-Notification-Answer (PNA) message is sent by the PAA (PaC)
to the PaC (PAA) in response to a PANA-Notification-Request from the
PaC (PAA).
The message MUST have one of the 'A' (re-Authentication) and 'P'
(Ping) bits exclusively set.
PANA-Notification-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 4[,REA][,PIN] >
*[ AVP ]
0*1< AUTH >
8. AVPs in PANA
This document uses AVP Value Format such as 'OctetString' and
'Unsigned32' as defined in Section 4.2 of [RFC 3588]. The definitions
of these data formats are not repeated in this document.
The following table lists the AVPs used in this document, and
specifies in which PANA messages they MAY or MAY NOT be present.
Forsberg, et al. Standards Track PAGE 29
RFC 5191 PANA May 2008
The table uses the following symbols:
0 The AVP MUST NOT be present in the message.
0-1 Zero or one instance of the AVP MAY be present in the message.
It is considered an error if there is more than one instance of
the AVP.
1 One instance of the AVP MUST be present in the message.
0+ Zero or more instances of the AVP MAY be present in the
message.
+---------------------------+
| Message Type |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
Attribute Name |PCI|PAR|PAN|PTR|PTA|PNR|PNA|
----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
AUTH | 0 |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|
EAP-Payload | 0 |0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Integrity-Algorithm | 0 |0+ |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Key-Id | 0 |0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Nonce | 0 |0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
PRF-Algorithm | 0 |0+ |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Result-Code | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Session-Lifetime | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Termination-Cause | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
Figure 4: AVP Occurrence Table
8.1. AUTH AVP
The AUTH AVP (AVP Code 1) is used to integrity protect PANA messages.
The AVP data payload contains the Message Authentication Code encoded
in network byte order. The AVP length varies depending on the
integrity algorithm used. The AVP data is of type OctetString.
8.2. EAP-Payload AVP
The EAP-Payload AVP (AVP Code 2) is used for encapsulating the actual
EAP message that is being exchanged between the EAP peer and the EAP
authenticator. The AVP data is of type OctetString.
Forsberg, et al. Standards Track PAGE 30
RFC 5191 PANA May 2008
8.3. Integrity-Algorithm AVP
The Integrity-Algorithm AVP (AVP Code 3) is used for conveying the
integrity algorithm to compute an AUTH AVP. The AVP data is of type
Unsigned32. The AVP data contains an Internet Key Exchange Protocol
version 2 (IKEv2) Transform ID of Transform Type 3 [RFC 4306] for the
integrity algorithm. All PANA implementations MUST support
AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_160 (7) [RFC 4595].
8.4. Key-Id AVP
The Key-Id AVP (AVP Code 4) is of type Integer32 and contains an MSK
identifier. The MSK identifier is assigned by PAA and MUST be unique
within the PANA session.
8.5. Nonce AVP
The Nonce AVP (AVP Code 5) carries a randomly chosen value that is
used in cryptographic key computations. The recommendations in
[RFC 4086] apply with regard to generation of random values. The AVP
data is of type OctetString, and it contains a randomly generated
value in opaque format. The data length MUST be between 8 and 256
octets, inclusive.
The length of the nonces are determined based on the available
pseudo-random functions (PRFs) and the degree of trust placed into
the PaC and the PAA to compute random values. The length of the
random value for the nonce is determined in one of two ways,
depending on whether:
1. The PaC and the PAA each are likely to be able to compute a
random nonce (according to [RFC 4086]). The length of the nonce
has to be 1/2 the length of the PRF key (e.g., 10 octets in the
case of HMAC-SHA1).
2. The PaC and the PAA each are not trusted with regard to the
computation of a random nonce (according to [RFC 4086]). The
length of the nonce has to have the full length of the PRF key
(e.g., 20 octets in the case of HMAC-SHA1).
Furthermore, the strongest available PRF for PANA has to be
considered in this computation. Currently, only a single PRF (namely
HMAC-SHA1) is available and therefore the maximum output length is 20
octets. Therefore, the maximum length of the nonce value SHOULD be
20 octets.
Forsberg, et al. Standards Track PAGE 31
RFC 5191 PANA May 2008
8.6. PRF-Algorithm AVP
The PRF-Algorithm AVP (AVP Code 6) is used for conveying the
pseudo-random function to derive PANA_AUTH_KEY. The AVP data is of
type Unsigned32. The AVP data contains an IKEv2 Transform ID of
Transform Type 2 [RFC 4306]. All PANA implementations MUST support
PRF_HMAC_SHA1 (2) [RFC 2104].
