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IETF RFC 3079
Deriving Keys for use with Microsoft Point-to-Point Encryption (MPPE)
Last modified on Thursday, March 29th, 2001
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Network Working Group G. Zorn
Request for Comments: 3079 cisco Systems
Category: Informational March 2001
Deriving Keys for use with Microsoft Point-to-Point Encryption (MPPE)
 Status of this Memo
This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does
not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this
memo is unlimited.
Copyright Notice
Copyright © The Internet Society (2001). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) provides a standard method for
transporting multi-protocol datagrams over point-to-point links.
The PPP Compression Control Protocol provides a method to negotiate
and utilize compression protocols over PPP encapsulated links.
Microsoft Point to Point Encryption (MPPE) is a means of representing
PPP packets in an encrypted form. MPPE uses the RSA RC4 algorithm to
provide data confidentiality. The length of the session key to be
used for initializing encryption tables can be negotiated. MPPE
currently supports 40-bit, 56-bit and 128-bit session keys. MPPE
session keys are changed frequently; the exact frequency depends upon
the options negotiated, but may be every packet. MPPE is negotiated
within option 18 in the Compression Control Protocol.
This document describes the method used to derive initial MPPE
session keys from a variety of credential types. It is expected that
this memo will be updated whenever Microsoft defines a new key
derivation method for MPPE, since its primary purpose is to provide
an open, easily accessible reference for third-parties wishing to
interoperate with Microsoft products.
MPPE itself (including the protocol used to negotiate its use, the
details of the encryption method used and the algorithm used to
change session keys during a session) is described in RFC 3078.
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RFC 3079 MPPE Key Derivation March 2001
Table of Contents
1. Specification of Requirements ............................... 2
2. Deriving Session Keys from MS-CHAP Credentials .............. 2
2.1. Generating 40-bit Session Keys ............................ 3
2.2. Generating 56-bit Session Keys ............................ 3
2.3. Generating 128-bit Session Keys ........................... 4
2.4. Key Derivation Functions .................................. 5
2.5. Sample Key Derivations .................................... 6
2.5.1. Sample 40-bit Key Derivation ............................ 6
2.5.2. Sample 56-bit Key Derivation ............................ 6
2.5.3. Sample 128-bit Key Derivation ........................... 7
3. Deriving Session Keys from MS-CHAP-2 Credentials ............ 7
3.1. Generating 40-bit Session Keys ............................ 8
3.2. Generating 56-bit Session Keys ............................ 9
3.3. Generating 128-bit Session Keys ...........................10
3.4. Key Derivation Functions ..................................11
3.5. Sample Key Derivations ....................................13
3.5.1. Sample 40-bit Key Derivation ............................13
3.5.2. Sample 56-bit Key Derivation ............................14
3.5.3. Sample 128-bit Key Derivation ...........................15
4. Deriving MPPE Session Keys from TLS Session Keys ............16
4.1. Generating 40-bit Session Keys ............................16
4.2. Generating 56-bit Session Keys ............................17
4.3. Generating 128-bit Session Keys ...........................17
5. Security Considerations .....................................18
5.1. MS-CHAP Credentials .......................................18
5.2. EAP-TLS Credentials .......................................19
6. References ..................................................19
7. Acknowledgements ............................................20
8. Author's Address ............................................20
9. Full Copyright Statement ....................................21
1. Specification of Requirements
In this document, the key words "MAY", "MUST, "MUST NOT", "optional",
"recommended", "SHOULD", and "SHOULD NOT" are to be interpreted as
described in [6].
2. Deriving Session Keys from MS-CHAP Credentials
The Microsoft Challenge-Handshake Authentication Protocol (MS-CHAP-1)
[2] is a Microsoft-proprietary PPP [1] authentication protocol,
providing the functionality to which LAN-based users are accustomed
while integrating the encryption and hashing algorithms used on
Windows networks.
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RFC 3079 MPPE Key Derivation March 2001
The following sections detail the methods used to derive initial
session keys (40-, 56- and 128-bit) from MS-CHAP-1 credentials.
Implementation Note
The initial session key in both directions is derived from the
credentials of the peer that initiated the call and the challenge
used (if any) is the challenge from the first authentication.
This is true for both unilateral and bilateral authentication, as
well as for each link in a multilink bundle. In the multi-chassis
multilink case, implementations are responsible for ensuring that
the correct keys are generated on all participating machines.
