|
|
|
|
|
|
IETF RFC 3739
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Qualified Certificates Profile
Last modified on Friday, March 12th, 2004
 Permanent link to RFC 3739
 Search GitHub Wiki for RFC 3739
 Show other RFCs mentioning RFC 3739
Network Working Group S. Santesson
Request for Comments: 3739 Microsoft
Obsoletes: 3039 M. Nystrom
Category: Standards Track RSA Security
T. Polk
NIST
March 2004
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure:
Qualified Certificates Profile
 Status of this Memo
This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
Copyright Notice
Copyright © The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
This document forms a certificate profile, based on RFC 3280, for
identity certificates issued to natural persons.
The profile defines specific conventions for certificates that are
qualified within a defined legal framework, named Qualified
Certificates. However, the profile does not define any legal
requirements for such Qualified Certificates.
The goal of this document is to define a certificate profile that
supports the issuance of Qualified Certificates independent of local
legal requirements. The profile is however not limited to Qualified
Certificates and further profiling may facilitate specific local
needs.
Santesson, et al. Standards Track PAGE 1 
RFC 3739 Qualified Certificates Profile March 2004
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Changes since RFC 3039 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Definitions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Requirements and Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. Statement of Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3. Policy Issues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.4. Uniqueness of Names. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Certificate and Certificate Extensions Profile . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Basic Certificate Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.1. Issuer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.2. Subject. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2. Certificate Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2.1. Subject Alternative Name . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2.2. Subject Directory Attributes . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2.3. Certificate Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2.4. Key Usage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2.5. Biometric Information. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2.6. Qualified Certificate Statements . . . . . . . . 13
4. Security Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
A. ASN.1 Definitions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
A.1. 1988 ASN.1 Module (Normative). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
A.2. 1997 ASN.1 Module (Informative). . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
B. A Note on Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
C. Example Certificate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
C.1. ASN.1 Structure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
C.1.1. Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
C.1.2. The Certificate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
C.2. ASN.1 Dump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
C.3. DER-encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
C.4. CA's Public Key. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1. Introduction
This specification is one part of a family of standards for the X.509
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for the Internet. It is based on
[X.509] and [RFC 3280], which defines underlying certificate formats
and semantics needed for a full implementation of this standard.
This profile includes specific mechanisms intended for use with
Qualified Certificates. The term Qualified Certificates and the
assumptions that affect the scope of this document are discussed in
Section 2.
Santesson, et al. Standards Track PAGE 2
RFC 3739 Qualified Certificates Profile March 2004
Section 3 defines requirements on certificate information content.
This specification provides profiles for two certificate fields:
issuer and subject. It also provides profiles for four certificate
extensions defined in RFC 3280: subject alternate name, subject
directory attributes, certificate policies, and key usage, and it
defines two additional extensions: biometric information and
qualified certificate statements. The certificate extensions are
presented in the 1997 Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) [X.680],
but in conformance with RFC 3280 the 1988 ASN.1 module in Appendix A
contains all normative definitions (the 1997 module in Appendix A is
informative).
In Section 4, some security considerations are discussed in order to
clarify the security context in which the standard may be utilized.
Appendix A contains all relevant ASN.1 structures that are not
already defined in RFC 3280. Appendix B contains a note on
attributes. Appendix C contains an example certificate.
The appendices sections are followed by the References, Authors
Addresses, and the Full Copyright Statement.
1.1. Changes since RFC 3039
This specification obsoletes RFC 3039. This specification differs
from RFC 3039 in the following basic areas:
* Some editorial clarifications have been made to introductory
sections to clarify that this profile is generally applicable
to a broad type of certificates, even if its prime purpose is
to facilitate issuance of Qualified Certificates.
* To align with RFC 3280, support for domainComponent and title
attributes in subject names are included, and postalAddress is
no longer supported.
* To align with actual usage, support for the title attribute in
the subject directory attributes extension is no longer
supported.
* To better facilitate broad applicability of this profile, some
constraints on key usage settings in the key usage extension
have been removed.
* A new qc-Statement reflecting this second version of the
profile has been defined in Section 3.2.6.1. This profile
obsoletes RFC 3039, but the qc-statement reflecting compliance
with RFC 3039 is also defined for backwards compatibility.
Santesson, et al. Standards Track PAGE 3
RFC 3739 Qualified Certificates Profile March 2004
1.2. Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14, [RFC 2119].
2. Requirements and Assumptions
The term "Qualified Certificate" is used by the European Directive on
Electronic Signature [EU-ESDIR] to refer to a specific type of
certificates, with appliance in European electronic signature
legislation. This specification is intended to support this class of
certificates, but its scope is not limited to this application.
Within this standard, the term "Qualified Certificate" is used
generally, describing a certificate whose primary purpose is to
identify a person with a high level of assurance, where the
certificate meets some qualification requirements defined by an
applicable legal framework, such as the European Directive on
Electronic Signature [EU-ESDIR]. The actual mechanisms that decide
whether a certificate should or should not be considered a "Qualified
Certificate" in regard to any legislation are outside the scope of
this standard.
Harmonization in the field of identity certificates issued to natural
persons, in particular Qualified Certificates, is essential within
several aspects that fall outside the scope of RFC 3280. The most
important aspects that affect the scope of this specification are:
- Definition of names and identity information in order to identify
the associated subject in a uniform way.
- Definition of information which identifies the CA and the
jurisdiction under which the CA operates when issuing a particular
certificate.
- Definition of key usage extension usage for Qualified
Certificates.
- Definition of information structure for storage of biometric
information.
- Definition of a standardized way to store predefined statements
with relevance for Qualified Certificates.
- Requirements for critical extensions.
Santesson, et al. Standards Track PAGE 4
RFC 3739 Qualified Certificates Profile March 2004
2.1. Properties
This profile accommodates profiling needs for Qualified Certificates
based on the assumptions that:
- Qualified Certificates are issued by a CA that makes a statement
that the certificate serves the purpose of a Qualified
Certificate, as discussed in Section 2.2.
- The Qualified Certificate indicates a certificate policy
consistent with liabilities, practices, and procedures undertaken
by the CA, as discussed in Section 2.3.
- The Qualified Certificate is issued to a natural person (living
human being).
- The Qualified Certificate contains a name which may be either
based on the real name of the subject or a pseudonym.
2.2. Statement of Purpose
This profile defines conventions to declare within a certificate that
it serves the purpose of being a Qualified Certificate. This enables
the CA to explicitly define this intent.