8.7. Result-Code AVP
The Result-Code AVP (AVP Code 7) is of type Unsigned32 and indicates
whether an EAP authentication was completed successfully.
Result-Code AVP values are described below.
PANA_SUCCESS 0
Both authentication and authorization processes are successful.
PANA_AUTHENTICATION_REJECTED 1
Authentication has failed. When authentication fails,
authorization is also considered to have failed.
PANA_AUTHORIZATION_REJECTED 2
The authorization process has failed. This error could occur when
authorization is rejected by a AAA server or rejected locally by a
PAA, even if the authentication procedure has succeeded.
8.8. Session-Lifetime AVP
The Session-Lifetime AVP (AVP Code 8) contains the number of seconds
remaining before the current session is considered expired. The AVP
data is of type Unsigned32.
Forsberg, et al. Standards Track PAGE 32
RFC 5191 PANA May 2008
8.9. Termination-Cause AVP
The Termination-Cause AVP (AVP Code 9) is used for indicating the
reason why a session is terminated by the requester. The AVP data is
of type Enumerated. The following Termination-Cause data values are
used with PANA.
LOGOUT 1 (PaC -> PAA)
The client initiated a disconnect.
ADMINISTRATIVE 4 (PAA -> PaC)
The client was not granted access or was disconnected due to
administrative reasons.
SESSION_TIMEOUT 8 (PAA -> PaC)
The session has timed out, and service has been terminated.
9. Retransmission Timers
The PANA protocol provides retransmissions for the
PANA-Client-Initiation message and all request messages.
PANA retransmission timers are based on the model used in DHCPv6
[RFC 3315]. Variables used here are also borrowed from this
specification. PANA is a request/response-based protocol. The
message exchange terminates when the requester successfully receives
the answer, or the message exchange is considered to have failed
according to the retransmission mechanism described below.
The retransmission behavior is controlled and described by the
following variables:
RT Retransmission timeout from the previous (re)transmission
IRT Base value for RT for the initial retransmission
MRC Maximum retransmission count
MRT Maximum retransmission time
MRD Maximum retransmission duration
RAND Randomization factor
Forsberg, et al. Standards Track PAGE 33
RFC 5191 PANA May 2008
With each message transmission or retransmission, the sender sets RT
according to the rules given below. If RT expires before the message
exchange terminates, the sender recomputes RT and retransmits the
message.
Each of the computations of a new RT include a randomization factor
(RAND), which is a random number chosen with a uniform distribution
between -0.1 and +0.1. The randomization factor is included to
minimize the synchronization of messages.
The algorithm for choosing a random number does not need to be
cryptographically sound. The algorithm SHOULD produce a different
sequence of random numbers from each invocation.
RT for the first message retransmission is based on IRT:
RT = IRT + RAND*IRT
RT for each subsequent message retransmission is based on the
previous value of RT:
RT = 2*RTprev + RAND*RTprev
MRT specifies an upper bound on the value of RT (disregarding the
randomization added by the use of RAND). If MRT has a value of 0,
there is no upper limit on the value of RT. Otherwise:
if (RT > MRT)
RT = MRT + RAND*MRT
MRC specifies an upper bound on the number of times a sender may
retransmit a message. Unless MRC is zero, the message exchange fails
once the sender has transmitted the message MRC times.
MRD specifies an upper bound on the length of time a sender may
retransmit a message. Unless MRD is zero, the message exchange fails
once MRD seconds have elapsed since the client first transmitted the
message.
If both MRC and MRD are non-zero, the message exchange fails whenever
either of the conditions specified in the previous two paragraphs are
met.
If both MRC and MRD are zero, the client continues to transmit the
message until it receives a response.
Forsberg, et al. Standards Track PAGE 34
RFC 5191 PANA May 2008
9.1. Transmission and Retransmission Parameters
This section presents a table of values used to describe the message
retransmission behavior of PANA requests (REQ_*) and PANA-Client-
Initiation message (PCI_*). The table shows default values.
Parameter Default Description
---------------------------------------------------------------------
PCI_IRT 1 sec Initial PCI timeout.
PCI_MRT 120 secs Max PCI timeout value.
PCI_MRC 0 Max PCI retransmission attempts.
PCI_MRD 0 Max PCI retransmission duration.
REQ_IRT 1 sec Initial Request timeout.