2.1. Generating 40-bit Session Keys
MPPE uses a derivative of the peer's LAN Manager password as the 40-
bit session key used for initializing the RC4 encryption tables.
The first step is to obfuscate the peer's password using the
LmPasswordHash() function (described in [2]). The first 8 octets of
the result are used as the basis for the session key generated in the
following way:
/*
* PasswordHash is the basis for the session key
* SessionKey is a copy of PasswordHash and is the generative session key
* 8 is the length (in octets) of the key to be generated.
*
*/
Get_Key(PasswordHash, SessionKey, 8)
/*
* The effective length of the key is reduced to 40 bits by
* replacing the first three bytes as follows:
*/
SessionKey[0] = 0xd1 ;
SessionKey[1] = 0x26 ;
SessionKey[2] = 0x9e ;
2.2. Generating 56-bit Session Keys
MPPE uses a derivative of the peer's LAN Manager password as the 56-
bit session key used for initializing the RC4 encryption tables.
The first step is to obfuscate the peer's password using the
LmPasswordHash() function (described in [2]). The first 8 octets of
the result are used as the basis for the session key generated in the
following way:
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RFC 3079 MPPE Key Derivation March 2001
/*
* PasswordHash is the basis for the session key
* SessionKey is a copy of PasswordHash and is the generative session key
* 8 is the length (in octets) of the key to be generated.
*
*/
Get_Key(PasswordHash, SessionKey, 8)
/*
* The effective length of the key is reduced to 56 bits by
* replacing the first byte as follows:
*/
SessionKey[0] = 0xd1 ;
2.3. Generating 128-bit Session Keys
MPPE uses a derivative of the peer's Windows NT password as the 128-
bit session key used for initializing encryption tables.
The first step is to obfuscate the peer's password using
NtPasswordHash() function as described in [2]. The first 16 octets
of the result are then hashed again using the MD4 algorithm. The
first 16 octets of the second hash are used as the basis for the
session key generated in the following way:
/*
* Challenge (as described in [9]) is sent by the PPP authenticator
* during authentication and is 8 octets long.
* NtPasswordHashHash is the basis for the session key.
* On return, InitialSessionKey contains the initial session
* key to be used.
*/
Get_Start_Key(Challenge, NtPasswordHashHash, InitialSessionKey)
/*
* CurrentSessionKey is a copy of InitialSessionKey
* and is the generative session key.
* Length (in octets) of the key to generate is 16.
*
*/
Get_Key(InitialSessionKey, CurrentSessionKey, 16)
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RFC 3079 MPPE Key Derivation March 2001
2.4. Key Derivation Functions
The following procedures are used to derive the session key.
/*
* Pads used in key derivation
*/
SHApad1[40] =
{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00};
SHApad2[40] =
{0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2,
0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2,
0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2,
0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2};
/*
* SHAInit(), SHAUpdate() and SHAFinal() functions are an
* implementation of Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1) [7]. These are
* available in public domain or can be licensed from
* RSA Data Security, Inc.
*
* 1) InitialSessionKey is 8 octets long for 56- and 40-bit
* session keys, 16 octets long for 128 bit session keys.
* 2) CurrentSessionKey is same as InitialSessionKey when this
* routine is called for the first time for the session.
*/
Get_Key(
IN InitialSessionKey,
IN/OUT CurrentSessionKey
IN LengthOfDesiredKey )
{
SHAInit(Context)
SHAUpdate(Context, InitialSessionKey, LengthOfDesiredKey)
SHAUpdate(Context, SHAPad1, 40)
SHAUpdate(Context, CurrentSessionKey, LengthOfDesiredKey)
SHAUpdate(Context, SHAPad2, 40)
SHAFinal(Context, Digest)
memcpy(CurrentSessionKey, Digest, LengthOfDesiredKey)
}
Get_Start_Key(
IN Challenge,
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RFC 3079 MPPE Key Derivation March 2001
IN NtPasswordHashHash,
OUT InitialSessionKey)
{
SHAInit(Context)
SHAUpdate(Context, NtPasswordHashHash, 16)
SHAUpdate(Context, NtPasswordHashHash, 16)
SHAUpdate(Context, Challenge, 8)
SHAFinal(Context, Digest)
memcpy(InitialSessionKey, Digest, 16)
}
2.5. Sample Key Derivations
The following sections illustrate 40-, 56- and 128-bit key
derivations. All intermediate values are in hexadecimal.