The function of this declaration is thus to assist any concerned
entity in evaluating the risk associated with creating or accepting
signatures that are based on a Qualified Certificate.
This profile defines two ways to include this information:
- As information defined by a certificate policy included in the
certificate policies extension, and
- As a statement included in the Qualified Certificates Statements
extension.
2.3. Policy Issues
Certain policy aspects define the context in which this profile is to
be understood and used. It is however outside the scope of this
profile to specify any policies or legal aspects that will govern
services that issue or utilize certificates according to this
profile.
It is however an underlying assumption in this profile that a
responsible issuing CA will undertake to follow a certificate policy
that is consistent with its liabilities, practices, and procedures.
Santesson, et al. Standards Track PAGE 5
RFC 3739 Qualified Certificates Profile March 2004
2.4. Uniqueness of names
Distinguished name is originally defined in X.501 [X.501] as a
representation of a directory name, defined as a construct that
identifies a particular object from among a set of all objects. The
distinguished name MUST be unique for each subject entity certified
by the one CA as defined by the issuer name field, for the whole life
time of the CA.
3. Certificate and Certificate Extensions Profile
This section defines certificate profiling conventions. The profile
is based on the Internet certificate profile RFC 3280, which in turn
is based on the X.509 version 3 format. For full implementation of
this section, implementers are REQUIRED to consult the underlying
formats and semantics defined in RFC 3280.
ASN.1 definitions, relevant for this section that are not supplied by
RFC 3280, are supplied in Appendix A.
3.1. Basic Certificate Fields
This section provides additional details regarding the contents of
two fields in the basic certificate. These fields are the issuer and
subject fields.
3.1.1. Issuer
The issuer field SHALL identify the organization responsible for
issuing the certificate. The name SHOULD be an officially registered
name of the organization.
The distinguished name of the issuer SHALL be specified using an
appropriate subset of the following attributes:
domainComponent;
countryName;
stateOrProvinceName;
organizationName;
localityName; and
serialNumber.
The domainComponent attribute is defined in [RFC 2247], all other
attributes are defined in [RFC 3280] and [X.520].
Additional attributes MAY be present, but they SHOULD NOT be
necessary to identify the issuing organization.
Santesson, et al. Standards Track PAGE 6
RFC 3739 Qualified Certificates Profile March 2004
A relying party MAY have to consult associated certificate policies
and/or the issuer's CPS, in order to determine the semantics of name
fields.
3.1.2. Subject
The subject field of a certificate compliant with this profile SHALL
contain a distinguished name of the subject (see 2.4 for definition
of distinguished name).
The subject field SHALL contain an appropriate subset of the
following attributes:
domainComponent;
countryName;
commonName;
surname;
givenName;
pseudonym;
serialNumber;
title;
organizationName;
organizationalUnitName;
stateOrProvinceName; and
localityName.
The domainComponent attribute is defined in [RFC 2247], all other
attributes are defined in [RFC 3280] and [X.520].
Other attributes MAY also be present; however, the use of other
attributes MUST NOT be necessary to distinguish one subject name from
another subject name. That is, the attributes listed above are
sufficient to ensure unique subject names.
Of these attributes, the subject field SHALL include at least one of
the following:
Choice I: commonName
Choice II: givenName
Choice III: pseudonym
The countryName attribute value specifies a general context in
which other attributes are to be understood. The country
attribute does not necessarily indicate the subject's country of
citizenship or country of residence, nor does it have to indicate
the country of issuance.
Santesson, et al. Standards Track PAGE 7
RFC 3739 Qualified Certificates Profile March 2004
Note: Many X.500 implementations require the presence of countryName
in the DIT. In cases where the subject name, as specified in the
subject field, specifies a public X.500 directory entry, the
countryName attribute SHOULD always be present.
The commonName attribute value SHALL, when present, contain a name
of the subject. This MAY be in the subject's preferred
presentation format, or a format preferred by the CA, or some
other format. Pseudonyms, nicknames, and names with spelling
other than defined by the registered name MAY be used. To
understand the nature of the name presented in commonName,
complying applications MAY have to examine present values of the
givenName and surname attributes, or the pseudonym attribute.
Note: Many client implementations presuppose the presence of the
commonName attribute value in the subject field and use this value to
display the subject's name regardless of present givenName, surname,
or pseudonym attribute values.
The surname and givenName attribute types SHALL be used in the
subject field if neither the commonName attribute nor the
pseudonym attribute is present. In cases where the subject only
has a givenName, the surname attribute SHALL be omitted.
The pseudonym attribute type SHALL, if present, contain a
pseudonym of the subject. Use of the pseudonym attribute MUST NOT
be combined with use of any of the attributes surname and/or
givenName.
The serialNumber attribute type SHALL, when present, be used to
differentiate between names where the subject field would
otherwise be identical. This attribute has no defined semantics
beyond ensuring uniqueness of subject names. It MAY contain a
number or code assigned by the CA or an identifier assigned by a
government or civil authority. It is the CA's responsibility to
ensure that the serialNumber is sufficient to resolve any subject
name collisions.
The title attribute type SHALL, when present, be used to store a
designated position or function of the subject within the
organization specified by present organizational attributes in the
subject field. The association between the title, the subject,
and the organization is beyond the scope of this document.
The organizationName and the organizationalUnitName attribute
types SHALL, when present, be used to store the name and relevant
information of an organization with which the subject is
Santesson, et al. Standards Track PAGE 8
RFC 3739 Qualified Certificates Profile March 2004
associated. The type of association between the organization and
the subject is beyond the scope of this document.
The stateOrProvinceName and the localityName attribute types
SHALL, when present, be used to store geographical information
with which the subject is associated. If an organizationName
value is also present, then the stateOrProvinceName and
localityName attribute values SHALL be associated with the
specified organization. The type of association between the
stateOrProvinceName and the localityName and either the subject or
the organizationName is beyond the scope of this document.
Compliant implementations SHALL be able to interpret the attributes
named in this section.
3.2. Certificate Extensions
This section provides additional details regarding the contents of
four certificate extensions defined in RFC 3280: Subject Alternative
Name, Subject directory attributes, Certificate policies, and Key
usage. This section also defines two additional extensions:
biometric information and qualified certificate statements.