REQ_MRT 30 secs Max Request timeout value.
REQ_MRC 10 Max Request retransmission attempts.
REQ_MRD 0 Max Request retransmission duration.
So, for example, the first RT for the PANA-Auth-Request (PAR) message
is calculated using REQ_IRT as the IRT:
RT = REQ_IRT + RAND*REQ_IRT
10. IANA Considerations
This section provides guidance to the Internet Assigned Numbers
Authority (IANA) regarding the registration of values related to the
PANA protocol, in accordance with BCP 26 [IANA]. The following
policies are used here with the meanings defined in BCP 26: "Private
Use", "First Come First Served", "Expert Review", "Specification
Required", "IETF Consensus", and "Standards Action".
This section explains the criteria to be used by the IANA for
assignment of numbers within namespaces defined within this document.
For registration requests where a Designated Expert should be
consulted, the responsible IESG Area Director should appoint the
Designated Expert. For Designated Expert with Specification
Required, the request is posted to the PANA WG mailing list (or, if
it has been disbanded, a successor designated by the Area Director)
for comment and review, and MUST include a pointer to a public
specification. Before a period of 30 days has passed, the Designated
Expert will either approve or deny the registration request and
Forsberg, et al. Standards Track PAGE 35
RFC 5191 PANA May 2008
publish a notice of the decision to the PANA WG mailing list or its
successor. A denial notice must be justified by an explanation and,
in the cases where it is possible, concrete suggestions on how the
request can be modified so as to become acceptable.
IANA has created a registry for PANA.
10.1. PANA UDP Port Number
PANA uses one well-known UDP port number (see Section 6.1), which has
been assigned by the IANA (716).
10.2. PANA Message Header
As defined in Section 6.2, the PANA message header contains two
fields that require IANA namespace management; the Message Type and
Flags fields.
10.2.1. Message Type
The Message Type namespace is used to identify PANA messages.
Message Type 0 is not used and is not assigned by IANA. The range of
values 1 - 65,519 are for permanent, standard message types,
allocated by IETF Consensus [IANA]. This document defines the range
of values 1 - 4. The same Message Type is used for both the request
and the answer messages, except for type 1. The Request bit
distinguishes requests from answers. See Section 7 for the
assignment of the namespace in this specification.
The range of values 65,520 - 65,535 (hexadecimal values 0xfff0 -
0xffff) are reserved for experimental messages. As these codes are
only for experimental and testing purposes, no guarantee is made for
interoperability between the communicating PaC and PAA using
experimental commands, as outlined in [IANA-EXP].
10.2.2. Flags
There are 16 bits in the Flags field of the PANA message header.
This document assigns bit 0 ('R'), 1 ('S'), 2 ('C'), 3 ('A'), 4
('P'), and 5 ('I') in Section 6.2. The remaining bits MUST only be
assigned via a Standards Action [IANA].
10.3. AVP Header
As defined in Section 6.3, the AVP header contains three fields that
require IANA namespace management; the AVP Code, AVP Flags, and
Vendor-Id fields, where only the AVP Code and AVP Flags created new
namespaces.
Forsberg, et al. Standards Track PAGE 36
RFC 5191 PANA May 2008
10.3.1. AVP Code
The 16-bit AVP code namespace is used to identify attributes. There
are multiple namespaces. Vendors can have their own AVP codes
namespace, which will be identified by their Vendor-Id (also known as
Enterprise-Number), and they control the assignments of their
vendor-specific AVP codes within their own namespace. The absence of
a Vendor-Id identifies the IETF IANA controlled AVP codes namespace.
The AVP codes, and sometimes also possible values in an AVP, are
controlled and maintained by IANA.
AVP Code 0 is not used and is not assigned by IANA. This document
defines the AVP Codes 1-9. See Section 8.1 through Section 8.9 for
the assignment of the namespace in this specification.
AVPs may be allocated following Designated Expert Review with
Specification Required [IANA] or Standards Action.
Note that PANA defines a mechanism for Vendor-Specific AVPs, where
the Vendor-Id field in the AVP header is set to a non-zero value.
Vendor-Specific AVP codes are for Private Use and should be
encouraged instead of allocation of global attribute types, for
functions specific only to one vendor's implementation of PANA, where
no interoperability is deemed useful. Where a Vendor-Specific AVP is
implemented by more than one vendor, allocation of global AVPs should
be encouraged instead.