2.5.1. Sample 40-bit Key Derivation
Initial Values
Password = "clientPass"
Step 1: LmPasswordHash(Password, PasswordHash)
PasswordHash = 76 a1 52 93 60 96 d7 83 0e 23 90 22 74 04 af d2
Step 2: Copy PasswordHash to SessionKey
SessionKey = 76 a1 52 93 60 96 d7 83 0e 23 90 22 74 04 af d2
Step 3: GetKey(PasswordHash, SessionKey, 8)
SessionKey = d8 08 01 53 8c ec 4a 08
Step 4: Reduce the effective key length to 40 bits
SessionKey = d1 26 9e 53 8c ec 4a 08
2.5.2. Sample 56-bit Key Derivation
Initial Values
Password = "clientPass"
Step 1: LmPasswordHash(Password, PasswordHash)
PasswordHash = 76 a1 52 93 60 96 d7 83 0e 23 90 22 74 04 af d2
Step 2: Copy PasswordHash to SessionKey
SessionKey = 76 a1 52 93 60 96 d7 83 0e 23 90 22 74 04 af d2
Step 3: GetKey(PasswordHash, SessionKey, 8)
SessionKey = d8 08 01 53 8c ec 4a 08
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RFC 3079 MPPE Key Derivation March 2001
Step 4: Reduce the effective key length to 56 bits
SessionKey = d1 08 01 53 8c ec 4a 08
2.5.3. Sample 128-bit Key Derivation
Initial Values
Password = "clientPass"
Challenge = 10 2d b5 df 08 5d 30 41
Step 1: NtPasswordHash(Password, PasswordHash)
PasswordHash = 44 eb ba 8d 53 12 b8 d6 11 47 44 11 f5 69 89 ae
Step 2: PasswordHashHash = MD4(PasswordHash)
PasswordHashHash = 41 c0 0c 58 4b d2 d9 1c 40 17 a2 a1 2f a5 9f 3f
Step 3: GetStartKey(Challenge, PasswordHashHash, InitialSessionKey)
InitialSessionKey = a8 94 78 50 cf c0 ac ca d1 78 9f b6 2d dc dd b0
Step 4: Copy InitialSessionKey to CurrentSessionKey
CurrentSessionKey = a8 94 78 50 cf c0 ac c1 d1 78 9f b6 2d dc dd b0
Step 5: GetKey(InitialSessionKey, CurrentSessionKey, 16)
CurrentSessionKey = 59 d1 59 bc 09 f7 6f 1d a2 a8 6a 28 ff ec 0b 1e
3. Deriving Session Keys from MS-CHAP-2 Credentials
Version 2 of the Microsoft Challenge-Handshake Authentication
Protocol (MS-CHAP-2) [8] is a Microsoft-proprietary PPP
authentication protocol, providing the functionality to which LAN-
based users are accustomed while integrating the encryption and
hashing algorithms used on Windows networks.
The following sections detail the methods used to derive initial
session keys from MS-CHAP-2 credentials. 40-, 56- and 128-bit keys
are all derived using the same algorithm from the authenticating
peer's Windows NT password. The only difference is in the length of
the keys and their effective strength: 40- and 56-bit keys are 8
octets in length, while 128-bit keys are 16 octets long. Separate
keys are derived for the send and receive directions of the session.
Implementation Note
The initial session keys in both directions are derived from the
credentials of the peer that initiated the call and the challenges
used are those from the first authentication. This is true as
well for each link in a multilink bundle. In the multi-chassis
multilink case, implementations are responsible for ensuring that
the correct keys are generated on all participating machines.
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RFC 3079 MPPE Key Derivation March 2001
3.1. Generating 40-bit Session Keys
When used in conjunction with MS-CHAP-2 authentication, the initial
MPPE session keys are derived from the peer's Windows NT password.
The first step is to obfuscate the peer's password using
NtPasswordHash() function as described in [8].
NtPasswordHash(Password, PasswordHash)
The first 16 octets of the result are then hashed again using the MD4
algorithm.