3.2.1. Subject Alternative Name
If the subjectAltName extension is present, and it contains a
directoryName name, then the directoryName MUST follow the
conventions specified in section 3.1.2 of this profile.
3.2.2. Subject Directory Attributes
The subjectDirectoryAttributes extension MAY be present and MAY
contain additional attributes associated with the subject, as a
complement to present information in the subject field and the
subject alternative name extension.
Attributes suitable for storage in this extension are attributes
which are not part of the subject's distinguished name, but which MAY
still be useful for other purposes (e.g., authorization).
This extension MUST NOT be marked critical.
Compliant implementations SHALL be able to interpret the following
attributes:
dateOfBirth;
placeOfBirth;
gender;
Santesson, et al. Standards Track PAGE 9
RFC 3739 Qualified Certificates Profile March 2004
countryOfCitizenship; and
countryOfResidence.
Other attributes MAY be included according to local definitions.
The dateOfBirth attribute SHALL, when present, contain the value
of the date of birth of the subject. The manner in which the date
of birth is associated with the subject is outside the scope of
this document. The date of birth is defined in the
GeneralizedTime format and SHOULD specify GMT 12.00.00 (noon) down
to the granularity of seconds, in order to prevent accidental
change of date due to time zone adjustments. For example, a birth
date of September 27, 1959 is encoded as "19590927120000Z".
Compliant certificate parsing applications SHOULD ignore any time
data and just present the contained date without any time zone
adjustments.
The placeOfBirth attribute SHALL, when present, contain the value
of the place of birth of the subject. The manner in which the
place of birth is associated with the subject is outside the scope
of this document.
The gender attribute SHALL, when present, contain the value of the
gender of the subject. For females the value "F" (or "f"), and
for males the value "M" (or "m"), have to be used. The manner in
which the gender is associated with the subject is outside the
scope of this document.
The countryOfCitizenship attribute SHALL, when present, contain
the identifier of at least one of the subject's claimed countries
of citizenship at the time the certificate was issued. If more
than one country of citizenship is specified, each country of
citizenship SHOULD be specified through a separate, single-valued
countryOfCitizenship attribute. Determination of citizenship is a
matter of law and is outside the scope of this document.
The countryOfResidence attribute SHALL, when present, contain the
value of at least one country in which the subject is resident.
If more than one country of residence is specified, each country
of residence SHOULD be specified through a separate, single-valued
countryOfResidence attribute. Determination of residence is a
matter of law and is outside the scope of this document.
Santesson, et al. Standards Track PAGE 10
RFC 3739 Qualified Certificates Profile March 2004
3.2.3. Certificate Policies
The certificate policies extension SHALL be present and SHALL contain
the identifier of at least one certificate policy which reflects the
practices and procedures undertaken by the CA. The certificate
policy extension MAY be marked critical.
Information provided by the issuer stating the purpose of the
certificate, as discussed in Section 2.2, SHOULD be evident through
indicated policies.
The certificate policies extension MUST include all policy
information needed for certification path validation. If policy
related statements are included in the QCStatements extension (see
3.2.6), then these statements SHOULD also be contained in the
identified policies.
Certificate policies MAY be combined with any qualifier defined in
RFC 3280.
3.2.4. Key Usage
The key usage extension SHALL be present. Key usage settings SHALL
be set in accordance with RFC 3280 definitions. Further requirements
on key usage settings MAY be defined by local policy and/or local
legal requirements.
The key usage extension SHOULD be marked critical.
3.2.5. Biometric Information
This section defines an OPTIONAL extension for storage of biometric
information. Biometric information is stored in the form of a hash
of a biometric template.
The purpose of this extension is to provide a means for the
authentication of biometric information. The biometric information
that corresponds to the stored hash is not stored in this extension,
but the extension MAY include a URI (sourceDataUri) that references a
file containing this information.
If included, the URI MUST use the HTTP scheme (http://) [HTTP/1.1] or
the HTTPS scheme (https://) [RFC 2818]. Since the fact that
identifying data is being checked may itself be sensitive
information, those deploying this mechanism may also wish to consider
using URIs which cannot be easily tied by outsiders to the identities
of those whose information is being retrieved.
Santesson, et al. Standards Track PAGE 11
RFC 3739 Qualified Certificates Profile March 2004
Use of the URI option presumes that the data encoding format of the
file content is determined through means outside the scope of this
specification, such as file naming conventions and metadata inside
the file. Use of this URI option does not imply that it is the only
way to access this information.
It is RECOMMENDED that biometric information in this extension be
limited to information types suitable for human verification, i.e.,
where the decision of whether the information is an accurate
representation of the subject is naturally performed by a person.
This implies a usage where the biometric information is represented
by, for example, a graphical image displayed to the relying party,
which MAY be used by the relying party to enhance identification of
the subject.
This extension MUST NOT be marked critical.
biometricInfo EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX BiometricSyntax
IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-biometricInfo }
id-pe-biometricInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pe 2}
BiometricSyntax ::= SEQUENCE OF BiometricData
BiometricData ::= SEQUENCE {
typeOfBiometricData TypeOfBiometricData,
hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
biometricDataHash OCTET STRING,
sourceDataUri IA5String OPTIONAL }
TypeOfBiometricData ::= CHOICE {
predefinedBiometricType PredefinedBiometricType,
biometricDataID OBJECT IDENTIFIER }
PredefinedBiometricType ::= INTEGER { picture(0),
handwritten-signature(1)} (picture|handwritten-signature,...)
The predefined biometric type picture, when present, SHALL identify
that the source picture is in the form of a displayable graphical
image of the subject. The hash of the graphical image SHALL be
calculated over the whole referenced image file.
The predefined biometric type handwritten-signature, when present,
SHALL identify that the source data is in the form of a displayable
graphical image of the subject's handwritten signature. The hash of
the graphical image SHALL be calculated over the whole referenced
image file.
Santesson, et al. Standards Track PAGE 12
RFC 3739 Qualified Certificates Profile March 2004
3.2.6. Qualified Certificate Statements
This section defines an OPTIONAL extension for the inclusion of
statements defining explicit properties of the certificate.
Each statement SHALL include an object identifier for the statement
and MAY also include optional qualifying data contained in the
statementInfo parameter.
If the statementInfo parameter is included, then the object
identifier of the statement SHALL define the syntax and SHOULD define
the semantics of this parameter. If the object identifier does not
define the semantics, a relying party may have to consult a relevant
certificate policy or CPS to determine the exact semantics.