10.3.2. Flags
There are 16 bits in the AVP Flags field of the AVP header, defined
in Section 6.3. This document assigns bit 0 ('V'). The remaining
bits should only be assigned via a Standards Action .
10.4. AVP Values
Certain AVPs in PANA define a list of values with various meanings.
For attributes other than those specified in this section, adding
additional values to the list can be done on a First Come, First
Served basis by IANA [IANA].
10.4.1. Result-Code AVP Values
As defined in Section 8.7, the Result-Code AVP (AVP Code 7) defines
the values 0-2.
All remaining values are available for assignment via IETF Consensus
[IANA].
Forsberg, et al. Standards Track PAGE 37
RFC 5191 PANA May 2008
10.4.2. Termination-Cause AVP Values
As defined in Section 8.9, the Termination-Cause AVP (AVP Code 9)
defines the values 1, 4, and 8.
All remaining values are available for assignment via IETF Consensus
[IANA].
11. Security Considerations
The PANA protocol defines a UDP-based EAP encapsulation that runs
between two IP-enabled nodes. Various security threats that are
relevant to a protocol of this nature are outlined in [RFC 4016].
Security considerations stemming from the use of EAP and EAP methods
are discussed in [RFC 3748] [EAP-KEYING]. This section provides a
discussion on the security-related issues that are related to PANA
framework and protocol design.
An important element in assessing the security of PANA design and
deployment in a network is the presence of lower-layer security. In
the context of this document, lower layers are said to be secure if
the environment provides adequate protection against spoofing and
confidentiality based on its operational needs. For example, DSL and
cdma2000 networks' lower-layer security is enabled even before
running the first PANA-based authentication. In the absence of such
a preestablished secure channel prior to running PANA, one can be
created after the successful PANA authentication using a link-layer
or network-layer cryptographic mechanism (e.g., IPsec).
11.1. General Security Measures
PANA provides multiple mechanisms to secure a PANA session.
PANA messages carry sequence numbers, which are monotonically
incremented by 1 with every new request message. These numbers are
randomly initialized at the beginning of the session, and they are
verified against expected numbers upon receipt. A message whose
sequence number is different than the expected one is silently
discarded. In addition to accomplishing orderly delivery of EAP
Forsberg, et al. Standards Track PAGE 38
RFC 5191 PANA May 2008
messages and duplicate elimination, this scheme also helps prevent an
adversary from spoofing messages to disturb ongoing PANA and EAP
sessions unless it can also eavesdrop to synchronize with the
expected sequence number. Furthermore, impact of replay attacks is
reduced as any stale message (i.e., a request or answer with an
unexpected sequence number and/or a session identifier for a
non-existing session) and any duplicate answer are immediately
discarded, and a duplicate request can trigger transmission of the
cached answer (i.e., no need to process the request and generate a
new answer).
The PANA framework defines EP, which is ideally located on a network
device that can filter traffic from the PaCs before the traffic
enters the Internet/intranet. A set of filters can be used to
discard unauthorized packets, such as the initial PANA-Auth-Request
message that is received from the segment of the access network,
where only the PaCs are supposed to be connected (i.e., preventing
PAA impersonation).
The protocol also provides authentication and integrity protection to
PANA messages when the used EAP method can generate cryptographic
session keys. A PANA SA is generated based on the MSK exported by
the EAP method. This SA is used for generating an AUTH AVP to
protect the PANA message header and payload (including the complete
EAP message).
The cryptographic protection prevents an adversary from acting as a
man-in-the-middle, injecting messages, replaying messages and
modifying the content of the exchanged messages. Any packet that
fails to pass the AUTH verification is silently discarded. The
earliest this protection can be enabled is when the PANA-Auth-Request
message that signals a successful authentication (EAP Success) is
generated. Starting with these messages, any subsequent PANA message
can be cryptographically protected until the session gets torn down.
The lifetime of the PANA SA is set to the PANA session lifetime,
which is bounded by the authorization lifetime granted by the
authentication server. An implementation MAY add a grace period to
that value. Unless the PANA session is extended by executing another
EAP authentication, the PANA SA is removed when the current session
expires.
Forsberg, et al. Standards Track PAGE 39
RFC 5191 PANA May 2008
The ability to use cryptographic protection within PANA is determined
by the used EAP method, which is generally dictated by the deployment
environment. Insecure lower layers necessitate the use of
key-generating EAP methods. In networks where lower layers are
already secured, cryptographic protection of PANA messages is not
necessary.