PasswordHashHash = md4(PasswordHash)
The first 16 octets of this second hash are used together with the
NT- Response field from the MS-CHAP-2 Response packet [8] as the
basis for the master session key:
GetMasterKey(PasswordHashHash, NtResponse, MasterKey)
Once the master key has been generated, it is used to derive two 40-
bit session keys, one for sending and one for receiving:
GetAsymmetricStartKey(MasterKey, MasterSendKey, 8, TRUE, TRUE)
GetAsymmetricStartKey(MasterKey, MasterReceiveKey, 8, FALSE, TRUE)
The master session keys are never used to encrypt or decrypt data;
they are only used in the derivation of transient session keys. The
initial transient session keys are obtained by calling the function
GetNewKeyFromSHA() (described in [3]):
GetNewKeyFromSHA(MasterSendKey, MasterSendKey, 8, SendSessionKey)
GetNewKeyFromSHA(MasterReceiveKey, MasterReceiveKey, 8,
ReceiveSessionKey)
Next, the effective strength of both keys is reduced by setting the
first three octets to known constants:
SendSessionKey[0] = ReceiveSessionKey[0] = 0xd1
SendSessionKey[1] = ReceiveSessionKey[1] = 0x26
SendSessionKey[2] = ReceiveSessionKey[2] = 0x9e
Finally, the RC4 tables are initialized using the new session keys:
rc4_key(SendRC4key, 8, SendSessionKey)
rc4_key(ReceiveRC4key, 8, ReceiveSessionKey)
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RFC 3079 MPPE Key Derivation March 2001
3.2. Generating 56-bit Session Keys
When used in conjunction with MS-CHAP-2 authentication, the initial
MPPE session keys are derived from the peer's Windows NT password.
The first step is to obfuscate the peer's password using
NtPasswordHash() function as described in [8].
NtPasswordHash(Password, PasswordHash)
The first 16 octets of the result are then hashed again using the MD4
algorithm.
PasswordHashHash = md4(PasswordHash)
The first 16 octets of this second hash are used together with the
NT-Response field from the MS-CHAP-2 Response packet [8] as the basis
for the master session key:
GetMasterKey(PasswordHashHash, NtResponse, MasterKey)
Once the master key has been generated, it is used to derive two
56-bit session keys, one for sending and one for receiving:
GetAsymmetricStartKey(MasterKey, MasterSendKey, 8, TRUE, TRUE)
GetAsymmetricStartKey(MasterKey, MasterReceiveKey, 8, FALSE, TRUE)
The master session keys are never used to encrypt or decrypt data;
they are only used in the derivation of transient session keys. The
initial transient session keys are obtained by calling the function
GetNewKeyFromSHA() (described in [3]):
GetNewKeyFromSHA(MasterSendKey, MasterSendKey, 8, SendSessionKey)
GetNewKeyFromSHA(MasterReceiveKey, MasterReceiveKey, 8,
ReceiveSessionKey)
Next, the effective strength of both keys is reduced by setting the
first octet to a known constant:
SendSessionKey[0] = ReceiveSessionKey[0] = 0xd1
Finally, the RC4 tables are initialized using the new session keys:
rc4_key(SendRC4key, 8, SendSessionKey)
rc4_key(ReceiveRC4key, 8, ReceiveSessionKey)
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RFC 3079 MPPE Key Derivation March 2001
3.3. Generating 128-bit Session Keys
When used in conjunction with MS-CHAP-2 authentication, the initial
MPPE session keys are derived from the peer's Windows NT password.
The first step is to obfuscate the peer's password using
NtPasswordHash() function as described in [8].
NtPasswordHash(Password, PasswordHash)
The first 16 octets of the result are then hashed again using the MD4
algorithm.
PasswordHashHash = md4(PasswordHash)
The first 16 octets of this second hash are used together with the
NT-Response field from the MS-CHAP-2 Response packet [8] as the basis
for the master session key:
GetMasterKey(PasswordHashHash, NtResponse, MasterKey)
Once the master key has been generated, it is used to derive two
128-bit master session keys, one for sending and one for receiving:
GetAsymmetricStartKey(MasterKey, MasterSendKey, 16, TRUE, TRUE)
GetAsymmetricStartKey(MasterKey, MasterReceiveKey, 16, FALSE, TRUE)
The master session keys are never used to encrypt or decrypt data;
they are only used in the derivation of transient session keys. The
initial transient session keys are obtained by calling the function
GetNewKeyFromSHA() (described in [3]):
GetNewKeyFromSHA(MasterSendKey, MasterSendKey, 16, SendSessionKey)
GetNewKeyFromSHA(MasterReceiveKey, MasterReceiveKey, 16,
ReceiveSessionKey)
Finally, the RC4 tables are initialized using the new session keys:
rc4_key(SendRC4key, 16, SendSessionKey)
rc4_key(ReceiveRC4key, 16, ReceiveSessionKey)
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RFC 3079 MPPE Key Derivation March 2001
3.4. Key Derivation Functions
The following procedures are used to derive the session key.