This extension may be critical or non-critical. If the extension is
critical, this means that all statements included in the extension
are regarded as critical.
qcStatements EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX QCStatements
IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-qcStatements }
-- NOTE: This extension does not allow to mix critical and
-- non-critical Qualified Certificate Statements. Either all
-- statements must be critical or all statements must be
-- non-critical.
id-pe-qcStatements OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 3 }
QCStatements ::= SEQUENCE OF QCStatement
QCStatement ::= SEQUENCE {
statementId QC-STATEMENT.&Id({SupportedStatements}),
statementInfo QC-STATEMENT.&Type
({SupportedStatements}{@statementId}) OPTIONAL }
SupportedStatements QC-STATEMENT ::= { qcStatement-1,...}
A statement suitable for inclusion in this extension MAY be a
statement by the issuer that the certificate is issued as a Qualified
Certificate in accordance with a particular legal system (as
discussed in Section 2.2).
Other statements suitable for inclusion in this extension MAY be
statements related to the applicable legal jurisdiction within which
the certificate is issued. As an example, this MAY include a maximum
reliance limit for the certificate indicating restrictions on CA's
liability.
Santesson, et al. Standards Track PAGE 13
RFC 3739 Qualified Certificates Profile March 2004
3.2.6.1. Predefined Statements
The certificate statement (id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1), identifies
conformance with requirements defined in the obsoleted RFC 3039
(Version 1). This statement is thus provided for identification of
old certificates issued in conformance with RFC 3039. This statement
MUST NOT be included in certificates issued in accordance with this
profile.
This profile includes a new qualified certificate statement
(identified by the OID id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v2), identifying
conformance with requirements defined in this profile. This
Qualified Certificate profile is referred to as version 2, while RFC
3039 is referred to as version 1.
qcStatement-1 QC-STATEMENT ::= { SYNTAX SemanticsInformation
IDENTIFIED BY id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1 }
-- This statement identifies conformance with requirements
-- defined in RFC 3039 (Version 1). This statement may
-- optionally contain additional semantics information as
-- specified below.
qcStatement-2 QC-STATEMENT ::= { SYNTAX SemanticsInformation
IDENTIFIED BY id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v2 }
-- This statement identifies conformance with requirements
-- defined in this Qualified Certificate profile
-- (Version 2). This statement may optionally contain
-- additional semantics information as specified below.
SemanticsInformation ::= SEQUENCE {
semanticsIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
nameRegistrationAuthorities NameRegistrationAuthorities
OPTIONAL }
(WITH COMPONENTS {..., semanticsIdentifier PRESENT}|
WITH COMPONENTS {..., nameRegistrationAuthorities PRESENT})
NameRegistrationAuthorities ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
GeneralName
The SementicsInformation component identified by id-qcs-
pkixQCSyntax-v1 MAY contain a semantics identifier and MAY identify
one or more name registration authorities.
The semanticsIdentifier component, if present, SHALL contain an OID,
defining semantics for attributes and names in basic certificate
fields and certificate extensions. The OID may define semantics for
all, or for a subgroup of all present attributes and/or names.
Santesson, et al. Standards Track PAGE 14
RFC 3739 Qualified Certificates Profile March 2004
The NameRegistrationAuthorities component, if present, SHALL contain
a name of one or more name registration authorities, responsible for
registration of attributes or names associated with the subject. The
association between an identified name registration authority and
present attributes MAY be defined by a semantics identifier OID, by a
certificate policy (or CPS), or some other implicit factors.
If a value of type SemanticsInformation is present in a QCStatement
where the statementID component is set to id-qcs-pkix-QCSyntax-v1 or
id-qcs-pkix-QCSyntax-v2, then at least one of the semanticsIdentifier
or nameRegistrationAuthorities fields must be present, as indicated.
Note that the statementInfo component need not be present in a
QCStatement value even if the statementID component is set to id-
qcs-pkix-QCSyntax-v1 or id-qcs-pkix-QCSyntax-v2.
4. Security Considerations
The legal value of a digital signature that is validated with a
Qualified Certificate will be highly dependent upon the policy
governing the use of the associated private key. Both the private
key holder, as well as the relying party, should make sure that the
private key is used only with the consent of the legitimate key
holder.
Since the public keys are for public use with legal implications for
involved parties, certain conditions should exist before CAs issue
certificates as Qualified Certificates. The associated private keys
must be unique for the subject, and must be maintained under the
subject's sole control. That is, a CA should not issue a qualified
certificate if the means to use the private key is not protected
against unintended usage. This implies that the CA has some
knowledge about the subject's cryptographic module.
The CA must further verify that the public key contained in the
certificate is legitimately representing the subject.
CAs should not issue CA certificates with policy mapping extensions
indicating acceptance of another CA's policy unless these conditions
are met.
Combining the nonRepudiation bit in the keyUsage certificate
extension with other keyUsage bits may have security implications
depending on the context in which the certificate is to be used.
Applications validating electronic signatures based on such
certificates should determine whether the present key usage
combination is appropriate for their use.
Santesson, et al. Standards Track PAGE 15
RFC 3739 Qualified Certificates Profile March 2004
The ability to compare two qualified certificates to determine if
they represent the same physical entity is dependent on the semantics
of the subjects' names. The semantics of a particular attribute may
be different for different issuers. Comparing names without
knowledge of the semantics of names in these particular certificates
may provide misleading results.
This specification is a profile of RFC 3280. The security
considerations section of that document applies to this specification
as well.
Santesson, et al. Standards Track PAGE 16
RFC 3739 Qualified Certificates Profile March 2004
A. ASN.1 Definitions
As in RFC 3280, ASN.1 modules are supplied in two different variants
of the ASN.1 syntax.
Appendix A.1 is in the 1988 syntax, and does not use macros.
However, since the module imports type definitions from modules in
RFC 3280 which are not completely in the 1988 syntax, the same
comments as in RFC 3280 regarding its use applies here as well; i.e.,
Appendix A.1 may be parsed by an 1988 ASN.1-parser by removing the
definitions for the UNIVERSAL types and all references to them in RFC
3280's 1988 modules.
Appendix A.2 is in the 1997 syntax.
In case of discrepancies between these modules, the 1988 module is
the normative one.