11.2. Initial Exchange
The initial PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer exchange is
vulnerable to spoofing attacks as these messages are not
authenticated and integrity protected. In order to prevent very
basic DoS attacks, an adversary should not be able to cause state
creation by sending PANA-Client-Initiation messages to the PAA. This
protection is achieved by allowing the responder (PAA) to create as
little state as possible in the initial message exchange. However,
it is difficult to prevent all spoofing attacks in the initial
message exchange entirely.
11.3. EAP Methods
Eavesdropping EAP messages might cause problems when the EAP method
is weak and enables dictionary or replay attacks or even allows an
adversary to learn the long-term password directly. Furthermore, if
the optional EAP Response/Identity payload is used, then it allows
the adversary to learn the identity of the PaC. In such a case, a
privacy problem is prevalent.
To prevent these threats, [RFC 5193] suggests using proper EAP methods
for particular environments. Depending on the deployment
environment, an EAP authentication method that supports user-identity
confidentiality, protection against dictionary attacks, and
session-key establishment must be used. It is therefore the
responsibility of the network operators and users to choose a proper
EAP method.
11.4. Cryptographic Keys
When the EAP method exports an MSK, this key is used to produce a
PANA SA with PANA_AUTH_KEY with a distinct key ID. The PANA_AUTH_KEY
is unique to the PANA session, and it takes PANA-based nonce values
into computation to cryptographically separate itself from the MSK.
The PANA_AUTH_KEY is solely used for the authentication and integrity
protection of the PANA messages within the designated session.
Forsberg, et al. Standards Track PAGE 40
RFC 5191 PANA May 2008
The PANA SA lifetime is bounded by the MSK lifetime. Another
execution of the EAP method yields a new MSK, and it updates the PANA
SA, PANA_AUTH_KEY, and key ID.
11.5. Per-Packet Ciphering
Networks that are not secured at the lower layers prior to running
PANA can rely on enabling per-packet data-traffic ciphering upon
successful PANA SA establishment. The PANA framework allows
generation of cryptographic keys from the PANA SA and uses the keys
with a secure association protocol to enable per-packet cryptographic
protection, such as link-layer or IPsec-based ciphering [PANA-IPSEC].
These mechanisms ultimately establish a cryptographic binding between
the data traffic generated by and for a client and the authenticated
identity of the client. Data traffic can be data origin
authenticated, replay and integrity protected, and optionally
encrypted using the cryptographic keys. How these keys are generated
from the PANA SA and used with a secure association protocol is
outside the scope of this document.
11.6. PAA-to-EP Communication
The PANA framework allows separation of PAA from EP. The protocol
exchange between the PAA and EP for provisioning authorized PaC
information on the EP must be protected for authentication,
integrity, and replay protection.
11.7. Liveness Test
A PANA session is associated with a session lifetime. The session is
terminated unless it is refreshed by a new round of EAP
authentication before it expires. Therefore, the latest a
disconnected client can be detected is when its session expires. A
disconnect may also be detected earlier by using PANA ping messages.
Forsberg, et al. Standards Track PAGE 41
RFC 5191 PANA May 2008
A request message can be generated by either PaC or PAA at any time
in access phase with the expectation that the peer responds with an
answer message. A successful round-trip of this exchange is a simple
verification that the peer is alive.
This test can be engaged when there is a possibility that the peer
might have disconnected (e.g., after the discontinuation of data
traffic for an extended period of time). Periodic use of this
exchange as a keep-alive requires additional care, as it might result
in congestion and hence false alarms.
This exchange is cryptographically protected when a PANA SA is
available in order to prevent threats associated with the abuse of
this functionality.
Any valid PANA answer message received in response to a recently sent
request message can be taken as an indication of a peer's liveness.
The PaC or PAA MAY forgo sending an explicit ping request message if
a recent exchange has already confirmed that the peer is alive.
11.8. Early Termination of a Session
The PANA protocol supports the ability for both the PaC and the PAA
to transmit a tear-down message before the session lifetime expires.
This message causes state removal, a stop of the accounting procedure
and removes the installed per-PaC state on the EP(s). This message
is cryptographically protected when PANA SA is present.
12. Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Mark Townsley, Jari Arkko, Mohan
Parthasarathy, Julien Bournelle, Rafael Marin Lopez, Pasi Eronen,
Randy Turner, Erik Nordmark, Lionel Morand, Avi Lior, Susan Thomson,
Giaretta Gerardo, Joseph Salowey, Sasikanth Bharadwaj, Spencer
Dawkins, Tom Yu, Bernard Aboba, Subir Das, John Vollbrecht, Prakash
Jayaraman, and all members of the PANA working group for their
valuable comments on this document.