/*
* Pads used in key derivation
*/
SHSpad1[40] =
{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00};
SHSpad2[40] =
{0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2,
0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2,
0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2,
0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2};
/*
* "Magic" constants used in key derivations
*/
Magic1[27] =
{0x54, 0x68, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74,
0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x4d, 0x50, 0x50, 0x45, 0x20, 0x4d,
0x61, 0x73, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x4b, 0x65, 0x79};
Magic2[84] =
{0x4f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6c, 0x69,
0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, 0x73, 0x69, 0x64, 0x65, 0x2c, 0x20,
0x74, 0x68, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68,
0x65, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, 0x6b, 0x65, 0x79,
0x3b, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x73,
0x65, 0x72, 0x76, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x73, 0x69, 0x64, 0x65,
0x2c, 0x20, 0x69, 0x74, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68,
0x65, 0x20, 0x72, 0x65, 0x63, 0x65, 0x69, 0x76, 0x65, 0x20,
0x6b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x2e};
Magic3[84] =
{0x4f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6c, 0x69,
0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, 0x73, 0x69, 0x64, 0x65, 0x2c, 0x20,
0x74, 0x68, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68,
0x65, 0x20, 0x72, 0x65, 0x63, 0x65, 0x69, 0x76, 0x65, 0x20,
0x6b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x3b, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68,
0x65, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x72, 0x76, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x73,
0x69, 0x64, 0x65, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x69, 0x74, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73,
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RFC 3079 MPPE Key Derivation March 2001
0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20,
0x6b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x2e};
GetMasterKey(
IN 16-octet PasswordHashHash,
IN 24-octet NTResponse,
OUT 16-octet MasterKey )
{
20-octet Digest
ZeroMemory(Digest, sizeof(Digest));
/*
* SHSInit(), SHSUpdate() and SHSFinal()
* are an implementation of the Secure Hash Standard [7].
*/
SHSInit(Context);
SHSUpdate(Context, PasswordHashHash, 16);
SHSUpdate(Context, NTResponse, 24);
SHSUpdate(Context, Magic1, 27);
SHSFinal(Context, Digest);
MoveMemory(MasterKey, Digest, 16);
}
VOID
GetAsymetricStartKey(
IN 16-octet MasterKey,
OUT 8-to-16 octet SessionKey,
IN INTEGER SessionKeyLength,
IN BOOLEAN IsSend,
IN BOOLEAN IsServer )
{
20-octet Digest;
ZeroMemory(Digest, 20);
if (IsSend) {
if (IsServer) {
s = Magic3
} else {
s = Magic2
}
} else {
if (IsServer) {
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RFC 3079 MPPE Key Derivation March 2001
s = Magic2
} else {
s = Magic3
}
}
/*
* SHSInit(), SHSUpdate() and SHSFinal()
* are an implementation of the Secure Hash Standard [7].
*/
SHSInit(Context);
SHSUpdate(Context, MasterKey, 16);
SHSUpdate(Context, SHSpad1, 40);
SHSUpdate(Context, s, 84);
SHSUpdate(Context, SHSpad2, 40);
SHSFinal(Context, Digest);
MoveMemory(SessionKey, Digest, SessionKeyLength);
}
3.5. Sample Key Derivations
The following sections illustrate 40-, 56- and 128-bit key
derivations. All intermediate values are in hexadecimal.