A.1. 1988 ASN.1 Module (Normative)
PKIXqualified88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-qualified-cert(31) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL --
IMPORTS
GeneralName
FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-pkix1-implicit(19)}
AlgorithmIdentifier, DirectoryString, AttributeType, id-pkix, id-pe
FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-pkix1-explicit(18)};
-- Locally defined OIDs
-- Arc for QC personal data attributes
id-pda OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 9 }
Santesson, et al. Standards Track PAGE 17
RFC 3739 Qualified Certificates Profile March 2004
-- Arc for QC statements
id-qcs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 11 }
-- Personal data attributes
id-pda-dateOfBirth AttributeType ::= { id-pda 1 }
DateOfBirth ::= GeneralizedTime
id-pda-placeOfBirth AttributeType ::= { id-pda 2 }
PlaceOfBirth ::= DirectoryString
id-pda-gender AttributeType ::= { id-pda 3 }
Gender ::= PrintableString (SIZE(1))
-- "M", "F", "m" or "f"
id-pda-countryOfCitizenship AttributeType ::= { id-pda 4 }
CountryOfCitizenship ::= PrintableString (SIZE (2))
-- ISO 3166 Country Code
id-pda-countryOfResidence AttributeType ::= { id-pda 5 }
CountryOfResidence ::= PrintableString (SIZE (2))
-- ISO 3166 Country Code
-- Certificate extensions
-- Biometric info extension
id-pe-biometricInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pe 2}
BiometricSyntax ::= SEQUENCE OF BiometricData
BiometricData ::= SEQUENCE {
typeOfBiometricData TypeOfBiometricData,
hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
biometricDataHash OCTET STRING,
sourceDataUri IA5String OPTIONAL }
TypeOfBiometricData ::= CHOICE {
predefinedBiometricType PredefinedBiometricType,
biometricDataOid OBJECT IDENTIFIER }
PredefinedBiometricType ::= INTEGER {
picture(0), handwritten-signature(1)}
(picture|handwritten-signature)
Santesson, et al. Standards Track PAGE 18
RFC 3739 Qualified Certificates Profile March 2004
-- QC Statements Extension
-- NOTE: This extension does not allow to mix critical and
-- non-critical Qualified Certificate Statements. Either all
-- statements must be critical or all statements must be
-- non-critical.
id-pe-qcStatements OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 3}
QCStatements ::= SEQUENCE OF QCStatement
QCStatement ::= SEQUENCE {
statementId OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
statementInfo ANY DEFINED BY statementId OPTIONAL}
-- QC statements
id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qcs 1 }
-- This statement identifies conformance with requirements
-- defined in RFC 3039 (Version 1). This statement may
-- optionally contain additional semantics information as specified
-- below.
id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qcs 2 }
-- This statement identifies conformance with requirements
-- defined in this Qualified Certificate profile
-- (Version 2). This statement may optionally contain
-- additional semantics information as specified below.
SemanticsInformation ::= SEQUENCE {
semanticsIndentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
nameRegistrationAuthorities NameRegistrationAuthorities OPTIONAL
} -- At least one field shall be present
NameRegistrationAuthorities ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName
END
A.2. 1997 ASN.1 Module (Informative)
PKIXqualified97 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-qualified-cert-97(35) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL --
Santesson, et al. Standards Track PAGE 19
RFC 3739 Qualified Certificates Profile March 2004
IMPORTS
informationFramework, certificateExtensions, selectedAttributeTypes,
authenticationFramework, upperBounds, id-at
FROM UsefulDefinitions {joint-iso-itu-t(2) ds(5) module(1)
usefulDefinitions(0) 3 }
ub-name
FROM UpperBounds upperBounds
GeneralName
FROM CertificateExtensions certificateExtensions
ATTRIBUTE, AttributeType
FROM InformationFramework informationFramework
DirectoryString
FROM SelectedAttributeTypes selectedAttributeTypes
AlgorithmIdentifier, Extension, EXTENSION
FROM AuthenticationFramework authenticationFramework
id-pkix, id-pe
FROM PKIX1Explicit88 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-pkix1-explicit(18) };
-- Locally defined OIDs
-- Arc for QC personal data attributes
id-pda OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 9 }
-- Arc for QC statements
id-qcs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 11 }
-- Personal data attributes
id-pda-dateOfBirth AttributeType ::= { id-pda 1 }
id-pda-placeOfBirth AttributeType ::= { id-pda 2 }
id-pda-gender AttributeType ::= { id-pda 3 }
id-pda-countryOfCitizenship AttributeType ::= { id-pda 4 }
id-pda-countryOfResidence AttributeType ::= { id-pda 5 }
-- Certificate extensions
id-pe-biometricInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 2 }
id-pe-qcStatements OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 3 }
Santesson, et al. Standards Track PAGE 20
RFC 3739 Qualified Certificates Profile March 2004
-- QC statements
id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qcs 1 }
id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qcs 2 }
-- Personal data attributes
dateOfBirth ATTRIBUTE ::= {
WITH SYNTAX GeneralizedTime
ID id-pda-dateOfBirth }
placeOfBirth ATTRIBUTE ::= {
WITH SYNTAX DirectoryString {ub-name}
ID id-pda-placeOfBirth }
gender ATTRIBUTE ::= {
WITH SYNTAX PrintableString (SIZE(1) ^ FROM("M"|"F"|"m"|"f"))
ID id-pda-gender }
countryOfCitizenship ATTRIBUTE ::= {
WITH SYNTAX PrintableString (SIZE (2))
(CONSTRAINED BY { -- ISO 3166 codes only -- })
ID id-pda-countryOfCitizenship }
countryOfResidence ATTRIBUTE ::= {
WITH SYNTAX PrintableString (SIZE (2))
(CONSTRAINED BY { -- ISO 3166 codes only -- })
ID id-pda-countryOfResidence }
-- Certificate extensions
-- Biometric info extension
biometricInfo EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX BiometricSyntax
IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-biometricInfo }
BiometricSyntax ::= SEQUENCE OF BiometricData
BiometricData ::= SEQUENCE {
typeOfBiometricData TypeOfBiometricData,
hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
biometricDataHash OCTET STRING,
sourceDataUri IA5String OPTIONAL,
... -- For future extensions -- }
TypeOfBiometricData ::= CHOICE {
predefinedBiometricType PredefinedBiometricType,
Santesson, et al. Standards Track PAGE 21
RFC 3739 Qualified Certificates Profile March 2004
biometricDataOid OBJECT IDENTIFIER }
PredefinedBiometricType ::= INTEGER {
picture(0), handwritten-signature(1)}
(picture|handwritten-signature,...)