13. References
13.1. Normative References
[RFC 2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC:
Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
February 1997.
[RFC 2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
Forsberg, et al. Standards Track PAGE 42
RFC 5191 PANA May 2008
[RFC 3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and
J. Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September
2003.
[RFC 3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and
H. Levkowetz, Ed., "Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP)", RFC 3748, June 2004.
[RFC 4086] Eastlake, D., 3rd, Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC
4086, June 2005.
[RFC 5234] Crocker, D., Ed., and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for
Syntax Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, January
2008.
[RFC 5192] Morand, L., Yegin A., Kumar S., and S. Madanapalli,
"DHCP Options for Protocol for Carrying Authentication
for Network Access (PANA) Authentication Agents", RFC
5192, May 2008.
[IANA] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing
an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC
2434, October 1998.
13.2. Informative References
[RFC 3315] Droms, R., Ed., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T.,
Perkins, C., and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration
Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, July 2003.
[RFC 4016] Parthasarathy, M., "Protocol for Carrying
Authentication and Network Access (PANA) Threat
Analysis and Security Requirements", RFC 4016, March
2005.
[RFC 4058] Yegin, A., Ed., Ohba, Y., Penno, R., Tsirtsis, G., and
C. Wang, "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for
Network Access (PANA) Requirements", RFC 4058, May
2005.
[RFC 4137] Vollbrecht, J., Eronen, P., Petroni, N., and Y. Ohba,
"State Machines for Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP) Peer and Authenticator", RFC 4137, August 2005.
[RFC 4306] Kaufman, C., Ed., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2)
Protocol", RFC 4306, December 2005.
Forsberg, et al. Standards Track PAGE 43
RFC 5191 PANA May 2008
[RFC 4595] Maino, F. and D. Black, "Use of IKEv2 in the Fibre
Channel Security Association Management Protocol", RFC
4595, July 2006.
[RFC 5193] Jayaraman, P., Lopez R., Ohba Y., Ed., Parthasarathy,
M., and A. Yegin, "Protocol for Carrying Authentication
for Network Access (PANA) Framework", RFC 5193, May
2008.
[EAP-KEYING] Aboba, B., Simon D., and P. Eronen, "Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management
Framework", Work in Progress, November 2007.
[PANA-IPSEC] Parthasarathy, M., "PANA Enabling IPsec based Access
Control", Work in progress, July 2005.
[IANAWEB] IANA, "Number assignment", http://www.iana.org.
[IANA-EXP] Narten, T., "Assigning Experimental and Testing Numbers
Considered Useful", BCP 82, RFC 3692, January 2004.
Forsberg, et al. Standards Track PAGE 44
RFC 5191 PANA May 2008
Authors' Addresses
Dan Forsberg
Nokia Research Center
P.O. Box 407
FIN-00045 NOKIA GROUP
Finland
Phone: +358 50 4839470
EMail: dan.forsberg@nokia.com
Yoshihiro Ohba
Toshiba America Research, Inc.
1 Telcordia Drive
Piscataway, NJ 08854
USA
Phone: +1 732 699 5305
EMail: yohba@tari.toshiba.com
Basavaraj Patil
Nokia Siemens Networks
6000 Connection Drive
Irving, TX 75039
USA
EMail: basavaraj.patil@nsn.com
Hannes Tschofenig
Nokia Siemens Networks
Linnoitustie 6 Espoo 02600
Finland
Phone: +358 (50) 4871445
EMail: Hannes.Tschofenig@nsn.com
URI: http://www.tschofenig.priv.at
Alper E. Yegin
Samsung
Istanbul, Turkey
EMail: a.yegin@partner.samsung.com
Forsberg, et al. Standards Track PAGE 45
RFC 5191 PANA May 2008
Full Copyright Statement
Copyright © The IETF Trust (2008).
This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
retain all their rights.
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND
THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS
OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF
THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Intellectual Property
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information
on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
http://www.ietf.org/ipr.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at
ietf-ipr@ietf.org.
Forsberg, et al. Standards Track PAGE 46
Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA)
RFC TOTAL SIZE: 96716 bytes
PUBLICATION DATE: Monday, May 12th, 2008
LEGAL RIGHTS: The IETF Trust (see BCP 78)
|