3.5.1. Sample 40-bit Key Derivation
Initial Values
UserName = "User"
= 55 73 65 72
Password = "clientPass"
= 63 00 6C 00 69 00 65 00 6E 00
74 00 50 00 61 00 73 00 73 00
AuthenticatorChallenge = 5B 5D 7C 7D 7B 3F 2F 3E 3C 2C
60 21 32 26 26 28
PeerChallenge = 21 40 23 24 25 5E 26 2A 28 29 5F 2B 3A 33 7C 7E
Challenge = D0 2E 43 86 BC E9 12 26
NT-Response =
82 30 9E CD 8D 70 8B 5E A0 8F AA 39 81 CD 83 54 42 33
11 4A 3D 85 D6 DF
Step 1: NtPasswordHash(Password, PasswordHash)
PasswordHash = 44 EB BA 8D 53 12 B8 D6 11 47 44 11 F5 69 89 AE
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RFC 3079 MPPE Key Derivation March 2001
Step 2: PasswordHashHash = MD4(PasswordHash)
PasswordHashHash = 41 C0 0C 58 4B D2 D9 1C 40 17 A2 A1 2F A5 9F 3F
Step 3: Derive the master key (GetMasterKey())
MasterKey = FD EC E3 71 7A 8C 83 8C B3 88 E5 27 AE 3C DD 31
Step 4: Derive the master send session key (GetAsymmetricStartKey())
SendStartKey40 = 8B 7C DC 14 9B 99 3A 1B
Step 5: Derive the initial send session key (GetNewKeyFromSHA())
SendSessionKey40 = D1 26 9E C4 9F A6 2E 3E
Sample Encrypted Message
rc4(SendSessionKey40, "test message") = 92 91 37 91 7E 58 03 D6
68 D7 58 98
3.5.2. Sample 56-bit Key Derivation
Initial Values
UserName = "User"
= 55 73 65 72
Password = "clientPass"
= 63 00 6C 00 69 00 65 00 6E 00 74 00 50
00 61 00 73 00 73 00
AuthenticatorChallenge = 5B 5D 7C 7D 7B 3F 2F 3E 3C 2C
60 21 32 26 26 28
PeerChallenge = 21 40 23 24 25 5E 26 2A 28 29 5F 2B 3A 33 7C 7E
Challenge = D0 2E 43 86 BC E9 12 26
NT-Response =
82 30 9E CD 8D 70 8B 5E A0 8F AA 39 81 CD 83 54 42 33
11 4A 3D 85 D6 DF
Step 1: NtPasswordHash(Password, PasswordHash)
PasswordHash = 44 EB BA 8D 53 12 B8 D6 11 47 44 11 F5 69 89 AE
Step 2: PasswordHashHash = MD4(PasswordHash)
PasswordHashHash = 41 C0 0C 58 4B D2 D9 1C 40 17 A2 A1 2F A5 9F 3F
Step 3: Derive the master key (GetMasterKey())
MasterKey = FD EC E3 71 7A 8C 83 8C B3 88 E5 27 AE 3C DD 31
Step 4: Derive the master send session key (GetAsymmetricStartKey())
SendStartKey56 = 8B 7C DC 14 9B 99 3A 1B
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RFC 3079 MPPE Key Derivation March 2001
Step 5: Derive the initial send session key (GetNewKeyFromSHA())
SendSessionKey56 = D1 5C 00 C4 9F A6 2E 3E
Sample Encrypted Message
rc4(SendSessionKey40, "test message") = 3F 10 68 33 FA 44 8D
A8 42 BC 57 58
3.5.3. Sample 128-bit Key Derivation
Initial Values
UserName = "User"
= 55 73 65 72
Password = "clientPass"
= 63 00 6C 00 69 00 65 00 6E 00
74 00 50 00 61 00 73 00 73 00
AuthenticatorChallenge = 5B 5D 7C 7D 7B 3F 2F 3E 3C 2C
60 21 32 26 26 28
PeerChallenge = 21 40 23 24 25 5E 26 2A 28 29 5F 2B 3A 33 7C 7E
Challenge = D0 2E 43 86 BC E9 12 26
NT-Response =
82 30 9E CD 8D 70 8B 5E A0 8F AA 39 81 CD 83 54 42 33
11 4A 3D 85 D6 DF
Step 1: NtPasswordHash(Password, PasswordHash)
PasswordHash = 44 EB BA 8D 53 12 B8 D6 11 47 44 11 F5 69 89 AE
Step 2: PasswordHashHash = MD4(PasswordHash)
PasswordHashHash = 41 C0 0C 58 4B D2 D9 1C 40 17 A2 A1 2F A5 9F 3F
Step 2: Derive the master key (GetMasterKey())
MasterKey = FD EC E3 71 7A 8C 83 8C B3 88 E5 27 AE 3C DD 31
Step 3: Derive the send master session key (GetAsymmetricStartKey())
SendStartKey128 = 8B 7C DC 14 9B 99 3A 1B A1 18 CB 15 3F 56 DC CB
Step 4: Derive the initial send session key (GetNewKeyFromSHA())
SendSessionKey128 = 40 5C B2 24 7A 79 56 E6 E2 11 00 7A E2 7B 22 D4
Sample Encrypted Message
rc4(SendSessionKey128, "test message") = 81 84 83 17 DF 68
84 62 72 FB 5A BE
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RFC 3079 MPPE Key Derivation March 2001
4. Deriving MPPE Session Keys from TLS Session Keys
The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [10] is a PPP extension
that provides support for additional authentication methods within
PPP. Transport Level Security (TLS) [11] provides for mutual
authentication, integrity-protected ciphersuite negotiation and key
exchange between two endpoints. EAP-TLS [12] is an EAP
authentication type which allows the use of TLS within the PPP
authentication framework. The following sections describe the
methods used to derive initial session keys from TLS session keys.