-- QC Statements Extension
-- NOTE: This extension does not allow to mix critical and
-- non-critical Qualified Certificate Statements. Either all
-- statements must be critical or all statements must be
-- non-critical.
qcStatements EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX QCStatements
IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-qcStatements }
QCStatements ::= SEQUENCE OF QCStatement
QCStatement ::= SEQUENCE {
statementId QC-STATEMENT.&id({SupportedStatements}),
statementInfo QC-STATEMENT.&Type
({SupportedStatements}{@statementId}) OPTIONAL }
QC-STATEMENT ::= CLASS {
&id OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE,
&Type OPTIONAL }
WITH SYNTAX {
[SYNTAX &Type] IDENTIFIED BY &id }
qcStatement-1 QC-STATEMENT ::= { SYNTAX SemanticsInformation
IDENTIFIED BY id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1}
-- This statement identifies conformance with requirements
-- defined in RFC 3039 (Version 1). This statement
-- may optionally contain additional semantics information
-- as specified below.
qcStatement-2 QC-STATEMENT ::= { SYNTAX SemanticsInformation
IDENTIFIED BY id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v2}
-- This statement identifies conformance with requirements
-- defined in this Qualified Certificate profile
-- (Version 2). This statement may optionally contain
-- additional semantics information as specified below.
SemanticsInformation ::= SEQUENCE {
semanticsIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
nameRegistrationAuthorities NameRegistrationAuthorities OPTIONAL
}(WITH COMPONENTS {..., semanticsIdentifier PRESENT}|
WITH COMPONENTS {..., nameRegistrationAuthorities PRESENT})
Santesson, et al. Standards Track PAGE 22
RFC 3739 Qualified Certificates Profile March 2004
NameRegistrationAuthorities ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName
-- The following information object set is defined to constrain the
-- set of attributes applications are required to recognize as QCSs.
SupportedStatements QC-STATEMENT ::= {
qcStatement-1 |
qcStatement-2 , ... -- For future extensions -- }
END
B. A Note on Attributes
This document defines several new attributes, both for use in the
subject field of issued certificates and in the
subjectDirectoryAttributes extension. A complete definition of these
new attributes (including matching rules), along with object classes
to support them in LDAP-accessible directories, can be found in
PKCS 9 [RFC 2985].
C. Example Certificate
This section contains the ASN.1 structure, an ASN.1 dump, and the
DER-encoding of a certificate issued in conformance with this
profile. The example has been developed with the help of the OSS
ASN.1 compiler. The certificate has the following characteristics:
1. The certificate is signed with RSA and the SHA-1 hash
algorithm
2. The issuer's distinguished name is (using the syntax specified
in [RFC 2253]): O=GMD - Forschungszentrum Informationstechnik
GmbH, C=DE
3. The subject's distinguished name is (using the syntax
specified in [RFC 2253]): GN=Petra+SN=Barzin, O=GMD
- Forschungszentrum Informationstechnik GmbH, C=DE
4. The certificate was issued on 1 February, 2004 and will expire
on 1 February, 2008
5. The certificate contains a 1024 bit RSA key
6. The certificate includes a critical key usage extension
exclusively indicating non-repudiation
7. The certificate includes a certificate policy identifier
extension indicating the practices and procedures undertaken
by the issuing CA (object identifier 1.3.36.8.1.1). The
Santesson, et al. Standards Track PAGE 23
RFC 3739 Qualified Certificates Profile March 2004
certificate policy object identifier is defined by TeleTrust,
Germany.
8. The certificate includes a subject directory attributes
extension containing the following attributes:
date of birth: October, 14th 1971
place of birth: Darmstadt
country of citizenship:Germany
gender: Female
9. The certificate includes a qualified statement certificate
extension indicating that the naming registration authority's
name is "municipality@darmstadt.de".
10. The certificate includes, in conformance with RFC 3280, an
authority key identifier extension.
C.1. ASN.1 Structure
C.1.1. Extensions
Since extensions are DER-encoded already when placed in the structure
to be signed, they are, for clarity, shown here in the value notation
defined in [X.680].
C.1.1.1. The subjectDirectoryAttributes Extension
certSubjDirAttrs AttributesSyntax ::= {
{
type id-pda-countryOfCitizenship,
values {
PrintableString : "DE"
}
},
{
type id-pda-gender,
values {
PrintableString : "F"
}
},
{
type id-pda-dateOfBirth,
values {
GeneralizedTime : "197110141200Z"
}
},
{
Santesson, et al. Standards Track PAGE 24
RFC 3739 Qualified Certificates Profile March 2004
type id-pda-placeOfBirth,
values {
DirectoryString : utf8String : "Darmstadt"
}
}
}
C.1.1.2. The keyUsage Extension
certKeyUsage KeyUsage ::= {nonRepudiation}
C.1.1.3. The certificatePolicies Extension
certCertificatePolicies CertificatePoliciesSyntax ::= {
{
policyIdentifier {1 3 36 8 1 1}
}
}
C.1.1.4. The qcStatements Extension
certQCStatement QCStatements ::= {
{
statementId id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v2,
statementInfo SemanticsInformation : {
nameRegistrationAuthorities {
rfc822Name : "municipality@darmstadt.de"
}
}
}
}
C.1.1.5. The authorityKeyIdentifier Extension
certAKI AuthorityKeyIdentifier ::= {
keyIdentifier '000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0FFEDCBA98'H
}
C.1.2. The Certificate
The signed portion of the certificate is shown here in the value
notation defined in [X.680]. Note that extension values are already
DER encoded in this structure. Some values have been truncated for
readability purposes.
certCertInfo CertificateInfo ::= {
version v3,
serialNumber 1234567890,
Santesson, et al. Standards Track PAGE 25
RFC 3739 Qualified Certificates Profile March 2004
signature
{
algorithm { 1 2 840 113549 1 1 5 },
parameters RSAParams : NULL
},
issuer rdnSequence :
{
{
{
type { 2 5 4 6 },
value PrintableString : "DE"
}
},
{
{
type { 2 5 4 10 },
value UTF8String :
}
}
},
validity
{
notBefore utcTime : "040201100000Z",
notAfter utcTime : "080201100000Z"
},
subject rdnSequence :
{
{
{
type { 2 5 4 6 },
value PrintableString : "DE"
}
},
{
{
type { 2 5 4 10 },
value UTF8String :
"GMD Forschungszentrum Informationstechnik GmbH"
}
},
{
{
type { 2 5 4 4 },
value UTF8String : "Barzin"
},
{
type { 2 5 4 42 },
value UTF8String : "Petra"
Santesson, et al. Standards Track PAGE 26
RFC 3739 Qualified Certificates Profile March 2004
}
}
},
subjectPublicKeyInfo
{
algorithm
{
algorithm { 1 2 840 113549 1 1 1 },
parameters RSAParams : NULL
},
subjectPublicKey '30818902818100DCE74CD5...0203010001'H
},
extensions
{
{
extnId { 2 5 29 9 }, -- subjectDirectoryAttributes
extnValue '305B301006082B0601050507090...7374616474'H
},
{
extnId { 2 5 29 15 }, -- keyUsage
critical TRUE,
extnValue '03020640'H
},
{
extnId { 2 5 29 32 }, -- certificatePolicies
extnValue '3009300706052B24080101'H
},
{
extnId { 2 5 29 35 }, -- authorityKeyIdentifier
extnValue '30168014000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0FFEDCBA98'H
},
{
extnId { 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 3 }, -- qcStatements
extnValue '302B302906082B06010505070B0...4742E6465 'H
}
}
}
C.2. ASN.1 Dump
This section contains an ASN.1 dump of the signed portion of the
certificate. Some values have been truncated for readability
purposes.
CertificateInfo SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16] constructed; length = 633
version : tag = [0] constructed; length = 3
Version INTEGER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 2] primitive; length = 1
2
Santesson, et al. Standards Track PAGE 27
RFC 3739 Qualified Certificates Profile March 2004
serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber INTEGER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 2]
primitive; length = 4
1234567890
signature AlgorithmIdentifier SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
constructed; length = 13
algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]
primitive; length = 9
{ 1 2 840 113549 1 1 5 }
parameters OpenType
NULL
issuer Name CHOICE
rdnSequence RDNSequence SEQUENCE OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
constructed; length = 72
RelativeDistinguishedName SET OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 17]
constructed; length = 11
AttributeTypeAndValue SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
constructed; length = 9
type OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]
primitive; length = 3
{ 2 5 4 6 } -- id-at-countryName
value PrintableString
"DE"
RelativeDistinguishedName SET OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 17]
constructed; length = 57
AttributeTypeAndValue SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
constructed; length = 55
type OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]
primitive; length = 3
{ 2 5 4 10 } -- id-at-organizationName
value UTF8String
"GMD Forschungszentrum Informationstechnik GmbH"
validity Validity SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
constructed; length = 30
notBefore Time CHOICE
utcTime UTCTime: tag = [UNIVERSAL 23] primitive; length = 13
040201100000Z
notAfter Time CHOICE
utcTime UTCTime: tag = [UNIVERSAL 23] primitive; length = 13
080201100000Z
subject Name CHOICE
rdnSequence RDNSequence SEQUENCE OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
constructed; length = 101
RelativeDistinguishedName SET OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 17]
constructed; length = 11
AttributeTypeAndValue SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
constructed; length = 9
type OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]
primitive; length = 3
Santesson, et al. Standards Track PAGE 28
RFC 3739 Qualified Certificates Profile March 2004
{ 2 5 4 6 } -- id-at-countryName
value PrintableString
"DE"
RelativeDistinguishedName SET OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 17]
constructed; length = 55
AttributeTypeAndValue SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
constructed; length = 53
type OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]
primitive; length = 3
{ 2 5 4 10 } -- id-at-organizationName
value UTF8String
"GMD Forschungszentrum Informationstechnik GmbH"
RelativeDistinguishedName SET OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 17]
constructed; length = 29
AttributeTypeAndValue SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
constructed; length = 13
type OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]
primitive; length = 3
{ 2 5 4 4 } -- id-at-surname
value UTF8String
"Barzin"
AttributeTypeAndValue SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
constructed; length = 12
type OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]
primitive; length = 3
{ 2 5 4 42 } -- id-at-givenName
value UTF8String
"Petra"
subjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE:
tag = [UNIVERSAL 16] constructed; length = 159
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
constructed; length = 13
algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]
primitive; length = 9
{ 1 2 840 113549 1 1 1 } -- rsaEncryption
parameters OpenType
NULL
subjectPublicKey BIT STRING: tag = [UNIVERSAL 3]
primitive; length = 141
0x0030818902818100dce74cd5a1d55aeb01cf5ecc20f3c3fca787...
extensions : tag = [3] constructed; length = 233
Extensions SEQUENCE OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
constructed; length = 230
Extension SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
constructed; length = 100
extnId OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]
primitive; length = 3
{ 2 5 29 9 } -- id-ce-subjectDirectoryAttributes
Santesson, et al. Standards Track PAGE 29
RFC 3739 Qualified Certificates Profile March 2004
extnValue OCTET STRING: tag = [UNIVERSAL 4]
primitive; length = 93
0x305b301006082b06010505070904310413024445300f06082...
Extension SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
constructed; length = 14
extnId OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]
primitive; length = 3
{ 2 5 29 15 } -- id-ce-keyUsage
critical BOOLEAN: tag = [UNIVERSAL 1] primitive; length = 1
TRUE
extnValue OCTET STRING: tag = [UNIVERSAL 4]
primitive; length = 4
0x03020640
Extension SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
constructed; length = 18
extnId OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]
primitive; length = 3
{ 2 5 29 32 } -- id-ce-certificatePolicies
extnValue OCTET STRING: tag = [UNIVERSAL 4]
primitive; length = 11
0x3009300706052b24080101
Extension SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
constructed; length = 31
extnId OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]
primitive; length = 3
{ 2 5 29 35 } -- id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier
extnValue OCTET STRING: tag = [UNIVERSAL 4]
primitive; length = 24
0x30168014000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0ffedcba98
Extension SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
constructed; length = 57
extnId OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]
primitive; length = 8
{ 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 3 } -- id-pe-qcStatements
extnValue OCTET STRING: tag = [UNIVERSAL 4]
primitive; length = 45
0x302b302906082b06010505070b02301d301b81196d756e696...
C.3 DER-encoding
This section contains the full, DER-encoded certificate, in hex.