56-, 40- and 128-bit keys are derived using the same algorithm. The
only difference is in the length of the keys and their effective
strength: 56- and 40-bit keys are 8 octets in length, while 128-bit
keys are 16 octets long. Separate keys are derived for the send and
receive directions of the session.
4.1. Generating 40-bit Session Keys
When MPPE is used in conjunction with EAP-TLS authentication, the TLS
master secret is used as the master session key.
The algorithm used to derive asymmetrical master session keys from
the TLS master secret is described in [12]. The master session keys
are never used to encrypt or decrypt data; they are only used in the
derivation of transient session keys.
Implementation Note
If the asymmetrical master keys are less than 8 octets in length,
they MUST be padded on the left with zeroes before being used to
derive the initial transient session keys. Conversely, if the
asymmetrical master keys are more than 8 octets in length, they
must be truncated to 8 octets before being used to derive the
initial transient session keys.
The initial transient session keys are obtained by calling the
function GetNewKeyFromSHA() (described in [3]):
GetNewKeyFromSHA(MasterSendKey, MasterSendKey, 8, SendSessionKey)
GetNewKeyFromSHA(MasterReceiveKey, MasterReceiveKey, 8,
ReceiveSessionKey)
Next, the effective strength of both keys is reduced by setting the
first three octets to known constants:
SendSessionKey[0] = ReceiveSessionKey[0] = 0xD1
SendSessionKey[1] = ReceiveSessionKey[1] = 0x26
SendSessionKey[2] = ReceiveSessionKey[2] = 0x9E
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RFC 3079 MPPE Key Derivation March 2001
Finally, the RC4 tables are initialized using the new session keys:
rc4_key(SendRC4key, 8, SendSessionKey)
rc4_key(ReceiveRC4key, 8, ReceiveSessionKey)
4.2. Generating 56-bit Session Keys
When MPPE is used in conjunction with EAP-TLS authentication, the TLS
master secret is used as the master session key.
The algorithm used to derive asymmetrical master session keys from
the TLS master secret is described in [12]. The master session keys
are never used to encrypt or decrypt data; they are only used in the
derivation of transient session keys.
Implementation Note
If the asymmetrical master keys are less than 8 octets in length,
they MUST be padded on the left with zeroes before being used to
derive the initial transient session keys. Conversely, if the
asymmetrical master keys are more than 8 octets in length, they
must be truncated to 8 octets before being used to derive the
initial transient session keys.
The initial transient session keys are obtained by calling the
function GetNewKeyFromSHA() (described in [3]):
GetNewKeyFromSHA(MasterSendKey, MasterSendKey, 8, SendSessionKey)
GetNewKeyFromSHA(MasterReceiveKey, MasterReceiveKey, 8,
ReceiveSessionKey)
Next, the effective strength of both keys is reduced by setting the
initial octet to a known constant:
SendSessionKey[0] = ReceiveSessionKey[0] = 0xD1
Finally, the RC4 tables are initialized using the new session keys:
rc4_key(SendRC4key, 8, SendSessionKey)
rc4_key(ReceiveRC4key, 8, ReceiveSessionKey)
4.3. Generating 128-bit Session Keys
When MPPE is used in conjunction with EAP-TLS authentication, the TLS
master secret is used as the master session key.
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RFC 3079 MPPE Key Derivation March 2001
The algorithm used to derive asymmetrical master session keys from
the TLS master secret is described in [12]. Note that the send key
on one side is the receive key on the other.
The master session keys are never used to encrypt or decrypt data;
they are only used in the derivation of transient session keys.