30820310 30820279 A0030201 02020449 9602D230 0D06092A 864886F7 0D010105
05003048 310B3009 06035504 06130244 45313930 37060355 040A0C30 474D4420
2D20466F 72736368 756E6773 7A656E74 72756D20 496E666F 726D6174 696F6E73
74656368 6E696B20 476D6248 301E170D 30343032 30313130 30303030 5A170D30
38303230 31313030 3030305A 3065310B 30090603 55040613 02444531 37303506
0355040A 0C2E474D 4420466F 72736368 756E6773 7A656E74 72756D20 496E666F
Santesson, et al. Standards Track PAGE 30
RFC 3739 Qualified Certificates Profile March 2004
726D6174 696F6E73 74656368 6E696B20 476D6248 311D300C 06035504 2A0C0550
65747261 300D0603 5504040C 06426172 7A696E30 819F300D 06092A86 4886F70D
01010105 0003818D 00308189 02818100 DCE74CD5 A1D55AEB 01CF5ECC 20F3C3FC
A787CFCB 571A21AA 8A20AD5D FF015130 DE724E5E D3F95392 E7BB16C4 A71D0F31
B3A9926A 8F08EA00 FDC3A8F2 BB016DEC A3B9411B A2599A2A 8CB655C6 DFEA25BF
EDDC73B5 94FAA0EF E595C612 A6AE5B8C 7F0CA19C EC4FE7AB 60546768 4BB2387D
5F2F7EBD BC3EF0A6 04F6B404 01176925 02030100 01A381E9 3081E630 64060355
1D09045D 305B3010 06082B06 01050507 09043104 13024445 300F0608 2B060105
05070903 31031301 46301D06 082B0601 05050709 01311118 0F313937 31313031
34313230 3030305A 30170608 2B060105 05070902 310B0C09 4461726D 73746164
74300E06 03551D0F 0101FF04 04030206 40301206 03551D20 040B3009 30070605
2B240801 01301F06 03551D23 04183016 80140001 02030405 06070809 0A0B0C0D
0E0FFEDC BA983039 06082B06 01050507 0103042D 302B3029 06082B06 01050507
0B02301D 301B8119 6D756E69 63697061 6C697479 40646172 6D737461 64742E64
65300D06 092A8648 86F70D01 01050500 03818100 8F8C80BB B2D86B75 F4E21F82
EFE0F20F 6C558890 A6E73118 8359B9C7 8CE71C92 0C66C600 53FBC924 825090F2
95B08826 EAF3FF1F 5917C80B B4836129 CFE5563E 78592B5B B0F9ACB5 2915F0F2
BC36991F 21436520 E9064761 D932D871 F71FFEBD AD648FA7 CF3C1BC0 96F112D4
B882B39F E1A16A90 AE1A80B8 A9676518 B5AA7E97
C.4. CA's Public RSA Key
This section contains the DER-encoded public RSA key of the CA who
signed the example certificate. It is included with the purpose of
simplifying verifications of the example certificate.
30818902818100c88f4bdb66f713ba3dd7a9069880e888d4321acb53cda7fcdf
da89b834e25430b956d46a438baa6798035af30db378424e00a8296b012b1b24
f9cf0b3f83be116cd8a36957dc3f54cbd7c58a10c380b3dfa15bd2922ea8660f
96e1603d81357c0442ad607c5161d083d919fd5307c1c3fa6dfead0e6410999e
8b8a8411d525dd0203010001
References
Normative References
[RFC 2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC 2247] Kille, S., Wahl, M., Grimstad, A., Huber R. and S.
Sataluri, "Using Domains in LDAP/X.500 Distinguished
Names", RFC 2247, January 1998.
[RFC 2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000.
Santesson, et al. Standards Track PAGE 31
RFC 3739 Qualified Certificates Profile March 2004
[RFC 2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object
Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985,
November 2000.
[RFC 3280] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W. and D. Solo, "Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Certificate and
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280,
April 2002.
[X.509] ITU-T Recommendation X.509 (2000) | ISO/IEC 9594-8:2001,
Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection -
The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate
frameworks
[X.520] ITU-T Recommendation X.520 (2001) | ISO/IEC 9594-6:2001,
Information Technology - Open Systems Interconnection -
The Directory: Selected Attribute Types, 2001.
[X.680] ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-1:2002),
Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One,
2002.
[ISO 3166] ISO 3166-1:1997, Codes for the representation of names of
countries, 1997.
[HTTP/1.1] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
Masinter, L., Leach, P. and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.
Informative References
[X.501] ITU-T recommendation X.501 (2001) | ISO/IEC 9594-2:2001,
Information Technology - Open Systems Interconnection -
The Directory: Models, 2001.
[EU-ESDIR] Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 13 December 1999 on a Community framework for
electronic signatures, 1999.
[RFC 2253] Wahl, M., Kille, S. and T. Howes, "Lightweight Directory
Access Protocol (v3): UTF-8 String Representation of
Distinguished Names", RFC 2253, December 1997.
Santesson, et al. Standards Track PAGE 32
RFC 3739 Qualified Certificates Profile March 2004
Authors' Addresses
Stefan Santesson
Microsoft Denmark
Tuborg Boulevard 12
DK-2900 Hellerup
Denmark
EMail: stefans@microsoft.com
Tim Polk
NIST
Building 820, Room 426
Gaithersburg, MD 20899, USA
EMail: wpolk@nist.gov
Magnus Nystrom
RSA Security
Box 10704
S-121 29 Stockholm
Sweden
EMail: magnus@rsasecurity.com
Santesson, et al. Standards Track PAGE 33
RFC 3739 Qualified Certificates Profile March 2004
Full Copyright Statement
Copyright © The Internet Society (2004). This document is subject
to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78 and
except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE
REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE
INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF
THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Intellectual Property
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed
to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology
described in this document or the extent to which any license
under such rights might or might not be available; nor does it
represent that it has made any independent effort to identify any
such rights. Information on the procedures with respect to
rights in RFC documents can be found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use
of such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository
at http://www.ietf.org/ipr.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention
any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other
proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required
to implement this standard. Please address the information to the
IETF at ietf-ipr@ietf.org.
Acknowledgement
Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
Internet Society.
Santesson, et al. Standards Track PAGE 34
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Qualified Certificates Profile
RFC TOTAL SIZE: 67436 bytes
PUBLICATION DATE: Friday, March 12th, 2004
LEGAL RIGHTS: The IETF Trust (see BCP 78)
|