Implementation Note
If the asymmetrical master keys are less than 16 octets in length,
they MUST be padded on the left with zeroes before being used to
derive the initial transient session keys. Conversely, if the
asymmetrical master keys are more than 16 octets in length, they
must be truncated to 16 octets before being used to derive the
initial transient session keys.
The initial transient session keys are obtained by calling the
function GetNewKeyFromSHA() (described in [3]):
GetNewKeyFromSHA(MasterSendKey, MasterSendKey, 16, SendSessionKey)
GetNewKeyFromSHA(MasterReceiveKey, MasterReceiveKey, 16,
ReceiveSessionKey)
Finally, the RC4 tables are initialized using the new session keys:
rc4_key(SendRC4key, 16, SendSessionKey)
rc4_key(ReceiveRC4key, 16, ReceiveSessionKey)
5. Security Considerations
5.1. MS-CHAP Credentials
Because of the way in which 40-bit keys are derived from MS-CHAP-1
credentials, the initial 40-bit session key will be identical in all
sessions established under the same peer credentials. For this
reason, and because RC4 with a 40-bit key length is believed to be a
relatively weak cipher, peers SHOULD NOT use 40-bit keys derived from
the LAN Manager password hash (as described above) if it can be
avoided.
Since the MPPE session keys are derived from user passwords (in the
MS- CHAP-1 and MS-CHAP-2 cases), care should be taken to ensure the
selection of strong passwords and passwords should be changed
frequently.
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RFC 3079 MPPE Key Derivation March 2001
5.2. EAP-TLS Credentials
The strength of the session keys is dependent upon the security of
the TLS protocol.
The EAP server may be on a separate machine from the PPP
authenticator; if this is the case, adequate care must be taken in
the transmission of the EAP-TLS master keys to the authenticator.
6. References
[1] Simpson, W., "The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP)", STD 51, RFC
1661, July 1994.
[2] Zorn, G. and S. Cobb, "Microsoft PPP CHAP Extensions", RFC 2433,
October 1998.
[3] Pall, G. and G. Zorn, "Microsoft Point-to-Point Encryption
(MPPE) RFC 3078, March 2001.
[4] RC4 is a proprietary encryption algorithm available under
license from RSA Data Security Inc. For licensing information,
contact:
RSA Data Security, Inc.
100 Marine Parkway
Redwood City, CA 94065-1031
[5] Pall, G., "Microsoft Point-to-Point Compression (MPPC)
Protocol", RFC 2118, March 1997.
[6] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[7] "Secure Hash Standard", Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication 180-1, National Institute of Standards and
Technology, April 1995.
[8] Zorn, G., "Microsoft PPP CHAP Extensions, Version 2", RFC 2759,
January 2000.
[9] Simpson, W., "PPP Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol
(CHAP)", RFC 1994, August 1996.
[10] Blunk, L. and J. Vollbrecht, "PPP Extensible Authentication
Protocol (EAP)", RFC 2284, March 1998.
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RFC 3079 MPPE Key Derivation March 2001
[11] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0", RFC
2246, January 1999.
[12] Aboba, B. and D. Simon, "PPP EAP TLS Authentication Protocol",
RFC 2716, October 1999.
7. Acknowledgements
Anthony Bell, Richard B. Ward, Terence Spies and Thomas Dimitri, all
of Microsoft Corporation, significantly contributed to the design and
development of MPPE.
Additional thanks to Robert Friend, Joe Davies, Jody Terrill, Archie
Cobbs, Mark Deuser, Vijay Baliga, Brad Robel-Forrest and Jeff Haag
for useful feedback.
The technical portions of this memo were completed while the author
was employed by Microsoft Corporation.
8. Author's Address
Questions about this memo can also be directed to:
Glen Zorn
cisco Systems
500 108th Avenue N.E.
Suite 500
Bellevue, Washington 98004
USA
Phone: +1 425 438 8218
FAX: +1 425 438 1848
EMail: gwz@cisco.com
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RFC 3079 MPPE Key Derivation March 2001
9. Full Copyright Statement
Copyright © The Internet Society (2001). All Rights Reserved.
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
English.
The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Acknowledgement
Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
Internet Society.
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Deriving Keys for use with Microsoft Point-to-Point Encryption (MPPE)
RFC TOTAL SIZE: 38905 bytes
PUBLICATION DATE: Thursday, March 29th, 2001
LEGAL RIGHTS: The IETF Trust (see BCP 78)
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